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The study sought to explore gender essentialism conceptually and empirically, and to 
specifically examine the concept of maternal essence as a framework for explaining 
gender difference. Gender, gender difference, gender essentialism, mothering and 
motherhood are individual fields of study however this thesis provides a sociological 
exploration of the intersections between these different fields. 
 
A selection was made of gender theorists: Simone de Beauvoir (1972), Shulamith 
Firestone (1970), Nancy Chodorow (1978, 1989, 1994) and Sara Ruddick (1989). I 
characterise these theorists as essentialist and analysed their contributions to explore 
their notions of gender difference. All four theorists commonly located gender 
difference in a maternal essence residing in individual women and their experiences. 
This essence was characterised as being biological, social or psychological.  
 
I came to the conclusion that women’s maternity was seen to be determined and 
reduced to biological essence (reproductive functions) or psychological essence 
(emotional drives and cognitive attributes) or social essence (mothering activity). All 
four theorists also read off micro social structural formations (family) from either 
individual biology or individual practice or individual psyche. In the writings of 
these theorists individuals are conceived of as discrete objects separated from the 
macro social structural context in which they exist. 
 
The study took the view that conceptions of gender can only be held to be true based 
on their power to represent social reality. To this end the study explored the extent to 
which the selected theorists’ notions of gender essentialism illuminate the social 
reality of individual men and women. Their essentialist conceptions of gender 





maternal realities of women in South Africa. The study used data from already 
existing studies and policy, legislation and programmes from South Africa which 
report on findings and reflect notions of gender differences which are located in 
mothering and defined in women’s reproduction, mothering capacity and maternal 
practice/thinking.  
 
The empirical and discursive evidence examined in this study showed that the four 
theorists’ essentialist characterisation of gender difference is useful as it draws our 
attention to the significance of maternity for women’s individual experiences and 
identity as well as for society in general.  However, the empirical and discursive 
evidence also revealed that external macro social structures, institutions and state 
discourse and practices influence the significance of maternity for women and 
society in general. The study therefore points to both the limits and the possibilities 
of essentialist notions, specifically maternal essence as an individual attribute, in 
explaining gender difference. This leads me to the view that there is a need for an 
approach that takes into account the complex, dialectical interaction between 
individual mothers and their social context to explain mothers’ experiences, 
behaviour, actions, capacities, attitudes, thinking, desires and activities.  
 
This study provides examples of how secondary empirical studies and policy 
discourse can be used to explore the usefulness of essentialist notions of gender 
difference.  It offers a way in which the power of essentialist accounts of gender 
difference can be tested conceptually and empirically. It also provides evidence 
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As an “essential” condition of being a man or a woman, can gender explain gender 
difference? Feminist theory has generated various conceptions of men and women in 
an endeavour to enable an understanding of their natures. Underlying these 
conceptions are certain ontological and epistemological assumptions about men and 
women. Holmstrom (1998:281) argues that the debate about women’s nature is both 
over the existence of certain cognitive, emotional and moral capacities as well as the 
source of these capacities and whether they can be changed. Gender essentialism 
refers to the claim that women and men have certain distinctive capacities and traits 
(Holmstrom 1998:281). 
 
Government policy, legislation and programmes are variously premised on 
underlying assumptions about gender difference, be they about differences in 
characteristics, attributes, personalities, capacities and behaviour. These invariably 
are linked to a perception of a maternal essence in women which allegedly resides in 
women’s biology, psychology or social practices. From these notions of gender 
difference various policy interventions have arisen which enable or constrain 
women’s participation in society to varying degrees. 
 
Gender, gender difference, gender essentialism and mothering and motherhood have 
been theorised in various disciplines including sociology, psychology, philosophy, 
feminist studies, literary studies and cultural studies among others. Each brings a 
different viewpoint to the problem that is captured in a vast body of literature which 
conceptualises and theorises gender, gender difference, gender essentialism and 
mothering. It is not the intention of this thesis to cover this vast landscape of 
literature and ideas; rather, the purpose here is to explore notions of gender 
essentialism as articulated by four theorists juxtaposed against the available, albeit 






1.1. Gender and gender differences 
 
When sociology emerged as a discipline, it was initially dominated by concerns 
about men. Feminist concerns were marginal to the discipline and gender was not 
seen as an important social organiser (Ritzer 1998:290).  
 
Theorists who did discuss women, portrayed them in a conventional and uncritical 
way. The classical ‘founding fathers’ of sociology (Auguste Comte 1974, Emile 
Durkheim 1964, and Talcott Parsons 1970) subscribed to biological conceptions of 
what it meant to be a man or woman. They assumed that gender differences were 
innate and that these differences manifested themselves in different intellectual, 
emotional and moral capacities (Chafetz 1999:4).  
 
From the late 19th Century, and even prior to this, feminists have contested these 
ideas, contending that not only are men and women differently located and have 
different experiences of society, but also that women are unequal to men in terms of 
resources and responsibilities and rights in society. Some held that the different 
location of men and women went even further to spawn an asymmetry of power 
between men and women, to the extent that men oppressed women. In the more 
contemporary world the sociology of gender has emerged as a sub disciplinary field 
engaging with the multiple aspects of what it means to be male and female and to 
live gendered lives in society.  
 
Alsop, Fitzsimons and Lennon (2002) suggest that there are three distinct approaches 
to theorising gender which include the naturalising approaches which are reliant on 
biology and psychology, the psychoanalytic approaches and social constructionist 
approaches. The last category is divided into those who prioritise material relations 
and also those who prioritise language and discourse in their explanations of gender 








Haraway (1991:131) argues that:  
“Despite important differences, all the modern feminist meanings of gender have 
their roots in Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that ‘one is not born a woman’ (de 
Beauvoir, 1952, p. 249) and in the post-Second World War social conditions that 
have enabled constructions of women as a collective historical subject-in-
process.” 
 
Haraway (1991:131) further points out that: 
“Gender is a concept developed to contest the naturalisation of sexual difference 
in multiple arenas of struggle.” 
 
Lastly Haraway (1991:131) concludes that: 
“Feminist theory and practice around gender seek to explain and change 
historical systems of sexual difference, whereby ‘men’ and ‘women’ are socially 
constituted and positioned in relations of hierarchy and antagonism.”  
 
Eisenstein (1980:xv) has  argued that the theme of “difference” has been a 
preoccupation of modern feminist thought triggered by de Beauvoir’s (1949) 
publication and the subsequent re-birth of the women’s movement in the late 1960s. 
Since then theorists have engaged gender difference in a variety of ways. Some deny 
its existence while others have sought to minimise the importance of gender 
difference, still others tried to eliminate gender difference. They have done this by 
arguing that either gender difference is socially constructed or biologically 
determined.  
 
There have also been theorists who have celebrated and valorised gender difference. 
They go so far as to argue that difference between men and women should be 
appropriated by all in society because women are seen to be better than men. They 
explain such differences as either biologically rooted in the psyche or socioculturally 
rooted in an individual’s social role (Jardine 1980:xxv-xxvi). What is important in 






withstanding, they all reduce difference to a ‘natural’ pregiven essence – biology and 
psyche. 
 
Ritzer (1998:294) argues that the central theme of the literature on gender difference 
is that it is women’s inner psychic life which is different to that of men in terms of 
their values and interests, their mode of making value judgements, and/or in the 
overall configuration of women’s relationships and social reality. Women differ from 
men in terms of their consciousness and life experience.  
 
Ontologically theories of gender and gender difference can largely be categorised as 
social constructionist and essentialist. Social constructionists explain phenomena as 
being created by and contingent on social factors such as language and culture. They 
seek to uncover the ways in which individuals or groups create their social reality. 
They seek to explain how people create and institutionalise social phenomena. By 
contrast essentialists view social phenomena as having inherent fixed essences which 
are independent of social or individual human. Thus language and culture are 
epiphenomenal and reflective of something that is held to be an essential quality or 
condition (Colebrook 2004:14-17). However, some have argued that social 
constructionism can itself become a form of essentialism (Sayer 1997). 
 
What becomes evident with these conceptualisations is that gender relations involve 
both notions of inequality and difference and the extent to which each is prioritised 
varies (Felski 1997 and Fraser 1997 cited in Walby 2009:254).  
 
1.2. Gender essentialism 
 
In order to understand gender essentialism it is necessary to first look at essentialism 
itself. Speake (1979) gives three separate philosophical positions on essentialism. 
The most important of these is: 
“a metaphysical view dating back to Aristotle, certain aspects of which are 






described – have essences; that is, they have, essentially or necessarily, certain 
properties, without which they could not exist or be the things they are… there is 
also a related essentialist view, presented originally by Locke, that objects must 
have a ‘real - though as yet unknown – ‘essence,’ which (causally) explains their 
more readily observable properties (or ‘nominal essence’)” (1979:112). 
 
Essentialism is the view that objects possess certain essential properties that 
distinguish one from another.  
 
Fuss (1989) argues: 
“Essentialism is classically defined as a belief in true essence - that which is 
most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or 
thing. This definition represents the traditional Aristotelian understanding of 
essence, the definition with the greatest amount of currency in the history of 
Western metaphysics” (Fuss 1989:2). 
 
For Fuss (1983:3) essentialist arguments take recourse in a stable and coherent, 
unchangeable, predictable ontology that stands outside the sphere of cultural 
influence and historical change. She argues that essentialist arguments are not 
necessarily a-historical, but frequently theorise history as an unbroken continuum 
that transports categories such as “man” and “woman” across cultures and through 
time. 
 
Fuss (1989:4) uses Locke’s (1690) distinctions between real and nominal essences to 
explain essentialism. Real essences are linked to the Aristotelian concept of essence 
(Aristotle 1925) namely that which is most irreducible and unchanging about a thing. 
Nominal essence, for Locke is merely a classificatory fiction, something that is used 
to categorise and to label in order to understand the difference between real and 
nominal essence. Locke (1690) argued that real essences are discovered by close 
empirical observation whereas nominal essences are not ‘discovered’ so much as 






distinction between the two types of essences corresponds to the broad oppositional 
categories of essentialism and constructionism.  
An essentialist assumes that innate or given essences sort objects naturally into 
species or kinds, whereas a constructionist assumes that it is language; the names 
arbitrarily affixed to objects, which establishes their existence in the mind. But Fuss 
suggests that despite this apparent difference, both share a common classification as 
essence. She argues further  that it has often been said that biological determinism 
and social determinism are two sides of the same coin – both posit an utterly passive 
subject subordinated to the shaping influence of either nature or culture, and both 
disregard the unsettling effects of the psyche (Fuss1989:6).  
 
In a similar vein Colebrook (2004:82) argues that implicit in essentialist thinking is a 
form of reductionism that seeks to answer the question of how essences are formed 
and the forms they take. For her, the debate in gender theory is reduced to a concern 
about just what counted as real. Are there really two sexes or is this perception just 
an effect of language and social construction? Are the differences of language and 
culture the only reality we have? These are ontological questions that underlie 
essentialist characterisations of gender difference. 
 
The explanatory uses of essences serve varying purposes:  
“One purpose is to identify the essence of an object in terms of properties which 
supposedly determine – or are indispensable for – what it can and cannot do; 
these are its ‘generative’ properties…The other purpose is to refer to those 
features of an object which enable us to distinguish it from other kinds of objects; 
these are its distinguishing or identifying properties” (Sayer 1997:458). 
 
Essentialist conceptions that are deployed in explanations of gender difference refer 
to a belief that the difference between women and men resides in an essence. Thus 
Schor argues that: 
“Essentialism in the specific context of feminism consists in the belief that woman 
has an essence, that woman can be specified by one or a number of inborn 






being and in the absence of which she ceases to be categorized as a woman. In 
less abstract, more practical terms an essentialist, in the context of feminism, is 
one who instead of carefully holding apart the poles of sex and gender maps the 
feminine onto femaleness, one for whom the body, the female body, that is , 
remains, in however complex and problematic a way, the rock of feminism” 
(Schor 1994:59-60). 
 
Essentialism is underpinned by a modernist epistemology that assumes a Cartesian 
subject, a subject that is defined by an essential core, a universal human essence, a 
rational and agentic subject and the source of all knowledge and actions (Hekman 
1999:18-19). Modernists explain the locus of gendered subjectivity as residing in the 
physical or internal attributes and capacities of individuals. Descartes’ (1968:54) 
famous dictum “I think, therefore I am” is based on things that can be known, the 
self as experienced by the self.  
 
Oakley (2000:76) argues that Descartes’ epistemological position of what constitutes 
knowledge embodies a ‘scientific revolution.’ It articulated a belief in the power of 
human reason and an appeal to experience of the world as the only valid basis of all 
knowledge (Oakley 2000: 80). It gave rise to the pursuit of knowledge which sought 
to discover the ‘laws’ of the social world, and which later led to the birth of social 
science (Oakley 2000: 80). It represented a deterministic reductionist view of human 
nature, where human beings and their experiences are construed as products of 
internal and external stimuli and it operated through dualism. 
 
Thus the body is segregated from the mind and is hierarchically ordered: 
“I thereby concluded that I was a substance of which the whole essence or nature 
consists in thinking … so that this ‘I’, that it is to say, the mind, by which I am 
what I am, is entirely distinct from the body” (Descartes 1968:54). 
 
Similarly this dualism is extended to gender difference. It created a conception in 
society of a cultural division of labour whereby masculine nature is linked to reason 






seen as different; with men associated with rationality which is also seen as the 
standard for all that is human, while women are associated with the body and 
emotions. Men are characterised as the agentic ‘One’ and women as the passive 
‘Other.’ Oakley (2000:87) argues that central to the Cartesian schema is the 
argument that human beings are made of two distinct substances – one thinking, the 
other ‘corporeal,’ where thought is independent of the body and the body is basically 
a machine. 
 
Like Colebrook (2004:82) and Fuss (1989), Sayer (1997:464) argues that essentialist 
explanations of human behaviour are characterised by reductionism and 
determinism. Reductionism entails explaining human behaviour by reading it off 
from just one of their characteristics (Sayer 1997:464), while determinist 
explanations make a claim that there are regular relationships between cause-event 
and effect-event (Sayer 1997: 470-471).  
 
Cartesian essentialist explanations of gender difference are countered by 
constructionism and postmodernism. As Velody and Williams (1998:13) maintain, 
constructionist and postmodernist explanations argue that there is no essence, no 
foundation, no overarching definition and no universal essence. Constructionist 
thinking is associated with cultural studies, deconstructionism and postmodernism. 
Social constructionism relates to sociology of knowledge approaches which 
distinguish the causal role of social factors from biological or natural factors 
(Shakespeare cited in Velody and Williams 1998:168). 
 
1.3. Types of gender essentialism 
 
Essentialist notions of gender difference that are used in feminist theory ultimately 
fall back on biological differences between men and women. Marshall (1994:104) 
identifies three types of essentialism within feminist theory: biological essentialism 
as in Firestone (1970), Daly (1978) and Rich (1977), philosophical essentialism as in 






(1978), Dinnerstein (1976) and Ortner (1974). She argues that common to all is the 
connection they make between the female body and reproduction of the species. This 
connection is made even though each type of essentialism rests on different sorts of 
arguments about how biological difference is transformed into subjective difference.  
 
Castell’s (1997:196-197) account of feminist essentialism adds other social 
dimensions to essentialist notions of difference between women and men. He points 
to the uniqueness of women’s experience rooted not only in biology but also in 
history. He also talks of the moral and cultural superiority of womanhood as a way of 
life. He cites the work of Luce Irigaray (1985) as an example of this superior 
conception of womanhood and of women reclaiming their identity from patriarchal 
order. 
 
Essentialist arguments are often associated with naturalist, biologist and universalist 
characterisations of human nature.  However, for essentialists the essence of an 
object does not necessarily have to be biological. Even though it is often 
counterposed to social constructionism, social constructionism can also be construed 
in essentialist notions of institutions and language. As Alsop et al (2002:65) argue, 
biological essentialist explanations assume that a binary division into men and 
women is requisite of biology and that these different biological features of men and 
women are explanations for their common psychological and behavioural features. 
However, they also argue that: 
“Essences do not have to be biological essences, however. Social essentialists 
would accept that all women,  for example, share characteristics as the 
consequence of adopting the same social role, being placed within  the same kind 
of social structures or being subject to the same symbolic order…”  (Alsop et al 
2002:65). 
 
They argue further that: 
“It is moreover, the case that many social constructionist accounts rely on a 
residual biological essentialism. Accounts of gender which focus on the ways in 






human species is unproblematically divided biologically into men and women”  
(Alsop et al 2002:65). 
So female ‘essence’ has historically been variously construed by a body of theorists 
as being either biologically, socially or symbolically given — where the unity of 
women can arise from biology, structural location or discursive construction. 
Biological essentialist arguments locate men and women’s essence in their biological 
features while arguments claiming social and symbolic essences explain this essence 
as arising out of the shared characteristics that derive from similar roles and social 
structures or from, or being subject to the same symbolic order (Alsop et al 2002). 
 
These varied locations of gender essences are also suggested by Grosz (1995) who 
argues that:  
“Women’s essence is assumed to be given and universal and is usually, though 
not necessarily, identified with women’s biology and “natural” characteristics. 
Essentialism usually entails biologism and naturalism, but there are cases in 
which women’s essence is seen to reside not in nature or biology but in certain 
given psychological characteristics – nurturance, empathy, support, non-
competitiveness, and the like. Or women’s essence may be attributed to certain 
activities and procedures (which may or may not be dictated by biology) 
observable in social practices – intuitiveness, emotional responses, concern and 
commitment to helping others, etc. Essentialism entails the belief that those 
characteristics defined as women’s essence are shared in common by all women 
at all times…” (Grosz 1995:47). 
 
The important contribution that Grosz (1995) makes to the characterisation of gender 
essences is that she adds social activities and practices as markers of gender essence.  
 
1.4. Sociological underpinnings for gender essentialism 
 
The approach of this study on gender essentialism is specifically sociological as it 






interpretive and material perspective. C. Wright Mills in The Sociological 
Imagination succinctly captures a key understanding of what the sociological 
perspective might be. To wit: 
“The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger 
historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career 
of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in 
the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social 
positions. Within that welter the framework of modern society is sought and 
within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are 
formulated” (Mills 1970:11). 
 
What this means in practice is that: 
“The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the 
relations between the two within society” (Mills 1970:12).  
 
According to Mills (1970:13), social analysts consistently ask three sorts of 
questions: 
1. What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? 
2. Where does this society stand in human history and what are the mechanics by 
which it is changing? 
3. What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? 
What kinds of ‘human nature’ are revealed in the conduct and character we observe 
in this society, in this period?  
 
The focus of this study is Mill’s third question – namely to explore gender differences 
and men and women’s nature in South African society at a particular ‘moment’ in 
time.  
 
Giddens (1979:59) argues that theories which primarily focus on the human 
agent/individual mainly conceive of the individual as a purposeful, 
reasoning/intentional actor who understands the conditions of his/her own actions. 






view of people as having agency, being active and wanting and doing things. So 
action or human behaviour is seen to reside in an individual’s personality, traits or 
emotions as well as their ability to think and reason. Phenomenology, existential 
phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and Max Weber’s (1949) social action 
theory are all inclined towards an interpretive epistemology in sociology. 
 
This interpretive approach can be further characterised as micro-interpretive, social 
psychological or a social-action perspective in sociology which focuses on the mind 
part of Cartesian duality to explain an individuals’ existence. In explaining human 
behaviour as psychologically informed actions, this perspective emphasises variables 
connected to individuals’ internal subjective states such as intentions, motivations, 
desires, emotions, consciousness, and understandings (Goldenberg 1997: 8).  
 
Social structural accounts of human behaviour look at the extent of 
institutional/external influences on men and women’s behaviour. These include race, 
class, sex, education, spatial location, rules and sanctions from social institutions and 
social relations. Although structural variables are external to the individuals, they 
shape and determine individual behaviour by setting the parameters of action and 
agency (Goldenberg 1997:8) and this influence could apply equally to micro 
sociological variables. They point to the local, contingent and variable characteristics 
of men and women’s behaviour.  
 
Within sociology, structuration theory seeks to synthesize the duality of structure and 
agency (Giddens 1976). Giddens argues that structure is not external to human action 
and solely identified with constraint but is both a medium and outcome of human 
activities, which it also organises (Giddens 1976:61). The structural properties of 
institutions and society as a whole are sustained and perpetuated by the individual 
actions of members of society. 
 
The dualism of structure and agency is also evident in essentialist theories of gender, 
where some theorists incline towards agency as determinant while others incline 






and structural perspectives. From a social action perspective the individual is where 
the action is and therefore policy should be addressed at the level of individuals. 
From a structuralist perspective, society, its systems and institutions as well as social 
structural scaffolding should be the focus. Sometimes both of these perspectives are 
incorporated in public policy.  
 
Ultimately conceptions of gender can only be held to be true based on their power to 
represent social reality. As we know social reality is not a stand- alone fact waiting to 
be found, but, rather, one that is filled with interpretation.  In looking for an essential 
core of women’s experience, gender theories try to locate it in characteristics that are 
held to represent gender difference. The question that must be asked is the extent to 
which the notions of   gender essentialism illuminate social reality in a way that is 
meaningful to women and men and the societies in which they live? 
 
1.5. The choice of the four theorists  
For this study I have selected four theorists whom I have identified as essentialist for 
a detailed conceptual analysis of gender essentialism using Grosz’s (1995) definition 
of gender essence. I have selected these theorists because they all commonly identify 
the centrality of maternity in women’s identities and gender difference and because 
of the prevailing primary association of women’s identity with that of maternity in 
South African policy, legislation and programmes.  
Feminist theorising on motherhood has ranged from either seeing motherhood as a 
limiting women’s agency and source of women’s oppression to conceptualising it as 
a experience that is a source of power and agency. Grosz (1995) sees women’s 
essence as residing in biology (reproductive capacities) or certain given 
psychological characteristics (maternal thinking and feelings) or social practices 
(mothering). Biological essence would be seen to reside in reproductive capacities, a 
social essence in the social practice of mothering activities or a psychological 







The first theorist examined in the thesis is Simone de Beauvoir who was a pre-
emininent French existentialist philosopher writing extensively on ethics, feminism, 
fiction and politics (Mussett 2003). She was born in 1908 and was the first child of a 
white middle class Catholic family in Paris who supported the development of her 
intellectual talents as she was growing up (Oakely 1986, Evans 1996). Her approach 
drew on a diverse range of philosophical ideas which included the works of 
Descartes, phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidgegger, the historical 
materialism of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels and the idealism of Immanuel Kant 
and G.W. F. Hegel (Mussett 2003). She studied philosophy and literature at the 
Sorbonne where she met Jean-Paul Sartre the famous existentialist philosopher 
(Okely 1986). Sartre played a most influential role in her intellectual, emotional and 
spiritual life (Evans 1996). They were both the founders of French existentialism and 
were also jointly involved in radical left wing politics in France at the time. De 
Beauvoir’s book the The Second Sex (1949) is regarded as her most influential 
contribution to philosophy. It marked a feminist revolution in her times and 
established her as a very influential feminist thinker (Mussett 2003). The book 
explored the implications of the historical dominant view of defining women as 
“other” and passive, and men as the ‘one’ and as active agents (Raymond 1991). The 
central claim of the The Second Sex – “one is not born a woman but becomes one” is 
seen as an application of Sartre’s ideas to interpersonal relationships (Raymond 
1991). In the book de Beauvoir argued that womanhood was a social construction. 
(Shneir 1994). The fundamental existential belief that each individual should be 
encouraged to define himself or herself and take individual responsibility for their 
existence is strongly asserted in the writings (Mussett 2003). Although the book was 
embraced by feminists and intellectuals in her time it was also attacked by both 
feminists and people against feminism. Feminists criticised de Beauvoir’s negative 
conceptions of the female body. However, The Second Sex remains an important text 
in the investigations of women’s oppression and liberation today (Mussett 2003). De 
Beauvoir embraced the feminist movement in the 1970s by participation in feminist 







The second theorist analysed in the thesis is Shulamith Firestone who was born in 
1945 to orthodox Jewish parents in Canada and studied fine art at the Art Institute in 
Chicago (Schneir 1994). She was one of the founders of the earliest women’s 
liberation collective in Chicago in the 1960s. After moving to New York after this 
she started the New York Radical Redstockings and the New York Radical Feminist 
groups (Schneir 1994). In 1970 she published The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for 
Feminist Revolution. Scott (2007) stated that it was one of the most influential of 
feminist writings standing alongside Betty Friedan’s The Feminist Mystique (1963), 
Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics (1970) and Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch 
(1970). Firestone (1970) dedicated her book to Simone de Beauvoir. In the book she 
argued that women’s subordination was fundamental to other forms of oppression 
(Benewick and Green 1998). Firestone (1970) stated that all other phenomena such 
as race and class could be explained in terms of the subordination of women. She 
claimed the basis of women’s subordination was ultimately biological (Benewick 
and Green 1998). Firestone (1970) also saw the family as the key institution of 
oppression of women and children (Schneir 1994). She integrated the ideas of 
Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis in her explanation of gender inequality 
(Scott 2007). Firestone’s ideas were never popular among grass-roots feminists at the 
time for various reasons which included  her perception that women’s biology was 
inferior to men’s, her negative views of childbirth and lactation and her confidence in 
the liberatory potential of technology (Benewick and Green 1998).  Contemporary 
feminist theorists have rejected her views as biological determinist, and essentialist, 
transcultural and transhistorical (Benewick and Green 1998). Despite these criticisms 
her work is historically significant as it sought to make women’s subordination 
visible. It is argued that she may have also been the first feminist in the 20th century 
to explore the significance of women’s distinctive roles in procreation (Benewick 
and Green 1998). 
 
The third theorist whose ideas are conceptually interrogated in the thesis is Nancy 
Chodorow who is a feminist sociologist and psychoanalyst. She was born in 1944 in 
New York City. She studied anthropology at Radcliff College and later received the 






2004:188). She also later trained as a psychoanalyst. She was professor in the 
departments of sociology and clinical psychology at the University of California, 
Berkeley, for many years (Chesler, Rothblum and Cole 1996:141). Through the 
publication of her first book The Reproduction of Mothering in 1979, she played a 
central role in constructing a feminist psychoanalytic. In this book she reinterprets 
Freud’s psychoanalytical theory of the self and identity and draws on object relations 
theory to explain how mothering is reproduced through the unconscious in females, 
generation after generation (Giles-Sims 1979: 437). Her analysis of gender draws on 
several theoretical streams which do not only include psychoanalysis but also 
Marxism and feminism (Marshall 1994:80). In her book Chodorow suggests that the 
root of gender difference between men and women lay in the process of socialisation 
experienced by children in their early childhood and infancy when gender roles and 
personal identity are developed (Schneir 1994:428-429). She has been criticised by 
several feminists for universalising both women’s experiences of motherhood and 
the family structure (Rich 1980, Flax 1981, Lorber et al 1981). However, others have 
argued that her distinctive contribution to the theorisation of gender is her use of 
Freudian theory to suggest that some aspects of gender difference is unconscious 
(Salerno 2004: 189). 
 
The last theorist analysed in the thesis is Sara Ruddick. She was born in 1935 and 
trained as a philosopher at Harvard University (O’Reilly 2010). Ruddick taught 
philosophy for many years at Eugene Lang College: The New School of Liberal 
Arts, until retiring in 1999 (O’Reilly 2010). She devoted almost a decade of her life 
to her philosophical analysis of mothering before writing the book Maternal 
Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace in 1989 (Bailey 1995:162). The book is her 
attempt to show the virtues of maternal work and the belief that it is the basis for a 
politics of peace (Snitow 1992:40). She engages with differences of sex and gender 
to make this argument. At the time of her writing the book, she was part of a group 
of feminist theorists (Carol Gilligan (1982), Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981) and Ann 
Ferguson (1989) )whose theoretical contributions were concerned with what women 
actually do, their understandings and their experiences (Snitow 1992:39). These 






experiences, specifically motherhood, from humanist accounts that devalued this 
experience to a gynocentric one. Their contributions validated the experiences of 
motherhood as something superior to those represented in the values of traditional 
male institutions (Young 1990, Eisenstein 1984). This shift in conceptualisation was 
also accompanied by methodological and epistemological shifts. Women as mothers 
were now studied from the standpoint of their own discourse rather than the 
perspective of “others” (Kaplan 1992:3). Within this view women were conceived of 
as active subjects who consciously constructed their identity and actions (Ritzer 
1998:312). Ruddick’s valorising of women’s experiences and actions and her 
celebration of their difference to men has been both theoretically and empirically 
criticised by some theorists such as Spelman (1988), Butler (1989), Bordo (1992) 
and Haraway (1991) who have all pointed out the limitations of explaining gender 
difference as a consequence of individual action located in the private sphere. They 
suggest that such an argument perpetuates oppressive gender stereotypes and 
excludes an analysis of the cultural, political and social constructions of gender 
difference. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
The chapters of the thesis are divided into three parts. Each part comprises of an 
exploration of a distinctive view of gender difference. Within each part there are two 
chapters; one conceptual and the other empirical and discursive. Chapters two, four 
and six conceptually and theoretically explore the distinct ideas of gender difference 
of Simone de Beauvoir, Shulamith Firestone, Nancy Chodorow and Sara Ruddick. 
 
Chapters three, five and seven explore the essentialist conceptions of gender 
difference of the four theorists empirically and/or discursively in order to see how 
robustly they are able to explain gender realities and discourse in South Africa. 
These realities have been variously described in other studies and also captured in 
policy documents developed to address gender difference and gender inequality. In 






chapters in addressing the research question on the conceptual power of maternal 







Part I - Gender as biological essence 
 
Biological conceptions of gender are often characterised as a form of essentialism; 
more specifically as biological essentialism. The gender theorists who have been 
identified in feminist literature employing this conception of gender are Shulamith 
Firestone (1970), Mary Daly (1978) and Adrienne Rich (1977) as noted in Marshall 
(1994:104). These theorists are considered to be biological essentialists because they 
reduce the source or cause of gender difference to the female body. They regard the 
female body as connected to reproduction of the species, to be the primary basis for 
women’s consciousness and behaviour (Marshall 1994:104). These feminists have 
variously conceptualised the female body as a focus of political action. In the late 
1960s and 1970s their ideas on gender were part of an era in feminist theorising 
popularly known as second wave feminism, when analysis of the private sphere 
became the focus of feminist theorising. It was characterised by the realisation that 
formal political equality which characterised the struggles of First Wave Feminism 
had not brought about social and cultural equality (Brooker 2002: 99-100). The 
slogan ‘the personal is the political’ was popularised by Second Wave feminists to 
emphasise the unacceptable distinctive spheres that men and women occupied. For 
men it was the public sphere but for women it was the private sphere (Brooker 2002: 
100). 
 
Essentialist explanations of gender difference have also often been associated with 
the terms; naturalism, universalism and biologism (Grosz 1989). Biologism, as a 
form of essentialism, ties women’s essence to their biological capacities which are 
specifically rooted in women’s childbearing capacity and links female biology to 
notions of motherhood (Grosz 1989). Analytic importance is given to women’s 
biology, where men and women are divided into different categories on the basis of 
their biological difference and biology. The body is seen to determine action 
(Connell 1991). Some of these gender theorists view female biology positively while 






to privilege women’s consciousness over men’s and in the latter to be the source of 
women’s oppression by men.  The concept of patriarchy is often used in biological 
conceptions of gender to explain gender oppression. Patriarchy is understood as a 
system of domination where men as a group dominate women as a group to the sole 
benefit of the former who are seen as appropriating women’s bodies and their 
sexuality (Walby 1990:3).  
 
Several criticisms have been levelled at biological and patriarchal conceptions of 
gender; the most pertinent being that this form of analysis tends towards 
essentialism, biological reductionism, and universalism (Walby 1990:3). Segal 
(1987) also criticised biological conceptions for being trans-historical. By simply 
analysing women’s oppression as the product of a single cause, namely, male 
domination over women’s bodies, the different structures and experiences of 
women’s oppression in different societies, historical periods and social classes are 
excluded (Barrett 1980:4).  
 
Andersen (1997) and Lowe (1982) also argue that by attributing differences between 
the sexes to biological origins theorists imply that nature determines social positions 
and identities, and indeed the whole social structure of society.  By contrast, while 
women’s role in biological reproduction and the bearing and nurturing of children is 
self evident. Oestergaard (1992:5) argues that it would be a false stereotype to 
presume from such biological capacity that women be confined to domestic roles in 
the household. Rather, to understand where women are in society requires an 
analysis of the social and historical roots of gender relations where the gender 
division of labour is regarded as part of wider social divisions of labour that are 
reinforced culturally, institutionally and ideologically. This view argues that men’s 
and women’s lives are shaped by the interrelationship between different forces in 
society. In this regard, Holmstrom (1998:286) has argued that whether men and 
women have distinct biological natures depends not only on their intrinsic properties 
but also on the importance accorded to these properties. This perspective resonates 
with Shilling’s (1993:20) contention that the body is treated differently in different 







This said, I have chosen to analyse Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1972) and 
Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex (1970) as examples of biological 
essentialist conceptions of gender difference and inequality and to explore the extent 
to which they resonate with women’s real lived conditions in a particular society.  
Firestone is cited in feminist writings as a radical feminist who uses the concept of 
patriarchy and women’s bodily differences to explain gender oppression. I propose to 
tease out and critically review Firestone’s assumptions and methods and then set 









Framing gender through the prism of biology: the theory 
 
 
2.1. Simone de Beauvoir 
 
To understand Shulamith Firestone it is necessary to begin with Simone de 
Beauvoir’s groundbreaking book The Second Sex (1972) since it was the template for 
much of the feminist theory that followed. In the opening pages of her book she 
poses two questions: “what is a woman?” and “how does one become one?”. De 
Beauvoir located gender difference and gender inequality as arising from maternal 
experience, a maternal essence which she argued had to be erased in order for 
women to become truly ‘human’ and equal to men. De Beauvoir also saw the 
specificities of the female body (menstruation, pregnancy and maternity, lactation, 
and so on) as limiting women’s access to the rights and privileges which are 
accorded to men in patriarchal society. Several analyses of de Beauvoir’s 
conceptions of gender have been undertaken for example, Mackenzie (1986), Butler 
(1990), Moi (1994), Heinamaa (1996), Hekman (1999), Bergoffen (2000), Kruks 
(2001) and Arnfred (2002). Some of these analyses are used in this thesis. 
 
Her book was written in a specific historical context in which European middle-class 
women were largely dependent on husbands and/or fathers for economic support 
because of (as she describes it) women’s enslavement to their procreative capacities. 
During this period modernity bore the promise of waged work and contraception for 
women, a promise that conceptually was to be translated into an idea of 
emancipation; women asserting their control over procreation and gaining economic 
independence (Arnfred 2002:4). There is a long history of struggle for access to 








In Book One of The Second Sex, de Beauvoir synthesises gender explanations from a 
biological determinist, psychoanalytical and historical materialist perspective. She 
thereby creates a cultural framework to account for society’s conception of women 
as ‘Other.’ Men are conceived of as ‘the One’ positively construed in relation to the 
‘Other’ and men are also conceived of as a neutral standard which defines what it is 
to be human. The ‘Other’ is conceptualised by lack and negativity. In Book Two she 
describes woman’s subjective experiences in order to fully comprehend the world in 
which women are confined. She does this in order not to produce eternal truths, but 
rather “to describe the common basis that underlies every individual feminine 
existence” (1972:31).  
 
She argues that in order for gender difference to be overcome and gender equality to 
be achieved between men and women, the primary difference between men and 
women — maternity (biologically conceived) needs to be erased to allow women’s 
status of ‘Other’ to be overcome. Although she uses the contributions of 
psychoanalysis and historical materialism, by her own account she draws primarily 
on an existentialist perspective as elaborated especially by Jean Paul Sartre (1956). 
Existentialism is a philosophical attitude that argues that ‘being’ is revealed to 
individuals in their subjective reflections of their own unique concrete existence in 
specific historical and social contexts (Flew 1979:115). Further, existentialism 
subscribes to the belief that individuals are self aware and understand their own 
existence in terms of their individual experiences of situations (Flew 1979:115). For 
Sartre people are free; they are responsible for everything they do; their fate is in 
their own hands. Even though Sartre acknowledged the significance of social 
structures in people’s lives, he emphasised the human ability to transcend these and 
to make choices freely (Ritzer 1998:361). For existentialists the focus is on the actor 
and his thoughts and actions within social settings. ‘Being’ takes precedence over 
knowledge and ‘being’ cannot be objectively investigated, but is rather revealed to 
the individual through reflecting on his existence:  
“Existence is basic: it is the fact of the individual’s presence and participation in 
a changing and potentially dangerous world. Each self-aware individual 






situation. The self of which he is aware is a thinking being which has beliefs, 
hopes, fears, desires, the need to find a purpose, and a will that can determine his 
actions. The problem of existence can have no significance if viewed impartially 
or in abstraction; it can only be seen in terms of the impact that experiences 
make on a particular existent. No individual has a predetermined place or 
function within a rational system and no one can deduce his supposed duty 
through reasoning; everyone is compelled to assume responsibility of making 
choices” (Speake 1979:115-116). 
 
This approach is in sharp contrast to rationalist and empiricist doctrines which view 
the universe as an ordered system governed by natural laws that can be explained 
through the power of reason or through observation (Speake 1979:115).  
 
De Beauvoir’s analysis of gender difference more specifically employs an existential 
phenomenological approach. Phenomenology also starts with the direct lived 
experience of humans where behaviour is seen as determined by the phenomena of 
experience rather than by external objective and physically described reality (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison 2000:23). The main features of phenomenology are that it 
gives primacy to subjective consciousness and understands consciousness as active 
and meaning bestowing (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2000:23). Phenomenology is 
a variant of a subjectivist/interpretive sociology.  
 
In examining the question “what is woman?” de Beauvoir employs the concepts of  
One and Other. She argues that these are the basic categories of human thought. She 
asserts that “The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself” (De 
Beauvoir 1972:16). She argues that in the most primitive societies and ancient 
mythologies one finds the expression of duality (De Beauvoir 1972:16). However, 
she continues by explaining that this duality was not in the first instance attached to 
the division of the sexes and was not dependent on any empirical facts but rather 






“Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought. Thus it is that no group 
even sets itself up as the One without at once setting the Other over against 
itself” (p:17).  
 
She clarifies these conceptions by using Hegel’s explanation which she argues 
asserts that:  
“ we find in consciousness itself there is a fundamental hostility towards every 
other consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed – he sets 
himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object” 
(p:17).  
 
This interpretation of subjectivity proposes that the experience of selfhood would not 
be possible without this oppositional duality.  In this way De Beauvoir explains that 
individuals engage in a process of defining who they are (the self) and what it is to be 
in relation to another (object).  
 
In the rest of her book De Beauvoir (1972) proceeds to illustrate how history and 
humanity have conceived of the human female – the Other - (how woman becomes) 
and how these conceptions negatively view women’s biology. For the ancients, she 
states that a typical view was that “Woman has ovaries, a uterus: these peculiarities 
imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own 
nature” (p.16). She cites Aristotle (1925) as having said that ‘The female is a female 
by virtue of a certain lack of qualities, we should regard the female nature as 
afflicted with a natural defectiveness’ (p.16-17).  
 
From this basic dualism she generalises the place of men and women in society. She 
argues that culturally men are defined as ‘One’ (subject), being positive and active in 
relation to the negative passive ‘Other’ (object), being women (ibid:15). But men are 
also represented in society as the neutral standard that defines humanness in general 
in terms of rationality, freedom and autonomy. Those qualities typify all that is 
supposed to be human. Thus, there is a difference between the ‘One’s’ self whose 






subjectivity is located in the body. Women are always conceived of as ‘Other’ to 
men who represent the norm of rationality, freedom and autonomy – all that is 
supposed to be human.  
 
De Beauvoir’s conceptualisation of gender difference emerged within the social and 
cultural context of a dominant dualist/Cartesian modernist epistemology (Hekman 
1999: 18-20). Her ideas were part of the Enlightenment thinkers’ view of human 
subjects being essentially autonomous and rational (Ashe in Ashe, Finlayson, Lloyd, 
MacKenzie, Martin and O’Neill 1999:108).This kind of thinking viewed terms such 
as man/women, mind/body, reason/emotion and culture/nature in opposition, 
contradictory and hierarchical in relation to each other (Lloyd in Ashe et al 
1999:112).  
 
De Beauvoir argues that this dualism extends to society’s association of women with 
the body and nature, and men with the mind. Under these conditions, the body is 
responsible for women being unable to attain active self formation: 
“The enslavement of the female to the species and the limitations of her various 
powers are extremely important facts; the body of woman is one of the essential 
elements in her situation in the world” (1972:69).  
 
Although she also argues that: 
“the body is not enough to define her as women; there is no true living reality 
except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities and in the 
bosom of society” (1972:69). 
 
De Beauvoir also argues that women are complicit in the maintenance of their status 
of ‘Other’: 
“If woman seems to be the inessential which never becomes the essential, it is 
because she herself fails to bring about this change…They have gained what men 
have been willing to grant; they have taken nothing, they have only received. The 
reason for this is that women lack concrete means of organising themselves into a 






among males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and 
social standing to certain men – father or husbands – more firmly than they are 
to other women…The division of the bond that unites her to her oppressors is not 
comparable to any other. The division of the sexes is a biological fact, not an 
event in human history. Male and female stand opposed within a primordial 
Mitsein1 and woman has not broken it” (De Beauvoir 1972:19-20).  
 
The reason she gives for their complicity is that women derive advantages from their 
status: 
“To decline to be the Other, to refuse to be party to the deal- this would be for 
women to renounce all the advantages conferred upon them by their alliance with 
the superior caste” (p.21). 
 
The essence of what makes a woman ‘woman’ is her bodily existence; she 
experiences her body as ‘other,’ negative and ‘lacking’ because of historical, cultural 
conceptions of her reproductive biological functions in relation to that of ‘man.’ De 
Beauvoir thus introduces the notion of a relational and social definition of gender 
difference; a woman is defined by society and she experiences herself in relation to 
men who are deemed to be the norm of what is rational and human. The physical 
reality of the female body (reproductive capacities) and its material functions are the 
source of the definition of what it is to be a woman/other. Gender difference 
conceptualised by De Beauvoir (1972) sees women’s bodies as negative. 
 
Not only does she engage with how society interprets women’s bodies but she also 
describes how women themselves experience their bodies as limiting, circumscribing 
and imprisoning. In the chapter The Data of Biology she contends that women are 










“Crises of puberty and menopause, monthly ‘curse,’ long and often difficult 
pregnancy, painful and sometimes dangerous childbirth, illnesses, unexpected 
symptoms and complications – these are characteristics of the human female” 
(De Beauvoir 1972: 64). 
 
For her, the consequence of these biological functions on women are multiple. To wit 
menstruation causes “alienation”, “psychic disturbances”, high blood pressure, 
impaired hearing and eyesight, abdominal pains, constipation and diarrhoea (De 
Beauvoir 1972:61). Pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding further undermine 
women’s health as they are viewed as “painful and dangerous” and “endows the 
feminine body with a disturbing frailty” and “Nursing is also an exhausting 
obligation… The nursing mother feeds the newborn at the expense of her own 
strength” (De Beauvoir 1972: 62-63). Thus there are physical consequences of 
biology (pain, loss of iron, calcium, lower blood pressure) as well as psychological 
effects (alienation, emotionalism).  
 
Women are condemned by their bodies and she in turn condemns the female body 
and its functions as an obstacle towards self actualisation.  Serially pregnant, she 
claims, women are like: 
“fertile organisms, like fowl with high egg-production. And they seek eagerly to 
sacrifice their liberty of action to the function of the flesh: it seems to them that 
their existence is tranquillity justified in the passive fecundity of their bodies” 
(De Beauvoir 1972:513).  
 
De Beauvoir’s famous statement; “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” 
alludes to and is often used in social constructionist explanations of gender, where 
gender is argued as being socially determined. Although often identified by this 
statement her negative conception of the female body in relation to maternity and as 
a source of gender difference and her solution for the erasure of this difference all 
suggest an insurmountable biological determinism. This contradiction has been noted 
by for example, Firestone (1970:7) and Marshall (1994) and Arnfred (2002:6-7).  It 






her analysis, that she sees women becoming women through their subjective 
consciousness giving this meaning as a reflection of the lived experiences of their 
bodies within historical and cultural contexts. 
 
Marshall (1994:107) also suggests that de Beauvoir makes the claim of an essential 
gendered subjectivity and that this consciousness privileges the ‘One’ over the 
‘Other.’ She holds that de Beauvoir’s analysis is underpinned by a conception of 
gender difference that arises from a primordial consciousness explained as a basic 
category of human thought that is organised by a priori categories of ‘One’ and 
‘Other.’ This contention, I would argue overstates the problem, since de Beauvoir in 
her book does include an account of the biological as well as historical circumstances 
that have pushed the class ‘women’ into the category of ‘Otherness.’  
 
De Beauvoir’s theoretical approach to women’s bodies has been described as 
conceiving it as that of a ‘lived body’ where the physical body acts and experiences 
itself within a specific socio-cultural context or situation (Kruks 2001). This 
conception of the body is underpinned by the framework of existential 
phenomenology in which the physical body acts and is experienced within a specific 
socio-cultural context (Young 2002:415). She interrogates the functioning of 
women’s bodies in order to explore women’s existence and individual experiences of 
their bodies as well. De Beauvoir’s argument is that women’s experiences of their 
bodies are negative and a burden and they are experienced as man’s ‘Other.’ These 
experiences are a reflection of responses from family and society.  
 
Marshall (1994:106) argues that de Beauvoir’s analysis of women is characterised by 
a philosophical essentialism rooted in women’s bodily existence. Marshal argues that 
de Beauvoir uses the Hegelian notion of transcendence to explain how women are 
bound by their reproductive capacities which traps their consciousness and prevents 
them from transcending their bodies and achieving full autonomy (Marshall 1994: 
106).  Man is seen as the subject, the model body that has transcended nature and is 
fully human. But the female body is never seen as a source of pleasure or pride only 






(Arnfred 2002:6). These conceptions led de Beauvoir to ultimately reject the female 
body and call for women to transcend it as it was seen as an obstacle to the 
development of women’s full human faculties. For her, this is to be fully rational and 
able to take a place in the public and intellectual world. De Beauvoir call for 
transcendence implies that women can by individual choice, take control of their 
maternity and transcend their body. 
 
What de Beauvoir defines as ‘real’, what could be known, the essence as defined in 
the Lockean tradition (1975), is a woman’s body, the object which generates 
perception and produces social relations. Thus de Beauvoir locates in women’s 
bodies an essential gendered subjectivity which needs to be transcended. This 
interpretation is supported by Marshall (1994:106) who describes de Beauvoir’s 
theory as feminist essentialism. This is a type of philosophical essentialism in turn 
ultimately takes the form of biological essentialism because she situates the female 
body and its connection to the reproduction of the species at the foundation of gender 
difference. In de Beauvoir’s explanation, women ‘become’ women and experience 
themselves as women in relation to society’s and men’s definition of them as ‘Other’ 
- a definition which is rooted in their bodily existence. Her analysis introduces an 
important relational and cultural aspect to the concept of gender, by arguing that the 
creation of subjectivity arises out of relations with others within a cultural context. 
Women’s consciousness is entrapped by their reproductive capacities; their sense of 
self becomes located in their negatively conceived ‘Other’ status. 
 
For de Beauvoir, men are conceived of as the subject, the model body that has 
transcended nature and who are fully human (Arnfred 2002:10). By contrast, for her 
the female body is never seen as a source of pleasure or pride merely a handicap that 
can be overcome only by minimising its difference to men’s (Arnfred 2002:6). The 
materiality of the body is the source for ascribing to women the Hegelian concept of 
‘Other’ (a fundamental category of human thought). In this way she brings both 
idealist and materialist conceptions to her explanation of gender difference. The logic 






women to transcend their bodies in order to be fully rational and take their place in 
the public and intellectual world like men. 
 
This position leads her to propose solutions for gender equality, where she calls on 
women to make individual choices to voluntarily control their maternity and if 
maternity is a choice made by women then she argues that institutional change needs 
to take place whereby women do not bear the  sole responsibility for children. 
 
To this end she begins the section on “The Mother” with a long discussion on 
abortion and concludes that “contraception and legal abortion (which) would permit 
woman to undertake her maternities in freedom” (de Beauvior 1972:510). In this 
way the role of motherhood would be freely chosen as women’s reproductive bodily 
functions would be brought under voluntary control. She also calls for children to be 
“largely taken in charge by the community” (p.540) so that women as mothers 
would be free to pursue a career. Such actions are necessary for women to transcend 
their bodies (reproductive capacities) and achieve freedom, autonomy and full human 
rational consciousness. 
 
Thus de Beauvoir concludes that women’s liberation can only be possible if women 
seek to transcend the limits of their maternal essence as located in their biology to 
become full social beings equal to men. However, in the concluding chapter of her 
book what de Beauvoir presents is also an existentialist strand to her solution that 
takes a very different direction, indeed it has nothing to do with overcoming the 
physical limits of female reproduction: 
“The quarrel [between men and women] will go on as long as men and 
women fail to recognize each other as equals; that is to say, as long as 
femininity is perpetuated as such” (p.727-728). 
 
And further that men and women must both recognise each other as subjects then  







“when we abolish the slavery of half of humanity, then the ‘division’ of 
humanity will reveal its genuine significance and the human couple will find 
its true form ….To gain the supreme victory, it is necessary for one thing, 
that by and through their natural differentiation men and women 
unequivocally affirm their full subjectivity” (p.741). 
 
De Beauvoir’s solution to gender difference and the inequality between men and 
women lies in overcoming the physiological limitations of the female body and the 
social roles that stem from these through external social solutions. She however, also 
argues for women to transcend their bodies (in the Hegelian notion of transcendence) 
and thereby experience their full humanity by making choices and living 
authentically through reflection on their circumstances and experiences (Marshall 
1994). This transcendence requires that women individually and through their own 
autonomous agency abandon their status of ‘Other’ and through their own 
subjectivity assume the status of ‘One’ in relation to the ‘Other’ status which men 
should assume. Both men and women should alternate the status of ‘One’ and 
‘Other’ for both men and women to attain full subjectivity and recognise each other 
as equal. 
 
There are several problems with both the assumptions and the logic of de Beauvoir’s 
analysis that require reflection. De Beauvoir’s (1972) theorising of gender difference 
in The Second Sex displays an ambiguity between the biological and social 
determinations of gender. While she describes at length how society and history have 
negatively conceived of womanhood she also provides a detailed account of how the 
female body and its capacities are a handicap. For the later analysis she draws on an 
existentialist phenomenological approach to explain the embodied existence and 
lived experience of women.   
 
Some critiques argue that de Beauvoir conceives of males as the category ‘One’ who 
is the subject, the universal, human, superior and the norm while female is conceived 
of as the ‘Other’ who is inferior, biologically handicapped and lacking. De Beauvoir 






mutually recognise each other as subjects where men and women reciprocate 
One/Other statuses. Hekman (1999:4-5) questions whether this alternation would 
work by pointing  out that there would be little incentive for men to assume the status 
of ‘Other’ as de Beauvoir paints only a negative picture of ‘Otherness.’ Hekman adds 
that women would have to deny her feminine qualities and embrace masculine 
qualities. Hekman (1999:4-5) argues that the difficulties with realising these 
solutions are related to the notion that de Beauvoir’s category of ‘One’ is inherently 
masculine and the ‘Other’ is inherently feminine. She also proposes that only by 
erasing reproductive maternal differences will men and women be equal. Hekman 
(1999:11) argues that this solution to gender inequality leads to a contradiction in de 
Beauvoirs subjectivity argument and points out that if there were no longer 
difference then how would subjectivity be defined.  
 
De Beauvoir also proposes that the act of transcending women’s biological limitation 
requires the application of technology for example contraception and social 
reorganisation such as collective child care as well as an individual existentialist act 
of transcendence. Her recourse to technology to regulate and control reproduction to 
eliminate the effects of women’s biology is also questionable. Technology, itself, is a 
product of, and mediates, social relations affecting individual choice and agency. 
Having argued that cultural processes are responsible for the negative 
conceptualisation of women, what she proposes, calling on women to individually 
transcend their bodies as an act of will, is an acultural individual subjective solution.   
 
Within this existential logic, women, as individuals, have the agency to transcend 
their bodies and to freely make choices as individuals because it is as individuals that 
they experience themselves and their situation. This view presupposes an 
autonomous acting subject which was the dominant conception of humans during 
modernity. This position implies that the limits of a generalised ‘incapacitated’ 
physiology or indeed of structural relations like class, colour or power have no 







She also fails to problematise the relationship between men’s bodies and their 
bodies’ relation to their social capacity. On what grounds does she claim that men 
alone are conceived of as positive, the ‘One’ and the norm for society in general? Do 
men’s bodies ipso facto make men active, fully human subjects at all times in all 
societies?  And if the logic of her argument were to be realised, and maternity and 
the female body overcome, what about male subjectivity? Would men want to 
become the ‘Other’? De Beauvoir’s analysis of gender is informed by the modernist 
tradition of her times where the dominant pattern of Western thought was a dualist 
epistemology which was both gendered and hierarchical (Hekman 1999:6). Several 
feminist writers criticise her modernist Western conception of women as ‘Other’ as 
devalued (Mohanty 1984/1987, Amadiume 1987/1997, Sudarskasa 1987, Oweyumi 
1997/2000 and Butler 1990/1991). African feminists like Oweyumi (1997/2000) and 
Amaiume (1987/1997) have characterised her conceptions of women as ethnocentric 
and phallocentric. 
 
Using the base of this understanding of de Beauvoir’s intellectual claims and their 
limitations it is now possible to turn to Shulamith Firestone, who argued that de 
Beauvoir’s work represented the first attempt to ground feminism in its historical 
base (Firestone 1970:7). However, Firestone claimed that the weakness of de 
Beauvoir’s analysis lay in her existentialist interpretation of feminism which 
Firestone argues is a cultural interpretation which like all cultural systems, are 
determined by sex dualism. She explains that de Beauvoir bases her explanation on 
difference by using the Hegelian concept of ‘Otherness’ yet documents at length the 
historical and biological conditions that have pushed women into this category. 
Firestone (1970:8) therefore posits that the dualism; a priori categories of 
‘Otherness’ and ‘One’ sprang from sex itself. She proceeded to take de Beauvoir’s 
essentialising contention that women were defined by their biological capacity to 
bear and raise children to radical conclusions. 
 







Shulamith Firestone (1970) sets out her understanding of gender inequality in The 
Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. For her, sexual difference is 
embodied in the role of women in childbearing, specifically in maternity, which she 
considers to be at the root of female oppression in a system of sex-class.  
 
Firestone argues that the weakness of de Beauvoir’s analysis of gender was that her 
primary frame of analysis was existentialism which explained concrete historical 
developments using a priori categories of thought (Firestone 1970:6).  She points out 
that within this framework of analysis de Beauvoir chooses to employ the Hegelian 
concept of ‘Otherness’ to explain gender difference (Firestone 1970:6). However, 
Firestone argues that de Beauvoir’s existentialism and in fact all cultural systems are 
themselves determined by the sex dualism (Firestone 1970:7). In light of this 
observation Firestone uses an historical materialist analytic approach to explain 
gender difference. She explains that this approach was developed by Karl Marx 
(1967) and Frederich Engels (1932) to explain class antagonisms in capitalist society. 
Historical materialism links the development of economic classes to organic 
historical conditions and thereby provides a material base for causation (Firestone 
1970:3-4). In other words, economic classes arise out of material conditions in 
particular historical contexts that create the conditions for action and therefore 
change. The ultimate aim of Marx and Engel’s approaches was to provide an 
understanding of the world that allows it to be transformed. Firestone explains that 
Marx’s historical materialism attempted to explain ‘knowing’ by ‘being’ as opposed 
to the existentialist view which explains ‘being’ by ‘knowing’ (Firestone 1970:6).  
 
Firestone uses these ideas from historical materialism to provide the framework and 
tools to uncover the historical and material bases for gender difference and 
oppression. However, she departs from historical materialism by locating the basis of 
social organisation in sexual differences between men and women rather than in 
class differences.  For her, the relations of biological reproduction rather than 
economic production are the constitutive base of society. She argues that biology 






“Unlike economic class, sex class sprang directly from a biological reality: men 
and women were created different, and not equally privileged”.  
 
Firestone argues that in order to understand inequality in society it is necessary to 
include what she calls the biological division of the sexes for the purposes of sex 
class reproduction. Paraphrasing Engels’ (1932) definition of historical materialism 
in Socialism: Utopian or Scientific she presents “a materialist view of history based 
on sex itself” (p.5): 
“Historical materialism is that view of the course of history which seeks the 
ultimate cause of the great moving power of all historic events in the dialectic of 
sex: the division of society into two distinct biological classes for procreative 
reproduction, and the struggles of these classes with one another; in the changes 
in the modes of marriage, reproduction and childcare; in the related development 
of other physically-differentiated classes[castes]; and in the first division of labor 
based on sex which developed into the [economic]class system (p.13). 
 
Thus, the materialism of her analysis is her identification of sex differences as the 
material, real objective basis (cause) for gender oppression. The historical aspect of 
her analysis is her claim that the sexual division of labour is the single ultimate 
driving force which accounts for all other divisions and developments in society.  
 
For Firestone the essence of men and women and gender difference lies in their 
functional reproductive capacities: 
“The heart of women’s oppression is her childbearing and childrearing roles. 
And in turn children are defined in relation to this role and are psychologically 
formed by it; what they become as adults and the sorts of relationships they are 
able to form determines the society they will ultimately build” (p. 81). 
 
She goes further to contend that “Pregnancy is barbaric”, temporarily deforming the 
body of the individual (women) for the sake of the species and that women do 







Firestone’s argument is that both the source of difference between men and women 
and the source of women’s oppression is women’s biological capacity to reproduce, a 
natural physiological difference. Women’s essence is thus located in their 
reproductive and childrearing capacity, which defines them. It is this sex based 
biological difference which gives rise to an unequal division of labour in society that 
in turn leads to the dominance of men over women (patriarchy). In other words, this 
is the base that determines the superstructure in society.  
 
Following the logic of this argument, Firestone contends that the “sexual imbalance 
of power is biologically based” and that the basic reproductive unit of 
male/female/infant has dictated a form of social organisation called the biological 
family. She identifies key characteristics that she believes are fundamental to this 
unit even across varying forms of social organisation:  
• That women throughout history, before the advent of birth control were at 
the continual mercy of their biology — menstruation, menopause, and 
“female ills”, painful childbirth, wetnursing and care of infants, all of 
which made them dependent on males (whether brother, father, husband, 
lover, or clan, government, community-at-large) for physical survival. 
• That human infants take an even longer time to grow up than animals, 
thus are helpless and for a short period at least, dependent on adults for 
physical survival.  
• That the basic mother/child interdependency has existed in some form in 
every society, past or present, and thus shaped the psychology of every 
mature female and every infant.  
• That the natural reproductive difference between the sexes led directly to 
the first division of labour based on sex, which is at the origin of all 
further division into economic and cultural classes and is possibly even at 
the root of all caste (discrimination based on sex and other biologically 







Firestone holds that these imputed biological features of the family have necessitated 
certain social relationships for the survival of women and children, where women 
depend on men and infants on adults, primarily women for their physical survival. 
Although she recognises that social institutions interact with biological factors to 
reinforce male dominance, the ultimate source of difference is women’s biology. 
 
The consequence of women’s biological essence is to be found in their behaviour and 
role in society. Arguing that childbirth and childrearing are seen to be physically 
constraining of women’s full and equal participation in the family and society, 
Firestone writes: 
“Nature produced the fundamental inequality – half the human race must bear 
and rear the children of all of them – which was later consolidated, 
institutionalised, in the interests of men. Reproduction of the species cost women 
dearly, not only emotionally, psychologically, culturally but even in strictly 
material (physical) terms: before recent methods of contraception, continuous 
childbirth led to constant “female trouble”, early aging and death. Women were 
the slave class that maintained the species in order to free the other half for the 
business of the world – admittedly often its drudge aspects, but certainly all its 
creative aspects as well” (p.232). 
 
In this way not only are women biologically distinguished from men but they are 
also culturally distinguished from what it is to be ‘human’. In turn, this natural 
division of labour leads to the production of two different psyches — in men 
rationalism and aggression and in women to emotionalism and passivity (p.233). 
 
The biological family is therefore seen by Firestone as enforcing power, repression, 
privilege and sexual repression to the detriment of women’s physical and 
psychological well-being. She attributes the persistence of this institution to biology, 
in that women are physically weaker than men as a result of their reproductive 
physiology and infants are physically helpless relative to adults. It is these biological 








While Firestone locates the basis of women’s subordination in the facts of human 
reproductive biology, she believes that biological imperatives are used by social 
institutions to reinforce male domination. Physiological differences, in themselves, 
do not directly determine masculine and feminine personalities; rather they are 
determined by social power.  This said, she argues that social institutions like the 
family ultimately derive their power from the material conditions of men and 
women’s biological structure. The characteristics of men and women are generated 
by the patriarchal family which rests on the pre-given biological attributes of men, 
women and children. In this way the anatomy of women determines their destiny. 
However, she does argue that we are no longer animals and that nature can be 
transformed: 
“(T)he ‘natural’ is not necessarily a ‘human’ value. Humanity has begun to 
outgrow nature: we can no longer justify the maintenance of a discriminatory 
sex class system on the grounds of its origin in Nature.” (p.10). 
 
In the final chapter in her book Firestone proposes four structural imperatives 
necessary to erode the functions of the family, which is primarily organised around 
reproductive differences between men and women, and is the essential source of 
gender difference and oppression. Firestone’s solutions to gender difference and 
oppression pre-date much of the current developments in reproductive technology 
and in many instances are projections of a possible future for women. Construed 
within the optimism and promise of modernity where individuals make rational and 
enlightened choices in a context of growth, progress and development, she believes 
that technological developments will offer humans the potential for advancement. 
 
Her logic of an essential physiology that predetermines sociological differences leads 
Firestone to argue that the development of the option of artificial reproduction to 
replace natural childbirth and modern technology to aid human labour has created the 






“ The freeing of women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology by 
every means available, and the diffusion of the childbearing and childrearing 
role to the whole of society as a whole, men as well as women” (p.233). 
 
She argues that biology will be conquered through reliable contraceptive technology 
and extra-uterine gestation, popularly known as test tube babies. In this way artificial 
reproduction can be expected to transform procreation, rendering genital distinctions 
between the sexes culturally irrelevant. Firestone sees that the freeing of women 
from their biology would in turn transform social institutions “that is organised 
around biological reproduction and the subjection of women to their biological 
destiny, the family” (p. 234). Like de Beauvoir, she turns to technology as a solution 
to erase gender difference – human made technical answers – as if these, in 
themselves, exist outside of social relations.  
 
At the same time, Firestone (1970:11) is aware that by eliminating the biological 
basis of women’s oppression by using reproductive technology that women and 
children might not be free, and that it may well have an opposite effect.  
“Though the sex class system may have originated in fundamental biological 
conditions, this does not guarantee once the biological basis of their 
oppression has been swept away that women and children will be freed. On 
the contrary, the new technology, especially fertility control, may be used 
against them to reinforce the entrenched system of exploitation.” 
 
This insight leads her to argue for an underclass, female revolution:  
“to assure the elimination of the sexual classes requires the revolt of the 
underclass (women) and the seizure of control of reproduction: the restoration to 
women of ownership of their bodies; as well as feminine control of human 
fertility, including both the new technology and all the social institutions of 
childbearing and childrearing”( Firestone 1970:11). 
 
Her second demand proposes a further destabilisation of the family, but this time of 






“The full self-determination, including economic independence, of both women and 
children” (Firestone 1970:11). However, she argues that their proper integration will 
only be secured if there is a fundamental change in the social and economic structure, 
thus arguing for a feminist socialism. Firestone argues that under capitalism 
women’s integration into the labour force can only exist at the level of tokenism, as 
she points out that women have increasingly been integrated into the capitalist labour 
force but only as useful and cheap paid labour and as unpaid labour in households 
supporting the economic functioning of society. 
 
Even though Firestone claims that by attacking the biological reproductive basis and 
economic basis of the organisation of the family, it would be destroyed — she called 
for a third demand to further eliminate it. Firestone demands “The total integration 
of women and children into all aspects of larger society” (p.236).  She however, 
restates that these three demands could only be realised in the context of a feminist 
revolution which was based on advanced technology. 
 
Lastly she demands “The freedom of all women and children to do whatever they 
wish to do sexually” (p.236). She argued that she called for this demand in the 
context of her contention that the full sexuality of women was restricted to 
reproductive purposes by religious and cultural institutions, where she saw that the 
sexual freedom of women would question the fatherhood of children and threaten 
patrimony. 
 
2.3. Biological essentialism: understanding the limits of the theory  
 
De Beauvoir and Firestone present very similar variants of biological essentialism. 
Both portray maternity as a negative experience for women with negative long 
lasting social consequences. They locate women’s oppression in their reproductive 
capacities; the only material basis which impacts negatively on women’s lives and 
experiences. The female body and its functions, menstruation, pregnancy, maternity 






transcendence in society. They both also allude to social factors which use biological 
differences to subjugate women. For de Beauvoir it is culture and history’s definition 
of women as ‘Other’ and for Firestone it is the institution of the family. The social 
and historical context of the female body is also seen as influencing how it is 
conceived. However, both emphasise biological constraints which both believe can 
only be overcome by technology. 
  
They both believe that reproductive technology could help women regulate and 
control their biology in so far as the female body is viewed as an impediment to 
intellectual and cultural achievement. Women’s social, economic and political 
participation, indeed equality itself, is technology dependent. Male bodies are not 
seen as inadequate but rather are seen by them as the standard for humanity and 
superior consciousness. The individual body and technology are abstracted from 
social relations. The body sets the parameters for women’s subjectivity. The views of 
de Beauvoir and Firestone preclude the possibility of there being any 
interrelationship between individuals, their biology and social structures and 
relationships 
 
Firestone’s approach can be seen as falling within a biosocial perspective; namely, 
that the objective and observable ‘real’ distinctions between males and female are 
rooted in human physiology, anatomy and/or genetics (Wharton 2005:22). Women’s 
reproductive biology is conceived of as the ‘real essence’. The underlying substratum 
from which gender distinctions, ‘nominal’ essences emerge are constructed between 
men and women in society. A unidirectional relationship is assumed between 
biological/sex differences and individual behaviour; where biology acts as the 
determinant of subjectivity and agency. 
 
Epistemologically Firestone's materialist explanation fits into a positivist view of 
human behaviour which argues that knowledge of human behaviour can be 
objectively acquired (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2000:6). Sex/biology is seen by 
Firestone as being an objective, material and identifiable real distinction between 






These sex distinctions act as the ‘raw material from which gender is constructed’ and 
are held to be powerful organisers of human capabilities and behaviour. Thus gender 
difference is rooted in a real objective reality located in women’s essential sexual 
difference which imposes itself on and structures the social relations between men 
and women. It is this material biological difference in itself and the social relations of 
power and domination within the family that acts to constrain women’s agency in the 
world.  
 
In other words, the cause of difference lies in human biology, or at least in those 
aspects that define apparent physiological difference. Barrett (1980:12) argues that 
these types of explanations do not account for ‘why’ or ‘how’ men acquire control of 
women’s bodies. She argues that this type of analysis is a form of biologism which 
philosophically tends towards reductionism, because it reduces complex social and 
historical phenomena to one causal category —  namely, biology. Such reductionism 
is problematic for several reasons. For Connell (1991:78) it makes biology the 
determinant of practice instead of seeing practice as being socially determined. For 
Birke (1986:7), because this argument is dependent on isolating a causal factor which 
is explained as a prior cause to an event, observed events are accounted for by 
arguing backwards from the event. The complexity of social processes is reduced to 
one essential component from which everything else emanates.  
 
Jagger (1983:112) argues that Firestone fails to see how women’s biology is also 
determined by their subordination. This failure is somewhat paradoxical given 
Firestone’s claim to presenting a dialectical materialist analysis of sex 
(reproduction), without pointing to the structural, systemic or even subjective 
contradictions that, as Therborn (2007:76) notes are intrinsic to a Marxian analysis of 
modernity.  
 
A biological view of difference also implies that social arrangements are ‘natural’ 
and therefore fixed and immutable. Walby (1990:16) argues that the main problem 
with ‘natural’ conceptions of gender is that they embody ahistorical and trans-






This problem in turn, limits the theory’s ability to account for variation and change. 
Alsop et al (2002:297) argue that feminists who have a naturalistic conception of the 
body view it as fixed and given and a constraint to the possibility of action. Rather, 
they suggest, it is not the body that prevents action but rather that action is prevented 
by the meaning and significance that is attached to the body by society.  As Grosz 
(1994:19) puts it, bodies are not inert, passive, non-cultural and ahistorical but, in 
fact, are a site of contestation in varied economic, political and sexual struggles. 
Bodies exist as racial and classed bodies as well. 
 
Biological determinism as argued for by Firestone (and de Beauvoir) presents a 
specific, scientistic model to explain or justify the existence of social hierarchy and 
social inequality (Lowe 1982:108). It is a particular way of viewing the causes of 
social structures, where observed social differences are accounted for in the 
biological nature of humans. This kind of theorising also tends to generalise and 
homogenise the experiences of all women. 
 
Firestone has also been criticised for universalising the position of women across 
time and place. Barrett (1980) and others (Segal 1987; Rowbotham 1981) have 
argued that in construing all men as exploiters of all women, radical feminists imply 
that the categories men and women can only be biological. Connell (1991:55) holds a 
similar view and argues that where men and women are treated as general categories 
and the relation between the two is of direct domination, this can only be biological 
explanations.  As Scott (1988:34) argues, physical difference conceptualised in this 
way takes on a universal and unchanging character which is problematic because it 
rests on a single variable of physical difference outside of the historical context. It 
attributes a consistent, inherent and universal meaning to the human body outside of 
the social or cultural experience and therefore cannot take account of the fact that, for 
example, menstruation, childbirth or breastfeeding practices differ across time and 








Subjectively, Gordon (cited in Gimenez 1983:297) suggests that in spite of the 
problematic aspects of reproduction, at least some women regard it as a creative and 
rewarding experience that provides them with a source of meaning and comfort that 
compensates for the alienating features of work. Rich (1977), a radical feminist, goes 
further to argue that rather than being burdensome and dehumanising, motherhood 
and bearing children are a source of joy to women and contends that the problem for 
women is patriarchy rather than bearing and rearing children. 
 
By reducing the differences between men and women to their reproductive 
functionality, Firestone reifies relations of sex, placing them outside of the plural and 
multifaceted human interactions that constitute society. Firestone’s recourse to 
technology to regulate and control reproduction in order to eliminate the constraining 
effects of women’s biology is also questionable. Inherent in her solution is the belief 
that biology predetermines social differences and it is therefore biology that needs to 
be altered through technology. But technology, itself, is a product of and mediates 
social relations affecting individual choice and agency (Walby 1990:66; Rose and 
Hanmer 1976). 
 
Thus although the availability of reproductive technology has the potential to modify 
reproductive behaviour, it is not sufficient in itself to trigger drastic changes in 
reproductive patterns for invariably non-technological, that is social, reasons. 
Gimenez (1983:292) argues that Firestone overestimates the power of technology to 
give women control over their reproductive lives and underestimates the power of 
social and psychological factors in influencing women’s behaviour, the structural 
basis of sexism. She further argues that individual decisions always have social 
content. Gordon (cited in Giminez 1983:296) argues that reproductive freedom is an 
important dimension of human freedom but is similarly affected by all other 
institutions which act to curtail that freedom. She argues that reproduction affects 
women differently; specifically creating more difficulty for women who, whether 







Lastly there is the question of Firestone’s solutions to gender oppression. In an age of 
cloning, genetic engineering and significant family restructuring, her ideas that 
sexual reproductive differences or the biological family can be eradicated and that 
together, they will end gender oppression are scenarios that may sound plausible to 
the contemporary ear. But, like her other contentions, they need to be tested 
empirically to see what truth, if any, they have in specific contexts, times and places.  








































While the theoretical limitations of biological essentialism as articulated by de 
Beauvoir and Firestone are apparent, it is equally, if not more important to consider 
the usefulness of their arguments by “testing” their claims empirically. More 
specifically I want to examine Firestone’s hopes for women’s use of reproductive 
technology and alternative family formations. Using contemporary South African 
data I propose to look at women’s reproductive behaviour in the form of fertility and 
contraceptive use, in the context of the household structures in which they live and 
their economic circumstances. For this purpose I draw on the South African 
Demographic and Health Survey (SADHS) 1998, a national survey of a statistically 
representative sample of women in South Africa, that is conducted every 5 years by 
the Department of Health (1998). The SADHS was developed in response to the 
changed health policy environment brought about by democratic transition. For my 





2 A second survey was conducted in 2003 but, at the time of writing, only the preliminary report of the 






Contemporary South African health policies that deal with reproductive health focus 
on the provision of adequate reproductive information and facilities to empower 
women, and to a lesser extent men, to make informed choices about sexual relations, 
pregnancy and childbearing (Department of Health 1998:3). In 1994, the Department 
of Health (DOH) adopted Primary Health Care as its core philosophical and 
structural approach to health care (Cooper et al 2004:72), emphasising human rights, 
equitable and expanded access, decentralisation of services and preventive health 
care provision. The introduction of free primary-level health services for women and 
children under the age of six within this strategy is a key intervention designed to 
redress the past neglect of the health needs of poor black women.  
 
Cooper et al (2004:72) point out that several laws, policies and programmes 
addressing gender inequality were introduced in South Africa from 1994 onwards. 
Of particular importance is The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (Act 92 of 
1996), the Sterilisation Act (Act 44 of 1998) and the creation of a directorate of 
Mother, Child and Women’s Health in the Department of Health in 1995 – all of 
which aim to increase women’s access to appropriate health services, ensure health 
services increase gender equality and by providing services to men and women to 
achieve optimal reproductive and sexual health (Cooper 2004:73). National 
reproductive health policy reform has also been influenced by international 
developments; (the International Conference on Population Development (ICPD) in 
1994 in Cairo and the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) in Beijing in 
1995) where women globally have drawn links between women’s reproductive 
health, women’s rights and general socio-economic development which in turn has 
given rise to a call for a broader definition of reproductive health (Cooper 2004:71). 
 
This context gave rise to the Department of Health (DOH) undertaking the South 
African Demographic and Health Survey (DOH 1998:4). Its purpose is to provide 
up-to-date information for the National Health Information System on several key 
areas of relevance to policy makers and health practitioners, namely:  







• awareness and use of contraceptive methods, 
• breastfeeding practices, 
• maternal and child health indicators, 
• awareness of HIV/AIDS, 
• chronic health conditions among adults, 
• lifestyles that affect the health status of adults, and  
• anthropometric indicators.  
 
In 1998 the survey comprised three questionnaires: a Household Questionnaire, an 
Adult Health Questionnaire and a Women’s Questionnaire. A total of 12,247 
households were interviewed throughout the country, in which 11,735 women (95% 
of those were identified as eligible to respond3) completed the Women’s 
Questionnaire. I have used the data from the last mentioned questionnaire because of 
its focus on women’s background characteristics such as age, education, race, 
pregnancy history, knowledge and use of contraceptive methods, antenatal and 
delivery care, breastfeeding and weaning practices, child health and immunisation, 
marriage and recent sexual activity, fertility preferences, violence against women, 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality, husband's background and the nature 
of the respondent's work. Together, the findings on these issues, speak to the ideas 
articulated by Firestone. 
 
3.2. The sociology of fertility and women’s contraceptive use   
 
In this section I will specifically examine Firestone’s arguments on the promise of 
reproductive technology to free women from the constraints of their reproductive 
biology against the realities of women’s fertility rates and contraceptive behaviour in 











3.2.1. Fertility levels and trends   
Fertility rates are an observable aspect of women’s reproductive behaviour and an 
observable indicator of the relationship they have to their reproductive propensity 
and the controls which they can exert over their bodies. Sociologically, it is possible 
to explain this relationship in terms of women’s individual desires and the structural 
and institutional context that influences their relation to their bodies. Firestone 
(1970:8) argues that “women throughout history before the advent of birth control 
were at the continual mercy of their biology”. Constant painful childbirth was cited 
as an affliction and one of the conditions which made women dependent on males for 
physical survival. However, she argued that contraception and reproductive 
technology such as modern embryology and artificial reproduction would allow 
women to control and free themselves from their reproductive biology capacities 
which, in turn, would free them from the reproductive imperatives of their bodies. 
What might the data say about the strength and breadth of her contention? 
 
The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) is the number of births the average woman would 
have had by the end of her childbearing years if she followed age specific fertility 
rates. Fertility indicators in the SADHS study were obtained from answers provided 
by women about their reproductive histories. The SADHS data (DOH 1998:33), 
reporting on fertility for the three year period prior to the survey, shows a TFR of 
2.9. This figure is lower than the 3.3 TFR reported in the 1996 Population Census 
data (Central Statistical Services 1998), suggesting that in contemporary South 
African society women are having fewer children. 
 
However, the survey also finds that this decline in fertility rates is not the same for 
all women in South Africa. Women’s social, economic and cultural location also 
influences their reproductive behaviour. Whether they bear children or not, the 
number of children they have and the intervals between their births are all influenced 







This finding suggests that the place of bio-physical reproductive capacity in women’s 
oppression is not driven by any iron law of biology, but rather is also significantly 
influenced by several non-biological factors. As the SADHS shows, women’s actual 
fertility is influenced by their residence, age, race and education levels as well as 
being influenced by social and economic opportunities.  
 
Table 1 shows that child bearing practices are significantly influenced by locality, 
where urban women have fewer children (TFR 2.3) than their rural counterparts 
(TFR 3.9). And this lower rate of child birth is evident across all ages, even though 
child bearing peaks at the same age (20-34 years) in both urban and rural South 
Africa.  
 
Table 1: Current fertility rates 
 
 








Equally, there is a linear association between education and fertility rates. The survey 
shows a clear decline in fertility as the level of women’s education increases. Thus, 
whereas the TFR for women without education is 4.5 that for women with completed 
secondary education drops to 2.2 falling even further to 1.9 for women with higher 
education. O’Gara and Robey (1998:181) argue that women’s level of education 
marks not only their status in society but also their social and economic standing in 
the home. Educated women have more power in the home, more control over their 
own and their husbands’ income and more control over their reproductive choices 
and, it would seem, are able to better negotiate their standing with spouses. 
Similarly, there are racial differences in child bearing practices, with African women 
having a total fertility rate of 3.1 compared to 1.9 for white women. However, 
locality remains the single largest differential; with African rural women have a TFR 
of 4.0 compared to a TFR of 2.4 for their urban African counterparts and 1.9 for 
urban white women. Given these variations in women’s childbearing rates, the 
evidence suggests that social inequalities rather than biology determine the 
childbearing practices.  Studies on fertility rates from most other countries show that 
the key factors known to influence lower fertility rates in urban areas compared to 
rural settings are greater contraceptive use, a higher age of marriage and the greater 
availability of abortion. (O’Gara and Robey 1998:181). In addition, urban women are 
more likely to have greater access to education, information and jobs in the economy 
and this increases their ability to make informed choices about their reproductive 
health. This said, in South Africa, the SADHS findings show that there are 
substantial and growing numbers of urban and rural women who are able to control 
their biology by using contraceptives in the way envisaged by de Beauvoir and 
Firestone. 
 
However, differences in residential location also influence the age at first birth, as 










Table 2: Median age at first birth by background characteristics 
 
Source: (DOH 1998:42) 
 
 
The median age for first birth is higher for women in urban areas than rural areas 
(p.42).  Age and education levels act in association with one another to influence 
women’s fertility; with the age of first birth increasing with the level of education. 
There is a five year differential on average between  women without a formal 
education who have their first birth at around age 19,8 years, compared to 24.9 years  







Even the data on teenage pregnancy reflects social rather than biological influences 
on young women’s reproductive behaviours. The rate of teen pregnancy is high in 
South Africa with 35 percent of all teenagers being pregnant or having a baby by the 
age of 19 years (DOH 1998). However, as with adult fertility the data shows 
considerable variation in adolescent fertility by region, education and population 
group. Rural adolescents tend to start childbearing earlier than urban adolescents (21 
percent compared to 13 percent of teenage childbearing). And there are racial 
differences, with teenage pregnancies greatest among coloured girls (19 percent) and 
African girls (18 percent) compared to  Asian (4 percent) or white (2 percent). The 
data also shows that there is a strong negative association between education and 
teenage pregnancy. 
 
That women’s reproductive biology may limit their access to the public social 
sphere, as Firestone (1970) argued, is perhaps not in dispute. However, what this data 
on South Africa suggests is that socio- economic factors rather than biology 
determine the extent to which such access is constrained or leveraged. Not all women 
are able to control their fertility in the same way and that regulation of their fertility 
is not solely dependent on the provision and availability of reproductive technology. 
This is the case even given the existence of women-controlled contraception (the pill 
or injection versus the condom). The SADHS data show that fertility rates have 
dropped, however, the extent and contours of this change is determined by social 
factors such as education, physical location and age.  
 
SADHS data on fertility also show that even when women do control their 
reproduction, other divisions in society continue to persist and influence women’s 
lives and circumstances.  This in turn puts paid to the notion that women’s 
oppression can be resolved simply by fertility regulating technologies. Several 
known direct and indirect influences on fertility have been identified in other studies 
(O’Gara and Robey 1998). Direct influences include the use of contraceptives, 
women’s age of first marriage, breastfeeding and lactational amenorrhea or sexual 
abstinence following childbirth and induced abortion (O’Gara and Robey, 1998:178). 






indirectly through one or more of the direct determinants. As in South Africa, these 
include education levels, place of residence, access to information and socio-
economic status. And even though contraceptive use is identified  as the strongest 
direct determinant of fertility (O’Gara and Robey, 1998: 183), its effect is influenced 
by indirect social, political, economic and cultural factors as well as subjective 
desire, as the next section will show. 
 
3.2.2. Contraceptive use 
 
The data on contraceptive use in the SADHS study (DOH 1998) is presented for all 
women (11735), currently married women (5077) and all sexually active women 
(2074). The study looks at the interface between technology, social structural and 
institutional factors and individual agency, and approach that is embedded in the 
questions asked. The SADHS findings show that contraception is being widely used 
by women (61%) and does offer women partial respite from the exigencies of their 
reproductive biology. However, the uptake of and the types of contraceptives used is 
conditional on women’s social context, making the promise of technological control 
over childbirth a goal that has still to be attained. 
 
Historically in South Africa, apartheid created social divisions between people 
according to a system of racial classification through which the state distributed 
access to goods, services and welfare unevenly. Although under the new democratic 
order, the government has attempted to redress these imbalances the past has left a 
racially patterned legacy of provision and access to health care where geographical 
location still affects the quality and access to social services provided by the state. 
The legacy of apartheid skewed the provision and distribution of these services 
resulting in rural areas, with a mainly African population, being more disadvantaged 
than urban areas and other population groups. 
 
Given that the majority of women use public health care facilities, the methods of 
contraception provided in state health institutions plays an important role in defining 






providers. The SADHS (DOH 1998) data on the source of supply of modern 
contraceptive methods used by women show how gender inequality is socially 
constructed through institutions. Table 3 below shows that the majority of women 
using contraception (84 percent) obtain their contraceptives from the public sector. 
Government hospitals are the most common public source (38 percent) for obtaining 
contraceptives, which is followed by day hospitals/clinics (20 percent) and family 
planning clinics (20 percent). Only a handful (6%) access contraception through 
mobile clinics and a very small number of women do so from community health 
workers which might refer to a community based distribution pilot project available 
at limited sites in six provinces.  
 
Table 3: Source of contraceptive method  
 







Fourteen percent of women get their contraceptives from the private sector, half 
doing so from their doctors or gynaecologists, while the remainder use a private 
hospital (5%) or pharmacy (2%). 
 
Although only 14 in a 100 women use the private sector to access contraception, this 
sector provides for almost half (46 percent) of IUD users and a quarter of pill users 
(25 percent). Half of all male sterilisations (48 percent) are also performed in the 
private sector. By contrast the public sector supplies (73 percent) of pill users, almost 
all (93 percent) injectable users, just over half (53 percent) of IUD users and over 
three quarters (77 percent) of condom users. 
 
Most women in the SADHS are therefore dependent on state provision of 
contraception and thus rely on the state to be able to control their reproductive 
capacities. Therefore their use of contraceptives is influenced by the kinds of 
reproductive technology provided by the state health provider. 
 
As Firestone (1970:11) contends, sweeping away the biological basis of women’s 
oppression is in itself insufficient to free women and children from their oppression. 
What women have to do is also seize control of the new technology and all the social 
institutions of childbearing and childrearing. The SADHS findings show that this has 
yet to happen.  
 
Over half of all women in the SADHS are using a method of contraception with the 
injection (27 percent) being the most widely used method, followed by the pill and 
female sterilisation (9 percent each). The IUD, condom and male sterilisation are 
used by less than two percent of all women. Contraceptive use is higher amongst 






women who are sexually active4 (DOH 1998:48). Despite the high use of 
contraceptives the SADHS findings conclude that 10 percent of all women and 15 
percent of married women reported unmet family planning needs. The greatest need 
is experienced by young women under 25 years and those between 45 and 49 years 
of age (DOH 1998: 269). Geographical location also impacts on unmet needs and is 
highest in rural areas. Social status also influences unmet needs and is higher among 
women with no formal education.  
 
What is also evident from the findings is that the provision and use of the various 
types of contraceptives are differentially influenced by both institutional and 
structural factors. This finding means that technology itself is not neutral because it 
exists in, and reflects, social relations. 
 
The male condom, the pill and injectable contraceptives are the most widely 
available means of fertility regulation in public health facilities. The female condom 
is only available on a limited basis and (at the time of the survey) at great cost in 
South Africa. The IUD can no longer be accessed in most government clinics, 
because there are not enough trained staff to fit the device. The diaphragm is also no 
longer available in either public or private services (DOH 1998:43). 
 
The provision of contraceptives, in this instance including sterilisation, shows an 
institutional bias within the state that favours some rather than other methods. What 
the data suggest is that a combination of reasons, including a shortage of skills, 
certainty of efficacy and cost, militate against contraceptive methods that afford 
women more control over their fertility. Health care providers’ (primary care nurses) 
opinions and  practices do play a role in influencing contraceptive choice and use 











At the same time, women rather than men are the primary targets of state health 
providers of contraceptive information and contraceptive techniques (Das Gupta and 
Adetunji 1998:152). This point is evident in the SADHS findings as well with regard 
to the types of contraceptives provided at state institutions. The use of some 
contraceptives by women is practically problematic given that some techniques (the 
male condom and male sterilisation) require male agreement while others (female 
sterilisation and the pill) are often used only after women have obtained male 
consent. The state’s primary provision of contraceptives that can only be used by 
women is also conceptually problematic because it essentialises women’s 
reproductive biology and implies women’s responsibility for childbearing.  
 
There is also the influence of social context on contraceptive use. A direct 
consequence of the political geography of apartheid is evident in differing patterns of 
current contraceptive use. According to the SADHS, whereas some two-thirds (67 
percent) of women in the urban areas use one or another method of contraception, 
only a little over half (54 percent) of women in rural (non-urban) areas do. And rural 
women are somewhat more likely to use injectables (33% compared to 28%). By 
contrast, the pill and female and male sterilisation are more common in urban areas. 
These differences can be explained in part by institutional practice. In part, they 
reflect cultural acceptability and service and skill availability as well as the way 
rural, African or poor women are politically constructed. This suggests that social 
determinants are as powerful as biological ones in shaping behaviour, which means 
that Firestone’s (1970:14) idea of a sexual reproductive base determining an 
economic, juridical and political superstructure is less than accurate.  
 
The SADHS (1998) findings also point to the race of recipients as a factor 
influencing the extent of contraceptive use, the type of contraception used and the 
choices offered women. Thus, while a large majority of white (76%) and Asian 
(80%) women regulate their fertility, the proportion of  African and Coloured women 
who do so is much lower (59% and 69% respectively).  In terms of methods, 
injectables are the most frequently used form of contraception for African women 






Coloured women are also high users of injectables (27 percent). By contrast, Asian 
women have the highest levels of use of the pill and female sterilisation (34 and 32 
percent, respectively) and only a very small proportion use the injection (4 percent). 
The data is similar for white women where the pill and sterilisation are the most 
popular methods of fertility regulation (20 and 27 percent, respectively). 
Interestingly, male sterilisation (15 percent) in partners is highest among the partners 
of white women, with some incidences occurring among those of Coloured and 
Asian women but none are reported by African women. 
 
Some of this difference in use and method can be accounted for by locality and 
education since the use of contraception is lower among less educated, rural African 
women when compared to their urban, more educated counterparts. Similarly these 
factors and specific apartheid policies also partly account for method ‘preferences’ – 
given explicit efforts to encourage sterilisation in the Coloured population and to 
promote injectables among Coloured and African users on the assumption that they 
could not be relied upon to use the pill and other self-controlled devices responsibly 
(Brown 1987:264).  
 
Firestone’s understanding of race is worth noting. In keeping with her quest to 
essentialise, she argues that (1970:122) race, like sex, is a physiological distinction 
which becomes important culturally due to power inequalities. Racism, she believes, 
is sexism extended. As an essentially sexual phenomenon, it can only be understood 
in terms of the power hierarchies of the family and racist power psychology. This 
understanding is refuted by an overwhelming body of evidence that shows that racial 
divisions, race thinking and racism have no biological foundation (Blaunt 1992:290). 
Rather they derive from structural social relations that influence social behaviour, 
shape technology and its uses, and construct subjective understanding. The evidence 
provided by the SADHS (DOH 1998) confirms the latter explanation as pertinent in 
South Africa. This finding is not surprising given the centuries of colonialism in this 
country’s past, and especially the half-century of apartheid during which time high 






One possible route out of biological subjugation for women is education, since 
education is believed to influence women’s choices in society quite significantly. 
The SADHS (DOH 1998:49) findings, in fact, point to education as a key influencing 
factor on contraceptive use. While a little over a third (35 percent) of women who 
have not attended school use some form of birth control, nearly four in five women 
(79 percent) with four years of secondary education (Standard 9) or more do so.  
 
At the same time, the data relating to education confirm Firestone’s (1970) insight 
into the constraining effects of women’s reproductive biology on their life chances. 
Falling pregnant (17.2%) ranks with an inability to pay fees (17,4%) as the leading 
reasons for not completing primary school. As the table below (Table 4) shows, this 
ratio swings in favour of pregnancy until women have completed secondary 
education, when economic pressures and the cost of further education become the 
overwhelming reasons for their not continuing with their education.  
 
Table 4: Reasons for leaving school 
 







The findings on teenage and scholar pregnancy also point to the way social relations 
constrain the promise of technology. Thus, in spite of technological know-how about 
controlling reproduction, a substantial minority of young women continue to have 
unplanned pregnancies because of external structural and institutional as well as 
subjective conditions. The barriers to accessing family planning services especially 
for young women include lack of privacy, inconvenient clinic opening times, and 
discouragement by clinic staff who disapprove of youth being sexually active 
(Cooper et al 2004:74). 
 
What of Firestone’s contention that the biological differences between women and 
men give rise to a dominant oppressive power psychology in men and the 
development of a patriarchal mentality (1970:222). The 1998 SADHS shows, as do 
studies elsewhere for example (O’Gara and Robey 1998), that women’s fertility 
regulation choices are influenced by the dynamics of their interpersonal relations. 
Over two-thirds of married, non-sterilised women (67 percent) report that they and 
their husbands approve of family planning. In couples where there is no consensus 
between partners, in nearly all cases it is the husband who disapproves (17 percent) 
of family planning rather than the wife (DOH 1998:64). The fact is that where there 
is opposition to fertility regulation, it comes from men rather than women, 
irrespective of age, race and education as well as location. This finding suggests that 
support or opposition to fertility regulation operates as a form of patriarchy 
influencing women’s use of technology. 
 
At the same time the SADHS findings also show that the dissention between women 
and men over the use of contraception is weakest for educated, urban based women 
and strongest among rural women with no education. Among the latter, whereas 
nearly four fifths (79 %) of the women approve of family planning only 47 percent of 
their partners agree with them to control their fertility. 
 
If  support for or opposition to fertility regulation is a sufficient proxy for patriarchy, 






reproductive capacity give rise to patriarchy, such power is tempered by place and 
educational (as well as social) status.  
 
Women’s relationship to their reproductive biology is also influenced by their 
fertility desires. Both de Beauvoir’s (1972) and Firestone’s (1970) negative 
characterisation fail to consider the importance of desire or the possibility that 
women derive pleasure in and from their reproductive capacity. For many women 
motherhood is integral to their sense of themselves as women. In this, they are 
influenced by societal expectations, where bearing children is closely connected to 
their social acceptance and status within the family as well as to the economic well 
being of their families. Children are a source of labour in the home or support in old 
age as well as being the vehicle for intergenerational perpetuation (O’Gara and 
Robey 1998). 
 
The SADHS (1998) findings on women’s subjective preferences reflect their sense of 
agency as well as on structural and institutional possibilities. The main reason 
women give for not using any form of contraception is their desire to have children 
(23.8%), a reason which is at its strongest amongst women under 30 years of age 
(47%), who have yet to have children  or who have only one child. Table 5 gives the 
reasons women gave for not using contraception.  
 
At the same time, as Table 6 shows, women also desire to discontinue childbearing, a 
desire that increases in strength with the number of living children. Such preferences 
are likely to be explained by economic and pragmatic factors, differential notions of 
ideal family size and, as Firestone correctly argues, because of the responsibilities of 











Table 5: Reasons for not intending to use contraception 
 
Source:  (DOH 1998:60)  
 
 
The fact that the SADHS findings also point to the influences of age, education, 
location and race on women’s desire to reproduce suggests that social conditions and 














Table 6: Fertility preferences by number of living children 
 
Source: (DOH 1998:67) 
 
This observation is not intended to dismiss the constraining or disruptive effects on 
women of their physiological capacity to reproduce. Evidence for this is clear in the 
SADHS (1998), which explores the strength and effects of fertility planning. Forty 
six percent of women report that their pregnancies in the five years prior to the study 
were wanted and on time. However, more than a third (36%) of women consider 
their pregnancies to be mistimed, a sentiment that is particularly widespread among 
teen (65.8% of <20 years old) and young adult (44% of 20-24 years old) respondents. 
A full 17% describe their pregnancies as unwanted with the proportion of unwanted 
births increasing significantly with age.  
 
Table 7 shows the planning status for women according to birth order and mothers 




Table 7: Fertility planning status 
Source: (DOH 1998: 74)  
 
The SADHS (1998) also shows that the demand for family planning is still strong, 
given the reported differences between desired and actual fertility as Table 8 
below shows. Actual fertility rates (2.9) are higher than preferred rates (2.3) and 








      Table 8: Wanted fertility rates 









3.3. The sociology of women’s biology: reflecting on the evidence in 
regard to fertility trends and contraceptive use 
 
Health policies in South Africa seek to increase women’s access to appropriate 
health services, ensure that health services increase gender equality and that they 
provide services to women and more recently, men, in order to achieve optimal 
reproductive and sexual health. The empirical evidence shows that fertility rates are 
decreasing and contraceptive use by women is widespread, albeit uneven. Women 
are choosing to have fewer children and they are doing so with the assistance of the 
reproductive regulatory technologies available to them. With greater or lesser 
success, they also try to use contraception to control their fertility in order to regulate 
the timing and spacing of their pregnancies. But they do not use it to obliterate the 
possibility of reproduction altogether. At the same time, the existent policy 
framework and the extensive availability of key methods of fertility control do not 
free women from their biology in and of itself.  The question that needs to be asked 
is whether such an objective has meaning to women in any given specific society? 
 
If, as in contemporary South African society, many women find themselves 
‘liberated’ from the tyranny of their biological capacity to reproduce by using 
available technology, the degree of their liberation is constrained by socially 
determined structural, institutional and subjective relations.  Empirically, the 
evidence shows that Firestone’s faith in the promise of technology to end women’s 
oppression is misplaced because both technology and oppression are socially rather 
than biologically determined. 
 
Firestone misconstrues the problem because she fails to account for the human desire 
to reproduce. In South Africa (and most other societies) women desire to have 
children. As Giminez (1983:297) puts it: “Women ‘fall into motherhood’ for, in spite 







compensates for the alienating features of the work to which most women are 
relegated.”  
 
Indeed the decision to become mothers might not only be driven by  social pressures 
but may also arise as a subjective rational act of individual choice, not least of all 
because child bearing and motherhood means different things to different women 
(Ziehl 1993:30).  
 
Firestone is also naïve in her confidence in the inherent progressive nature of science 
and technology. As Ziehl (1993:33) points out, technology like most social products 
is neither the salvation nor the curse of women but a ‘double edged sword’ that 
solves some problems at the same time as it creates others. 
 
Firestone argues that women’s control of their biology would lead to the 
transformation of the institution of the family which was also necessary to free 
women (make them less dependent on men). What do the SADHS findings reveal 
about the current structure and composition of the family where women are using 
contraceptives and what is their economic status?  
      
3.4. Fertility decline, contraceptive use and the family 
 
Firestone (1970:8-9) contends that the reproduction of gender takes place under the 
‘tyranny of the biological family’. Arguing that social structure is biologically 
determined she says that biological differences produce the biological family: a form 
of social organisation that has universal generalisable features. These features are 
that “before the advent of birth control women were at the continual mercy of their 
biology” which made them dependent on men for physical survival; that human 
infants also are dependent on adults for physical survival for a long time; that 







women and children; and that the natural reproductive differences between the sexes 
is the source of all other economic and cultural divisions.  Together, these basic 
characteristics create psychosexual distortions of the human personality.  
 
Following on from this logic, it is possible to anticipate that women’s ability to 
control their fertility significantly influences the core characteristics of the biological 
family. It is worthwhile considering empirically current family structure, the extent 
to which women depend on men for physical survival, the persistence or not of 
mother/child interdependency and the influences that the family has on women’s 
psychology. While the SADHS (1998) is insufficient to adequately answer all these 
queries it does provide a part of the answer. Table 9 provides data about the 
composition of households. 
 
Table 9 shows that the average household5 at the time the survey was conducted 
comprised of 4.2 persons, being somewhat larger in rural (4.7) compared to urban 
areas (3.9). It also shows that a significant proportion of households (42 percent) are 
headed by women, especially in rural areas (50%). The propensity of rural families to 
be headed by women can be attributed historically to the migrant labour system and 
more recently to migrancy generated by high rates of rural poverty and 
unemployment. By contrast, Castells (1997) cites figures of cross county studies 
which include Sub-Saharan Africa to argue that the reason behind the formation of 
female headed urban families lies elsewhere – in women’s economic independence, 
in the breakdown of social and economic ties and responsibilities, and in the 







5 The SADHS (1998) uses the notion of household, rather than family, although not in the sense of 





reasons behind this family form, what is clear is that it has little to do with fertility 
regulation and contraceptive technology. At the same time, it can be expected to 
influence the way gendered psychosexual personalities are formed albeit in possibly 
contradictory ways. 
 
Table 9: Household composition 
  









The SADHS (1998) also shows that nearly a quarter of all households in the study 
(24%) contain foster children6, with the proportion rising to 34 percent of families in 
rural areas. This does not necessarily mean that all these households are linked by 
ties other than blood or marriage. Rather, it suggests that the care of children has 
been entrusted by their parents to others, more often than not grandmothers and 
aunts.  
 
Nor do these changes in household composition suggest that the conditions for “the 
traditional dependencies and resulting power relations” (Firestone 1970: 262) have 
been eradicated or that they pave the way for the end of gender oppression. Table 10 
gives data on household structures. 
 
On the contrary, Table 10 (below) confirms that women remain central to the care of 
children. Only about one third of children live with both their parents while 37.4% 
live with only one parent, invariably their mothers. As for the 25% of children who 
live with neither of their parents, most are raised by their grandmothers, aunts or 
other family members, in keeping with traditional practices where the older 













Table 10: Household structure  
Source: (DOH 1998:11) 
 
The SADHS suggests that the interdependency between mothers and children still 
holds, notwithstanding women’s efforts to control their fertility or the fact that this 
interdependency is moderated by cultural and social practices across generations. 
And it is an interdependence that remains gendered.  
 
Discussion and conclusion: it’s not about fertility regulation per se 
 
The SADHS findings show that a high rate of contraceptive use and low fertility 







female headed households. These findings seem to indicate that the use of 
reproductive technology and decisions on fertility may also be influenced by 
economic and pragmatic considerations – where women increasingly find themselves 
raising children alone and having to sustain themselves and their children without the 
support of males.  
 
In this regard, South African trends are similar to those found elsewhere. Castells 
(1997:149-151), for example, shows that between the early 1970s and mid to late 
1980s, in developed countries there was an overall upward growth in the proportion 
of single-parents, invariably female headed households with dependent children  This 
general trend challenges the assumptions of traditional family forms of patriarchal 
domination with wives and children clustering around husbands (Castells 1997:156). 
Castells goes on to argue that in combination, declining fertility rates, low marriage 
rates and changes in household structure are a consequence of the crisis of the 
patriarchal family and reflect the end of patriarchy, a conclusion similar to 
Firestone’s (1970). Whether, in fact, this is the outcome in South Africa at this point 
is doubtful, although patriarchy as we know it  is coming under considerable multiple 
pressures. Firestone construes the family as a natural, biological and functional 
instrument of society. The SADHS (1998) findings suggest otherwise, that it is rather 





Barrett (1980:188) has critically considered Firestone’s conceptualisations of the 
family and others that give primacy to it, as an institution that locates women in 
society. Barrett (1980) argues that many sociologists, Marxist and feminist alike 
consider the family to be a natural unit, where the nuclear family form is seen as 
either a cause or an effect of broader social formations. To this end, Talcott Parsons 
(1970) provided the classic functionalist account of how the family fits into society, 
describing it as the site of reproduction, of labour power where the physical and 
emotional needs of workers are met, and children are socialised and economic 




consequence of external factors, a view echoed in Marxist accounts which see the 
family as an effect of relations of production.  
 
The evidence from South Africa challenges such functionalist assumptions and 
claims about the family. Rather, the complexity of family formation, the fact that a 
large proportion of families are femi-centric, inter-generational and not organised 
around the institution of marriage calls into question family formation as a condition 
of systemic functionality.  
 
Barrett (1980:195) also engages Firestone’s (1970) contention that patriarchy is the 
outcome of the divisions of men and women in the family, where the family is seen 
as a determinant of social processes and psychological being. This view implies that 
there is an “essential family whose internal structure may vary and whose relations 
to the system of production may vary, but which nevertheless persists across these 
historical transformations.” (Barrett 1980:195). In other words, Barrett (1980) refers 
to Rayna Rappa’s (1978) argument which states that the family thus conceived 
implies a pre-given natural unit to which human arrangements must adapt.  
 
Historically and taking into account cultural variation, ‘the facts’ suggest otherwise. 
Not only does childbirth vary in its degrees of disruption over time and space, as do 
the degrees of child dependency on adults, but even the link between mothers and 
children is far from universal as the evidence from the SADHS (1998) shows in 
respect of child rearing practices in South Africa. In short, it is only possible to 
concur with Barrett (1980) about the limits in accuracy and usefulness of Firestone’s 




“women are defined in terms of their anatomy and hence assumed to be 
‘naturally’ dependent upon men. ‘The family’, however, does not exist other than 
as an ideological construct, since the structure of the household, definition of 
kinship, and the ideology of ‘the family’ itself, have all varied enormously in 




Firestone can’t be separated from the period in which she was writing when the 
terms of sexual regulation were being transformed by female controlled 
contraception and economic independence. The value of her contribution to gender 
theorising is that she provides a radical critique of reproduction and the taken for 
granted nature of parental roles, raising motherhood as a possible option and not a 
prescriptive, indeed compulsory role (Giminez 1983:298-299). Her analysis and 
emphasis on sex also drew attention to the need for a fuller recognition of ‘the body 
as a material and physical phenomenon’ (Shilling 1997:81), which is implicated in 
action.  
 
The above contribution notwithstanding, Firestone’s ideas are both theoretically and 
empirically flawed. From the available empirical evidence it would seem that 
Firestone overestimates the power of contraceptive technology to alter patriarchy 
even as it gives women greater control over their reproductive lives because she 
underestimates the influence of social structural, institutional and interpersonal 
factors that shape gender inequality and women’s oppression. It is also clear that the 
limits and possibilities of biology are socially mediated at all times, even in the 





Firestone’s account of gender difference located in the biological body is a 
naturalistic view of the body; where the body is seen as pre-social and one on which 
the social (self and society) is constructed. Not only does this understanding locate 
the source of women’s inequality in the weakness of their bodies, but it also reduces 
the complexities of social relationships and inequalities to an unchanging pre-social 
body. At the same time it is this body which must be the generator of social action 
(Shilling 1993:37).  As Connell (1987:87) argues “in the reality of practice the body 
is never outside of history, and history never free of bodily presence and effects on 
the body.” He argues that the construction of the categories ‘men’ and ‘women’ as 
only being biologically based fails to account for the different experiences of bodies 




determination or practical relevance through practice which comes from social 
sources.  
 
At the heart of Firestone’s (1970) analysis of gender is her conception of the female 
body as a reproductive functionally constraining body. Grosz (1994:18) argues that 
in theorising gender, feminists have evoked the body as a social and discursive object 
that is linked to desire, signification and power. Firestone precludes the complexity 
of these possibilities, especially that the body can be a source of pleasure and desire. 
For her sexuality is inextricably linked to sex and for reproduction as well. 
 
Like de Beauvoir (1972) and many other modernist feminists, Firestone’s (1970) 
ideas are informed by a Cartesian logic, that in separating the body from the mind, 
she associates women with the body and men with the mind (Grosz 1994: 8-9). In 
arguing for women to assert control over their fertility and overcome the limiting 
constraints of women’s reproductive biology, she infers that the only way for women 
to occupy “mind” status is to become equal to men.  
 
Control over reproductive decisions (through the availability of contraceptives) in 
terms of frequency and timing or birth does not automatically free women from 
gender inequality and oppression in society. Further, reproductive policies and 
programmes that mainly target women are underpinned by essentialist assumptions 
about women as bearers and carers of children in society. The availability, and 
promotion by health providers, of contraceptive methods that target mostly women 
promotes the view that reproductive decision making is a ‘woman’s matter’. The fact 





In short, essentialising gender difference to reproductive biology cannot account for 
the complexity of social reality, just as overcoming the constraints of reproductive 
biology does not ipso facto lead to an end of gender oppression, patriarchy or 




            Part II - Gender as psychological essence 
 
Gender difference has been conceptualised and theorised by some gender theorists as 
a maternal essence which is a psychological attribute reflected in mothering practices 
in women. Psychoanalysis has been embraced by both sociologists and feminists 
who have attempted to use and also revise Freud’s (1917) psychoanalytical theory to 
explain gendered subjectivity, through examining early childhood relationships and 
attachments. The sociological theories influenced by psychoanalysis include the  
functionalism of Talcott Parsons (1970), the Marxism of the Frankfurt School of 
Horkheimer (1947) and Marcuse (1955) and psychoanalytic feminism of Juliet 
Mitchell (1974) and Nancy Chodorow (1978).  
 
The distinctive features of a psychoanalytically influenced sociology is that it focuses 
on the relationship between “unconscious mental processes and the organisation of 
conscious social life” (Rabow, Platt, and Goldman 1987: ix) as well as characterising 
the individual as an active subject as opposed to being a passive victim of external 
social forces. Psychoanalytic theories emphasise women’s oppression in terms of 
psycho social interfacing and in terms of men’s innate need to subjugate women for 
psychological reasons (Ritzer 1998:324). The appeal of psychoanalysis to 
sociologists and feminists engaged in theorising gender, lies in its emphasis on 
human subjectivity where gender is located at the level of the subject and individual 
psyche and domination is explained as being reproduced through individuals as 
opposed to an emphasis on social structures. Walker (1995:426) has argued that the 
use of the concept of social identity in studying motherhood focuses on women as 
agents and she opens up the way for a connection to be made between individual and 









Marshall (1994:28) argues that the  sociological theorisation of gender is 
underpinned by modernisation theory which regards social life as differentiated and 
separated into spheres - the public and the private. In this context, women are seen 
predominantly to occupy the private sphere where they specialise in reproductive 
work which functions to serve the needs of society. Marshall (1994:107) identifies 
Chodorow (1978), Dinnerstein (1976) and Ortner (1974) as feminists who all 
characterise human activity as being universally divided into two spheres – the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’. Women and children are confined to the private sphere 
where women’s work is organised around mothering children and this activity is seen 
as pivotal to the development of gender identity. Women’s lower status in society is 
is explained by their mothering activities in the private sphere which is valued less in 
society than the human activity performed by men, who are located in the public 
sphere.  
 
Marshall (1994:107) also argues that “most socialist feminist theory tends toward 
essentialism based on an historical reification of women’s experience and a 
corresponding reification of ‘gender identity’. She contends that the reason for this is 
that socialist feminist theories draw on Marxist theory that locates subjectivity and 
consciousness in human activity as it is organised under capitalism. Ritzer 
(1998:305) argues that the psychoanalytic feminists, Chodorow (1978) and 
Dinnerstein (1976), also employ the concept of patriarchy to describe women’s 






Psychoanalytical feminists explain the reason and persistence for male domination 
(patriarchy) as men’s and women’s differential, early gendered, childhood emotional 
development. The reason for men developing similar psyches to other men and 
women developing similar psyches and personalities to other women is related to the 
similar socio-emotional environment in which their psyches develop (Ritzer 1998: 




domination is also embedded in their personality development. Men and women do 
not only develop different roles but different psyches which makes them unequal. 
Psychoanalytic explanations of gender focus on the unconscious processes through 
which different gender identities are transmitted and the importance of early 
childhood interactions within the family as the basis of gender identities.  
 
The main criticisms that have been levelled at the psychoanalytical theories of 
gender is that they assume an ahistorical, universal and transcultural kinship structure 
to be at the root of women’s oppression (Marshall 1994: 81). Marshall further argues 
that the assumption that women universally ‘mother’ denies all the other 
contradictory and complex social relations in which women’s oppression takes place. 
Spelman (1988:85) points out that apart from male dominance, there are other forms 
of dominance which include racism and classism, which characterise most societies. 
However, Spelman (1988) maintains that the usefulness of Chodorow’s theoretical 
account is her emphasis on the socially specific contexts that give rise to the gender 
identity which she describes. Several other theorists have tried to test the usefulness 
of her theory of the acquisition of gender identity in other social and historically 
specific contexts. Segura and Pierce (1993:66) argue that several social scientists 
maintain that the limitations of a psychoanalytic sociological approach lie in it being 
too ‘psychological’, ‘individualistic’ and ‘nonfalsifiable’.  
 
To better understand the way psychonanalytic feminist theory uses gender 
personality to explain gender differences I have chosen to examine Chodorow’s 1978 
work  The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. 
In the next chapter, I will analyse the conceptual and theoretical ideas that underpin 
Chodorow’s  model of the reproduction of gender and in the next (chapter five) I will  
test these against the empirically specific social context of mothering as reflected in 
Social Welfare Policy in South Africa and the Child Support Grant (CSG) 










The psychological reproduction of gender: the theory 
 
 
4.1. Nancy Chodorow  
 
Theories and conceptions are historically and culturally specific. Chodorow’s 1978 
work, The Reproduction of Mothering, was written in the late 1970s, the early period 
of the contemporary feminist movement when most social theorists were searching 
for a grand theory - that is, a single dominant cause for inequality (Chodorow 
1989:1). Chodorow herself has argued that her writing was a reaction to Freud’s 
prevailing theory of personality where there was an emphasis on the father and 
Oedipus complex. She wrote the book to challenge the pervasive biological 
determinist explanations of social scientists, feminists and people opposed to 
feminism who claimed a natural connection between women’s childbearing and 
lactation capacities and their responsibility for childcare. For Chodorow the activity 
of women’s mothering was socially and psychologically constituted rather than 
biologically. Nicholson (1994:93) points out, that Chodorow’s ideas were a part of 
Second Wave feminism of the ‘70s and ‘80s that started developing theories to 
explain the similarities between women and their difference to men. 
 
Unlike Firestone (1970), Chodorow (1999) does not focus on mothering as defined 
by women’s biological functions of pregnancy, childbearing or lactation. Rather, she 
focuses on the childrearing aspects of mothering which she argues are not necessarily 
tied to the biological capacities of women. Chodorow is classified in feminist theory 
as a social constructionist rather than a biological determinist because her 
explanation of gender difference emphasises the social practice of mothering. Grosz 







conceive of the body as being biologically determined, fixed and ahistorical in that 
they see the body as providing the raw material for ideology and cultural production. 
They, together with biological determinist theorists, also seek to eliminate/neutralise 
the body to achieve gender equality. However, unlike Firestone (1970), who 
proposed the use of medical technology to do this, Chodorow proposes the 
equalisation of the sexes through the reorganisation of childrearing which would then 
lead to the psychological re-socialisation of children. 
 
In the new preface to her 1978 book Chodorow (1999:xv) states that she developed 
her theory at a moment in time when full-time mothering was the ideological (albeit 
not the empirical) norm, a norm that  did not acknowledge the other parts of 
women’s lives and identity. She argues that with the development of capitalism and 
industrialisation, the structure of the family and women’s lives changed (1978:4). 
She held that the ‘Western family’ – a married couple with children – had been 
nuclear “for centuries” creating an exclusive parent-child realm with the family 
mainly responsible for the rearing of children. The family came to represent the 
personal and private sphere of society where women’s role was defined in terms of 
taking care of children and men. This caring role was not just physical but was also 
relational and personal. And even as women’s productive and reproductive roles and 
the form of the family changed, due to women’s increased participation in paid work, 
fluctuating marriage and fertility rates, organised childcare and schooling outside the 
home, women continued to take the primary responsibility for children.  
 
Following criticism of her universalising and historically questionable assumptions 
about the family, in a 1999 revised preface to her original work Chodorow contends 
that despite these limitations and the changes in women’s lives, her analysis is still 




“the enduring contribution of the book, I believe, is in its understanding of 





While recognising that family forms are culturally specific she maintains that certain 
psychic capacities and processes, namely development of the self and of gender 
identity through attachments and identifications with primary figures – are universal 
to all human beings. In so doing she maintains her original position that men and 
women develop essential gendered identities in the process of self identity formation. 
 
Chodorow has been very influential in psychoanalytical theories of gender. Her 
distinctive contribution to the theorisation of gender is her use of Freudian theory to 
suggest that some aspects of gender difference derive from unconscious 
psychological processes. She argues that although other theorists (e.g. Frederick 
Engels 1932, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman 1898) have recognised the family, and 
mothering in particular, as a central feature of women’s oppression, what they have 
failed to understand is how women themselves are produced and how they come to 





In developing her explanation of gendered personalities, Chodorow’s (1978) analysis 
also draws on several theoretical streams – psychoanalytic, Marxist and feminist. 
Marshall (1994:80) characterises Chodorow’s (1978) work as a sociological account 
that relates social reproduction to both societal and psychological factors. 
Chodorow’s conception  of mothering include elements of Gayle Rubin’s (1975)  
notion that every society is organised by a ‘sex/gender system’ as much as by a 
particular organisation of production and that this sex-gender system of any society 
is located in family and kinship organisation which reproduce socially organised 
gender and sexuality. For Rubin (1975) all sex-gender systems have organised 
society around two genders, where the sexual division of labour has women 
mothering in heterosexual marriage. This ‘sex/gender system’ plays a significant role 
in determining the constitutive elements of society, in much the same way that the 
dominant mode of production does. It creates  a set of arrangements whereby 
biological sex and procreation are shaped and satisfied by human and social 




system can be sexually egalitarian even though they are and have always been, male-
dominated.  
 
The other feminist ideas influencing Chodorow’s theoretical formulations were those 
articulated by Michelle Rosaldo (1974) and Sherry Ortner (1974). These authors 
contend that in distinguishing between the domestic and public aspects of social 
organisation, all societies locate mothers and children primarily in the private sphere 
whereas men are primarily assigned to that of the public.  
 
Although her theory is classified as a psychoanalytic theory of gender, Chodorow 
(1978:47) argues that her explanation of the development of gendered personalities 
draws specifically on object-relations theory, a more social psychological approach 
(Fairbairn 1952; Winnicott 1958) than classical Freudian sexual instinctual 
determinism. She emphasises relationships and issues of intimacy and separation 
rather than sexuality as important to psychological development. Object-relations 
theory is used by her to explain the reproduction of mothering and the reproduction 
of sex, gender and family organisation. Chodorow emphasises the importance of pre-
Oedipal experiences rather than the Oedipal in the creation of gender. For her, gender 
differences emerge in object-relational experiences which have differential effects on 
the constitution of the mental structures and psychic lives of men and women.  
 
Whereas Freudian psychoanalysis assumes a biological and instinctual basis for the 
sexual division of labour, gender personality and heterosexuality, the argument that 
Chodorow makes is that the psyches of men and women emerge out of specific 
social relations between men and women and children within a particular kind of 
family structure. She (1978:49) focuses on the ways that family structure and the 
asymmetrical organisation of the family affect unconscious psychic structure and 
processes. In this she gives a materialist account of human gendered development, 







Chodorow, gender identity is located in mothering and rooted in the sexual division 
of labour:  
“Elements of social structure, especially as transmitted through the organisation 
of parenting as well as features of individual families, are appropriated and 
transformed internally through unconscious processes and come to influence 
affective life and psychic structure” (Chodorow 1978:50). 
 
This internalisation is not a direct transmission into the unconscious experience of 
self-in-relationship to what the child experiences objectively in the social world. For 
the child, these social experiences have varied psychological meanings depending on 
how they are internalised, be it as distortions, defences and transformations. In fact, 
the meaning and resonance of the experience depends, among other things, on the 
quality and settings of relationships and the physiological arena of relationships and 
the child’s maturational stage. In other words consciousness emerges out of a 
particular set of social relations and material reality; it emerges out of a context. The 
social context that she refers to is a particular set of social relations within the family; 
that of mother-child, child-absent working father. The psychological characteristics 
which emerge from this specific set of relations is the same gendered psyches for all 
men and women. In engaging the genesis of gender difference, Chodorow moves 
away from a purely structural account to one that situates difference  in the relations 
that are reproduced by parents and children through their individual psyches. 
 
Psychoanalysis seeks to understand the relationship between mental life and 
behaviour by interpreting people’s words, where words act as a means of accessing 
the content of their unconscious processes and structure (Chodorow 1978:52). For 
her (1978: 53), psychoanalysis provides an explanation of how social forms and 





She uses this approach to try to understand the persistence of mothering by women, 




despite their changing economic, social and political circumstances. For Chodorow, 
as in much psychoanalytic theory, considerable importance is attached to infant 
relations with their mothers. Psychoanalytic theorists hold that because this is an 
experience that is emotionally meaningful, it shapes their unconscious. In addition, 
for her, early childhood development is important because it is where children form 
emotional attachments with same sex-parents or adults through identification. She 
argues that in all societies infants and children experience their earliest childhood 
development in close relationship with women, as it is women who ubiquitously take 
primary responsibility for them. The universal fact that it is women who mother, she 
argues, is something that is culturally rather than biologically prescribed. It is 
something that becomes integrated into women’s psyche: 
“Women, as mothers, produce daughters with mothering capacities and the 
desire to mother. These capacities and needs are built into and grow out of the 
mother-daughter relationship itself. By contrast, women as mothers (and men as 
not- mothers) produce sons whose nurturant capacities and needs have been 
systematically curtailed and repressed. This prepares men for their less affective 
later family role and for their primary participation in the impersonal, extra 
familial world of work and public life. The sexual and familial division of labor in 
which women mother and are more involved in interpersonal, affective 
relationships than men, produces in daughters and sons a division of 
psychological capacities which leads them to reproduce this sexual and familial 
division of labor....Women have primary responsibility for childcare in families 
and outside them; women by and large want to mother, and get gratification from 
their mothering; and with all the conflicts and contradictions, women have 





And just as women’s psyches are prepared for mothering, so the psyche of men are 
prepared “for their less affective later family role, and for primary participation in 
the impersonal extra-familial world of work and public life” (p.7). For her, the 




the basis of gender differences in respect of sexuality and personality as well as 
family and public life.   
 
Her explanation of gender difference centres on the social activity or practices of 
mothering and its psychological reproduction. She argues that mothering is central to 
the social organisation of gender including the construction and reproduction of male 
dominance. Chodorow states that men are primarily located in the public sphere and 
that public institutions define and provide rules for and rank domestic units and 
men’s relations to each other separate from the domestic sphere. Since men are 
located here they have the power to enforce institutions of social and political control 
in the public sphere as well as the domestic sphere. Men’s primary location in the 
public sphere then renders society as masculine (Chodorow 1978:9). In turn, 
“women’s mothering determines women’s primary location in the domestic sphere 
and creates the basis for the structural differentiation of domestic and public 





How then do boys and girls develop gendered psyches?  A tenet of psychoanalytic 
theory is that the early relationship of infants to caretakers is very important for their 
mental and physical survival and that their very survival even depends on this social 
environment and relationship (Chodorow 1978:57). This in turn, means that constant 
care and a certain quality of care is necessary for personality development. In other 
words infant development always happens in relation to another person, although, as 
Chodorow notes, this care giver does not necessarily have to be the biological mother 
just as long as the person who substitutes fulfils the physiological and psychological 
needs of the child. And it is the early mother-infant relationship that is responsible 
for creating different parenting capacities in children of both genders (Chodorow 
1978: 90).  Notwithstanding the fact that the character and relationship of the 
mother-child relationship is historically and socially context specific, she holds that 
the relationship between mothers and infants in Western industrial society “reveals 




female – have of their mothers in particular, and of women in general” (p.91), and 
therefore has universal relevance. 
 
Chodorow then proceeds to elaborate on the differential relationship that boys and 
girls have to their mother in the earliest (pre-Oedipal) period of their development. 
For her, mothering and nurturing qualities develop in girls and not in boys as a 
consequence of object relational experiences, where sons’ nurturant capacities and 
needs are repressed while those of daughters are encouraged.  
 
By exploring both sides of the mother-infant relationship, Chodorow tries to account 
for why women mother. She does this also from a psychological perspective. In this 
way she accounts for how the different psyches are therefore constituted mutually in 
the family and reproduced by parents and the child in their psyche. Meanings are 
assigned unconsciously by boys and girls to men and women as object relations. By 
so doing Chodorow introduces the concept of individual agency (albeit an 
unconscious process) into her discussion of men and women’s behaviour.  
 
For Chodorow the pre-Oedipal experiences of boys and girls differ because of the 
asymmetrical organisation of parenting in family structures. 
“Because mothers are the same gender as their daughters and have been girls, 
mothers of daughters tend not to experience their infant daughters as separate 





Mothers experience a sense of oneness and continuity with both sexes; but with their 
daughters they experience them as more like themselves, seeing girls as extensions of 
themselves. But for children, while both sexes identify with their mothers, girl 
children do so for longer, developing a sense of separation later than boys. The long 
term consequence of this differentiated identification process is that, even though 
women  develop a separate sense of self (ego), their sense of identity develops in 




“As long as women mother, we can expect that a girl’s pre-oedipal period will be 
longer than that of a boy and that women, more than men, will be more open to 
and preoccupied with those very relational issues that go into mothering-feelings 
of primary identification, lack of separateness or differentiation, ego and body, 
ego boundary issues and primary love not under sway of the reality principle” 
(p.110). 
 
While maintaining mothers as the primary object relation of girls , they shift their 
attachment to their fathers and men in general, in order to attain a heterosexual 
orientation (ibid:192-3). Fathers and men become primary erotic objects to women 
when girls emerge from their Oedipus complex. According to Chodorow, this shift in 
the object and the nature of their focus (from mothers to fathers, from emotions to 
eros) means that women have to look elsewhere and not to their mothers for love and 
emotional gratification: 
“One way that women fulfil these needs is through the creation and maintenance 
of important personal relations with other women…However, deep affective 
relationships to women are hard to come by on a routine, daily, ongoing basis for 
many women…There is a second alternative…Given the triangular situation and 
emotional asymmetry of her own parenting, a woman’s relation to a man 
requires on the level of psychic structure a third person, since it was originally 
established in a triangle… Then, a child completes the relational triangle for a 
woman” (p.201). 
 




“For men, by contrast, the heterosexual relationship alone recreates the early 
bond to their mother; a child interrupts it. Men moreover do not define 
themselves in relationships, and have come to suppress relational capacities and 
repress relational needs. This prepares them to participate in the affect-denying 





Mothers also respond to their sons very differently. As their masculine opposite, 
women push boys away allowing them to separate themselves from their mothers 
earlier on in their development.  This act of active separation denies them the 
experience of primary love and empathy from their mothers. While boys retain their 
mothers as their main love object, in boyhood they learn to repress their attachment 
to their mothers in order to resolve their Oedipal complex. As adults, however, they 
seek this primary relationship with someone like their mother. 
  
Chodorow goes on to argue that boys and girls resolve their Oedipal complex 
differently Whereas girls continue to be attached to their mothers even though they 
try to separate from them and form attachments to their fathers, the oedipal love of 
boys for their mothers is more overwhelming and threatening to their egos and sense 
of (masculine) independence, and hence it is repressed. This difference gives rise to a 
gendered difference in people’s “relational potential” where men develop a sense of 
self by repudiating relations and connections while women derive their sense of 
themselves by asserting their relations to others (1978:166).  
 
Chodorow does not attribute any value judgements to male and female personalities. 
She argues that the sum total of girls and boys psychological development is that 
girls are endowed with a greater potential for participation in relational spheres than 
boys (Chodorow 1978:169). Men experience a constant need to prove their 
masculinity by defining themselves as separate from their mothers (repressing 
identification with their mother). Thus, boys are ambivalent towards women, seeking 
both emotional attachment and a distinct separateness which is expressed as 
domination. By contrast, girls are preoccupied with relational issues, fulfilling their 
emotional needs by becoming mothers and having babies while meeting their 




“Women’s mothering then produces psychological self-definition and capacities 
appropriate for mothering in women, and curtails and inhibits these capacities 





One of the consequences of women’s mothering is the reproduction of their location 
and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. Their mothering interest produces and 
reproduces their social roles and positions in the family and in society. 
“The reproduction of women’s mothering is the basis for the reproduction of 
women’s location and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. This mothering, 
and its generalization to women’s structural location in the domestic sphere, 
links the contemporary social organisation of gender and social organization of 
production and contributes to the reproduction of each. That women mother is a 
fundamental organizational feature of the sex-gender system: It is basic to the 
sexual division of labor and generates a psychology about women’s capacities 
and nature. Women, as wives and mothers, contribute as well to the daily and 
generational reproduction, both physical and psychological, of male workers and 
thus the reproduction of capitalist production” (p.208).  
 
   Furthermore: 
“Institutionalised features of family structure and the social relations of 
reproduction reproduce themselves. A psychoanalytic investigation shows that 
women’s mothering capacities and commitments, and general psychological 
capacities and wants which are the basis of women’s work, are built 
developmentally into feminine personality. Because women are themselves 
mothered by women, they grow up with the relational capacities and needs, and 
psychological definition of self-in-relationship, which commit them to mothering. 
Men, because they are mothered by women do not. Women mother daughters 





For Chodorow, a consequence of this differential development is that boys grow up 
to be achievement-oriented and emotionally closed to others while girls grow up to 
be emotionally open to and even dependent on the approval of others. Thus they are 




reproduces a gendered psychology and gender inequality. Women’s mothering 
produces women who are good at relationships and bad at autonomy.  
 
Chodorow argues that “the structure of production and reproduction requires and 
presupposes those specific relational modes” (p. 190). The masculine personality 
happens in the family context of fathers who are uninvolved in child care and in a 
societal context of sexual inequality and an ideology of masculine superiority. The 
absence and inaccessibility of fathers in the family leads to them being idealised by 
mothers and children. In the process they acquire an ideological superiority. The 
consequence of all this is that “the social organisation of parenting produces sexual 
inequality, not simply role differentiation” (p. 214). 
 
In brief, Chodorow argues that the ‘essential’ difference between men and women 
lies in their psyches, which are constituted and reproduced in a particular kind of 
family structure through the activity of mothering, which in turn, gives rise to object-
relations between parents and children. This mothering activity produces different 
experiences of object relations for both sexes and therefore different psychical 
capacities and characteristics for men and women. While Chodorow’s emphasis is on 
female subjectivity, she incorporates ideas of social and cultural reproduction 





Chodorow concludes by suggesting that since parenting qualities are created in 
women through specific social and psychological processes, they could also be 
created in men. Given that psychological development in children requires warmth, 
contact and reliable care as much as physical care, it is possible that it can be 
provided by men – fathers and others. The current organisation of parenting separates 
children and men, however, children could be dependent from the outset on people of 
both genders and establish an individuated sense of self in relation to both. In this 
way masculinity would not be tied to the denial of male dependence and devaluation 




difference and inequality, a solution that requires the social reorganisation of 
parenting to transform gendered psyches. 
 
Two decades after developing these ideas, Chodorow accepted the criticisms of her 
characterisation of family structure and her search for a single cause to account for 
gender inequality. However, she still maintains the importance of psychoanalytic 
theory in explaining social and cultural specificity.   
 
In a new preface (1999) to her book, she reflects on and has revised her own 
understanding, pointing out a tension in her own logic. For her, if her main 
contribution is an account of the psychological reproduction of mothering, where 
psychological subjectivity is central to a meaningful life, the argument for equal 
parenting based on legislating for political equality (from without) ignores the very 
subjectivity, centrality and distinctiveness of the mother-child bond. By 
acknowledging the centrality of mothering for women, she is arguing that mothers 
produce and reproduce women who mother because they also gain meaning, 
satisfaction and gratification from this activity and do not mother simply because of 
the requirements and demands of society. She ends the preface by arguing that “I am 
now more respectful of the ways in which individuals do in fact create their 
emotional reality and sense of personal meaning and less absolute about how they 





This understanding developed in the process of her later writings Feminism and 
Psychoanalytic Theory (1989) and The Power of Feelings (1994) which refined and 
advanced her original thesis in The Reproduction of Mothering (1978). In Feminism 
and Psychoanalytic Theory (1989:5) she argues that there is no single factor to 
explain male dominance but rather it arises from a web of social, psychological and 
cultural relations. She argues that it is not possible to privilege psychology, psyche or 
culture. Also, a multiplex conception of gender relations and sexuality, while 




terms of hierarchy, domination, inequality and patriarchy. Gender and sexuality can 
include benefits to women (ibid: 5). If, in Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory 
(1989) she acknowledges that in The Reproduction of Mothering (1979) she implied 
that women’s mothering was the main cause of male dominance, she contends that 
her focus on the mother and pre-Oedipal stage of development was her historical and 
contextual reaction to the exclusive Freudian focus on fathers and the Oedipal 
complex. This said, she continues to maintain its relevance as a social and cultural 
fact, given that we are still mothered by women, and that in all societies women 
rather than men have primary parenting responsibilities. Thus, despite 
acknowledging the multiplex nature of gender and its causes, she holds that: 
“Women’s inequality may be multiply caused and situated, but I have yet to find 
a convincing explanation for the virulence of masculine anger, fear, and 
resentment of women, or of aggression toward them, that bypasses – even if it 
does not rest with – the psychoanalytic account, first suggested with Horney, that 
men resent and fear women because they experience them as powerful mothers”  
(1989:6). 
 
She accepts that gender is experienced in a variety of ways around varied axes of 
power and this makes it possible to both valorise women’s qualities and see them as 
a product of inequality. She also argues (ibid:7) that she would not, as she did in The 
Reproduction of Mothering (1979), give determinist primacy to social relations 
which generate psychological patterns, because “psychology itself is equally 
important to, constitutive and determinative of human life.” She argues that the 
formation of psyche, self and identity is universal and psychoanalysis provides a 
method and theory to investigate how these are constructed.   
 




“gender difference is not absolute, abstract or irreducible; it does not involve an 
essence of gender. Gender differences, and the experience of difference, like 




In addition I want to suggest a relational notion of difference. Difference and 
gender difference do not exist as things in themselves; they are created 
relationally, that is, in relationship. We cannot understand difference apart from 
this relational construction.”   
 
Lastly, Chodorow explicitly distances herself from essentialist conceptions of the 
feminine, which argue that men and women are fundamentally different and these 
differences must recognised. However, together with other critics, I argue that her 
theory is essentialist in that she reduces gender to universal psychological processes 
which emerge from a universal practice by women – mothering – that arises within a 
universal social structure – the family. 
  
4.2. The limits of gender difference as psyche/personality 
 
Chodorow’s (1989:18) writing is reflective of her own work, theoretically 
categorising her explanation of gender at the same time as she considers some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled against her: 
“I am a self defined ‘interpretive,’ or even ‘humanistic,’ ‘psychoanalytic 
sociologist and psychoanalytic feminist.’ I have been criticized by sociologists for 
being ungrounded empirically and individualistic theoretically, for not 
understanding societal determinism, and for underestimating the force of social 
reality. At the same time, I have been criticized by Lacanian psychoanalytic 
feminists for the opposite, for being empiricist and socially determinist and for 
seeing the unconscious as a sociological phenomenon rather than an analytically 
irreducible and unique register of being and level of analysis.” 
This said, the theoretical, epistemological and methodological limitations in 
Chodorow’s psychological conception of gender that a reading of her work gives rise 
to, are worth considering in this exploration of gender essentialism. Theoretically, 







unconscious attribute which develops psychologically and resides in people’s 
personalities. She reduces the essential gender difference between men and women 
to their personalities or psyches which arise from the activity of women’s mothering. 
According to Chodorow it is women’s primary mothering role which results in their 
primary location in the private sphere and it is this activity, combined with their 
location in the private sphere, which makes them dependent on men. This is 
Chodorow’s explanation for the cause of women being devalued by the bearing and 
rearing of children, by society and their oppression by men.  
 
As she states above Chodorow has been criticised by sociologists for being 
theoretically individualistic and for not accounting sufficiently for the power of 
social forces in determining behaviour. Wharton (2005:31) classifies Chodorow’s 
conception of gender as an individualist psychological approach which sees gender 
as being produced through a process of socialisation, where biological sex is 
transformed into gendered personalities through unconscious psychological 
processes. Wharton argues that individualist approaches to gender locate the primary 
sociological action at the level of individuals. Gender is seen as an individual 
characteristic and, as conceptualised by Chodorow, is an internalised attribute or 
characteristic trait that men and women possess. The unit of analysis for 
investigation is individuals. Parker, Mars, Ransome and Stanworth (2003:111) argue 
that methodological individualists are incorrect in their analysis in that “the capacity 
to act depends not on one’s humanity, but on the powers one has by virtue of one’s 
relation to collectivities and institutions. No one would deny that one’s position in 





Notwithstanding Chodorow’s individualist emphasis, she does look at social 
structural influences, particularly the way that the structure of families gives rise to 
gendered personalities. In this her conceptualisation could be interpreted as social 
psychological, although the way she uses social context – that is how family 




socially appropriate behaviour – suggests that in explaining gender she is more 
inclined to individualist theories that favour internalised psychological motivation  
rather than social relations. Young (1983:142) argues that this view reduces social 





Somewhat contradictorily, Chodorow turns to the social context in her search for a 
solution to the gender differences and inequality. For her, the answer lies in shared 
parenting which she believes will transform individual gendered personalities and 
address gender inequality. Shared parenting would allow girls and women to 
participate in the public sphere while it would transform boys and men into carers 
who value women.  Lorber et al (1981:483) believes that there is a problem of 
directionality and causation which arises from Chodorow’s individualistic 
psychoanalytical bias, where personality rather than social structure acts as the link 
between individuals and social institutions and where social institutions respond to 
and are determined by personalities rather than vice versa. She also argues that 
Chodorow’s solution to gender difference and inequality remains individualistic, in 
that she wants to change men and women by changing individual parenting 
arrangements, rather than by changing the social structures that produce parenting 
arrangements. For Lorber et al (1981:486) changing the social structures that produce 
parenting arrangements would entail giving both men and women opportunities to 
earn equal incomes and therefore would make it too costly for women to mother full 
time. Lorber et al (1981:485) also engages with the logic of Chodorow’s solution of 
shared parenting by arguing that, if both men and women parent, then children will 
acquire both affective and instrumental capacities. As individuals with both these 
capacities, the necessity for biological men and biological women to parent falls 
away, as the same job could be done by single parents or same sex parents or non-
biological parents. However, she argues that this changed form of parenting would 
then have very different implications for pre-Oedipal and Oedipal relationships for 






Young (1983:141) argues that Chodorow assumes that individuals are the unit of 
institutions, rather than focussing on the interactions among individuals, and that 
therefore she mistakenly reads the structure of the institutions “off from the structure 
of individual personalities”.  
 
This said, these critics also recognise that Chodorow’s individualism is tempered by 
the inclusion of elements of a more holistic approach because she situates the 
individual in a family context and in relationships that influence individual 
behaviour. Fay (1996:70) cites Gidden’s structuration theory (1991) where he argues 
for the importance of both agency and structure in shaping human behaviour as an 
attempt to combine these approaches. 
 
Linked to criticism of her being too theoretically individualistic, are concerns about 
her use of socialisation theory – more specifically, identification theory in 
psychoanalysis - to explain how gendered personalities are acquired. Socialisation 
theory has been criticised for treating men and women as homogenous groups that 
experience the same kind of early childhood development (Gerson 1985:192). It 
construes gender as a characteristic that is a stable part of an individual’s personality. 
Wilson and Weir (1986:168) argue that psychoanalytic feminism seems to restate a 
‘psychic law and order’ that merely describes and fixes the process of the production 
and reproduction of women’s oppression. While Andersen (1997:49) maintains that 
socialisation does not occur in a vacuum. Gender differences acquired by individuals 
have an institutional basis and social structural origins. 
 
Chodorow has also been criticised from a microstructural perspective. Risman argues 
that: 
“Material conditions, situational constraints, opportunity structures, socially 







all operated to create and sustain cultural definitions of gender over and above 
gender-typed training and personality development” (1987:8). 
 
Because gender is located at the level of the individual, individualist approaches to 
gender usually seek solutions to gender through the transformation of individuals. By 
contrast, Chodorow (1978) proposed shared parenting as a way of transforming 
gendered personalities. Risman (1987:28) however writes that:  
“Only when situational contexts change, will parenting behaviour among 
men become more similar to parenting behaviour of women”. 
 
For all their specificity, the above criticisms generally articulate a social structural 
understanding of gender where gendered behaviour and social practices within the 
family are constituted by the structures and practices of organisations and social 
institution (Wharton 2005: 8). Relations within the family do not exist in isolation 
from other social relations within other social institutions in society. For example, 
the unequal power and participation of men and women in the workplace also 
impacts significantly on their behaviour, roles and status within the family. Young 
(1983 cited in Trebilcot 1983:135) criticises Chodorow for using gendered 
psychological dispositions to explain social inequality and difference, the split 
between private and public spheres, relations of hierarchy in institutions etc. She is 
especially critical of Chodorow’s argument that male domination is caused by gender 
differentiation, and she sees her as overpsychologising a social phenomenon that is 
materially and socially structured in and by society. Ritzer (1998:315) contends that 
women’s roles cannot be compartmentalised in separate institutions. Rather, there is 
a constant interaction and merging of their roles in the several institutions they 




Di Leonardo and Lancaster’s (1996: 47-48) critique focuses on the way Chodorow 
(1978) has conceptualised gender as women’s reproductive labour linked to their 
reproductive capacities and their universal caring or mothering role. They (Di 




lead to a mistaken conclusion that  it is mothering that causes children to devalue 
women, but her understanding of  women’s place in society as the domestic sphere of  
childbirth, childcare, cooking and housework is ahistorical and acultural. Di 
Leonardo and Lancaster point out that the idea of a ‘woman’s sphere’ is a Western 
historical construct which came into its own in the Victorian era. In reality, women’s 
labour differs across time and space and that even the division between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres is neither universal nor uniform. 
 
Although Chodorow (1980) criticises essentialist notions of gender difference, her 
theory can be characterised as a form of gender essentialism because she reduces 
gender difference to universal gendered personalities spawned by a universal type of 
human activity in women – mothering – which arises from a universal type of social 
organisation – the family. It is this mothering activity/practice which creates 
universal personality differences in male and female children who then reproduce 
these differences as adults. Marshall (1994:104) argues that what is common to all 
gender essentialist explanations is that they hinge on the specificity of the female 
body and its connection to reproduction of the species. Each essentialist argument 
remains a form of biological essentialism. Although Chodorow’s focus is on the link 
between mothering and the gendering of individual psyche, why women assume this 
responsibility in the first instance presupposes a biological essence. 
 
Nicholson (1994:94) argues that although Chodorow appears to build on a cultural 
explanation, her ideas are in fact founded in biology. Her attempt to account 
theoretically for children’s development across cultures  
“rests on the assumption that the possession of certain kinds of genitals conveys 
a common meaning across this range of cultures to make possible the postulation 





Nicholson and other commentators observe that a ‘feminism of difference’ is really a 




describe some kind of essence, even if they contend that this essence is socially 
constructed.  Chodorow’s characterisation of women’s personalities is based on 
generalisations underpinned by assumptions about the body in relation to character. 
 
Marshall (1994:81) states that to view women universally as ‘mothers’ excludes the 
complex and contradictory web of social relations in which women’s oppression can 
be situated. While Chodorow (1978) does not ignore the role of social structure in 
her account of gender, her theory  could be seen as a mere explanation of how people 
accommodate an already existing sexual division of labour, without explaining how 





Chodorow’s theory of gendered personality development linked to mothering has 
been criticised because it seeks to generalise to all women possibly typical mothering 
experiences of North American and European middle class white women generated 
by an historically specific heterosexual family structure. Several empirical studies 
have tested the usefulness of this claim in different social contexts. Studies by Segura 
and Pierce (1993) show that the particularistic features of Chicana/o families with 
multiple mothering figures has different implications for gender identity 
development in children  The ideas of motherhood from Africa, Finland, Sweden and 
the African Diaspora are examined in Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African 
Women Studies, Issue 4, 2002 and Issue 5, 2003. All point to the ways in which 
experiences of motherhood are tied to sociohistorical and cultural contexts. Other 
feminists (Rich 1980, Flax 1981, Joseph 1981, Lorber et al 1981, and Spelman 1988) 
also specifically criticise Chodorow’s typology of family structure. For Lorber 
(1981:483), Chodorow’s explanation of the centrality of mothering for women is 
based on a certain kind of mothering in an isolated nuclear family. From her 
(Chodorow 1978: 485) research this type of family is not necessarily typical of the 
varying relationships of American working class families and the values they instil in 
their children. Spelman (1988:85) has also specifically argued that race, ethnicity and 





Magwaza (2003) argues that mothering practices of South African women are 
influenced by their socio-cultural and political histories, where mothering is often a 
communal shared practice. In similar vein, Oyewumi from Nigeria (2000:1097) 
criticises Chodorow’s ‘nuclear motherhood’ which sees the meaning of motherhood 
tied to her identity as the patriarch’s wife and to relationships within a nuclear 
family. African constructions of motherhood are different. There are many mothers, 
many fathers and many ‘husbands’ in African households and therefore the mother – 
child relationship is different. She also contends that dominant Western feminist 
accounts of motherhood see it as a gender category where women are perceived as 
subordinated and oppressed and males as privileged. This interpretation 
patriarchalises motherhood in a way that reduces it to a powerless condition without 
agency. By defining mothering as primarily nurturing, she claims that Chodorow 
portrays mothers as trapped in the role of caregiving, whereas African conceptions of 
motherhood see it as a revered role that is imbued with power and social status. 
Alsop et al (2002:61) also argue that Chodorow’s work is not as relevant in the 
context of changing household structures even in white middle class North American 





Chodorow’s conception of gendered personalities is also criticised for not looking at 
the role of social interaction and social relations in the production of gender. 
Through this lens an explanation of gender would analyse social expectations, social 
categorisation and classification by others and the environment as important 
influences on gendered behaviour and personalities. From this perspective male 
domination and power relations between men and women in relation to the sexual 
division of labour in the family plays an equally important role in the development of 
individual gendered personality and the roles of men and women in the family.  For 
Alsop et al (2002:61) Chodorow’s depiction of how men’s psyche unconsciously 
develops in terms of rejecting their feminine attributes, fails to show how men 




against women. Chodorow’s explanation rests on an absent father rather than the 
pervasiveness of male power in society and the family.  
 
Young (1983:136) also argues that by locating the source of male domination and 
men and women’s differential emotional development in patriarchy alone, her 
psychological conception does not account for the actual material sources of 
patriarchy within the family, ideology, institutional arrangements and practices; the 
organisation of production, distribution and allocation of resources and the rules 
according to which all of these are organised. Chodorow also does not look at male 
power or the power of the father in the development of gender personalities (Young 
1983:137). Just as she generalises about mothering, Chodorow also makes universal 
claims about male domination without the empirical evidence about its historical and 
cultural specificity. 
 
Epistemologically, Chodorow subscribes to paradigms that have variously been 







7 An Action is 'social' if the acting individual takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course (Weber 1949). 
8 Interpretive social science is related to various research strategies, theories and approaches in 
sociology and philosophy; hermeneutics, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, Freudian 
psychology, semiology, linguistics, phenomenological sociology, symbolic interaction and 
existentialism (Rosenau 1988:427; Johnson, Dandeker, Ashworth 1984; Berger and Luckman 1967; 
Weber 1974/1981; Andersen, Hughes and Sharrock 1986). 
9 Runes (1942) explains that “The philosophical point of departure for romanticism is the Kantian 
philosophy, and romanticism shares with all German Idealism both the fundamental purpose of 
extending knowledge to the realm of noumena, and the fundamental doctrine that all reality is 
ultimately spiritual, derivative from a living spirit and so knowable by the human spirit. The essence 
of philosophical romanticism as expressed by Schelling, that which differentiates it from other types 
of Idealism, resides in its conception of Spirit; upon this depend its metaphysical account of nature 
and man, and its epistemological doctrine of the proper method for investigating and understanding 
reality. Romanticism holds that Spirit, or the Absolute, is essentially creative; the ultimate ground of 
all things is primarily an urge to self-expression, and all that it has brought into being is but a means to 



















s early as 
ntasies and of how we construct and reconstruct our felt past in 
e present”. 
 
approaches reject positivism, which looks to external, deterministic, causal socia
factors to explain human behaviour and social phenomena, emphasising rather the 
importance of subjectivity and human consciousness in shaping meaningful human 
activity. While some may criticise her use of these paradigms to explain gender 
difference, far more serious are criticisms of Chodorow’s evidential basis fo
c
 
Lorber (1981:483) points out,  that psychoanalytic  theory is based on evidence
clinical case histories. These are patients’ accounts and their interpretation by 
psychoanalysts is specific and particular and as such cannot be generalised to soc
or people in general (Lorber 1981: 483). Chodorow does not develop or test her 
theory on the basis of data or evidence from the social context of the experiences o
mother and child. Furthermore, as Young (1983:141) points out, such evidence is 
complex since, the context of actions and interactions, as much as the a
in
 
Many of the criticisms that have been levelled at Chodorow are valid. As indicated 
earlier she especially acknowledges those that point to the social and cultural lim
of her assumptions about family structure and social life. Equally, however, she 
continues to argue for the salience of human psyche in the formation of gend
erence. In Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (1989:4) she explains: 
“People everywhere have emotions that they care about, connections to others,
sexual feelings and senses of self, self-esteem, and gender. People everywhere 
form a psyche, self and identity. These are everywhere profoundly affected by 
unconscious fantasies as well as by conscious perceptions that begin a
infancy. Psychoanalysis is the method and theory directed toward the 













, psychoanalytic tools 
should be able to analyse these” (Chodorow 1989:4). 
93), 
he implications of the 
demise of the patriarchal family and the crisis of patriarchy. 








Historically, this method and theory [psychoanalysis] have not often been 
applied in a socially or culturally specific manner, but there is not a basi
antagonism between psychoanalytic thinking and social specificity... As 
factors of race, class, culture, or history either into a labelled (conscious or
unconscious) identity, or as they shape particular early experienced object 
relational and family patterns and forms of subjectivity
 
Several studies have attempted to empirically examine the usefulness of Chodorow’s 
theory of gender by applying it to specific social contexts. Segura and Pierce (19
for example, explored the implications of Chodorow’s theory of mothering and 
gendered personalities within the social context of Chicano families in the United 
States. Castells (1997:221-235) has used it in his analysis of t
 
Following in this tradition, and in response to Chodorow’s continued assertio
value of her ideas, in the next chapter I propose to explore her theory of the 
production and reproduction of mothering and gendered personality development in 
children through an examination of discourse around these ideas in the specific socia
context of Social Welfare Policy, Legislation and Programmes in South Africa. The
following section seeks to explore assumptions about gender difference wh








Chapter 5  
 
Chodorow’s theory and the discourse of caring/mothering 
and gender difference in South African Social Welfare 




In The Reproduction of Mothering (1978) Chodorow provided a psychoanalytical 
model for the reproduction of gender difference. For her (1978:191-209) women’s 
mothering of children is central. She defines mothering not only as a biological but 
also as a social and psychological phenomenon. Boys’ and girls’ gendered 
personalities develop within particular family relations through the practice of 
women’s mothering. Feminists and sociologists critical of Chodorow’s theory have 
argued against her emphasis on the unconscious psychological constitution of gender 
identity and difference. Rather, they have explained the production and reproduction 
of gender differences in society by emphasising relational, institutional, structural 
and ideological influences. Criticism has also been levelled against her essentialist 
notions of gender difference and for locating this difference in women’s mothering 
capacity.  Methodologically, criticisms have been raised against her psychoanalytical 
account of gender identity formation, in that it is difficult to verify or test her theory 
empirically (Wharton 2005:38).  
 
In light of these methodological criticisms, the analysis which follows does not seek 
to find or verify her ideas about the internal unconscious psychological processes of 
identity formation in women and children. Rather, I propose to analyse the discourse 







Africa in terms of Chodorow’s view on the significance of mothering in gender 
formation. The purpose here is to see whether or not her assumptions have any 
resonance in welfare policy discourse in South Africa and if this discourse itself is a 
constitutive force in the production and reproduction of mothering practice and 
gendered identities, difference and inequality in society.  The analysis specifically 
focuses on exploring the discourse of caring and this caring discourse’s links to the 
discourse of gender in three key texts and to these texts as practices, namely, the 
White Paper on Social Welfare (WPSW) (Department of Welfare 1997), the Social 
Assistance Act No.59, 1992 (Department of Welfare 1992) and the Child Support 
Grant (CSG) programme (South African Government Services 2010). 
 
The White Paper on Social Welfare provides the policy framework for state 
provision of care for the vulnerable in society. The Social Assistance Act and the 
Child Support Grant programme are the legislative and programmatic statements that 
operationalise these ideas of the framework. These texts have been specifically 
chosen for analysis because they embody contemporary institutional discourse on 
mothering and care for children in vulnerable households. The chapter also looks at 
how policy and programme discourse on mothering/caring impacts on the actual 
practice of caring for vulnerable children through an analysis of the findings from 
secondary studies on the uptake of the child support grant. The findings on the 
practice of caring in the CSG programme are also weighed against the arguments 
made by Chodorow (1978) that it is women who mainly mother and want to mother 
as well as the implications of Chodorow’s (1978) model of object relations between 





Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:156) state that a discourse is “broad patterns of 
talk – systems of statements – that are taken up in particular speeches and 
conversations.”  However, discourse has been defined as ideological practice 
(Fairclough 1995; Thompson 1984) where discourse as ideology is embedded in the 




social relations and social practices in society. Viewed from this perspective 
discourse does not merely reflect reality but actively constructs it and the way in 
which people act and behave in the world. Their actions serve to reproduce dominant 
discourses and relational patterns. Discourse analysis as a research tool is employed 
to interrogate the assumptions and statements embedded in the language of texts or 
speech acts:  “(d)iscourse analysis can be defined as the act of showing how certain 
discourses are deployed to achieve particular effects in specific contexts” (Terre 
Blanche and Durrheim 1999:154). Terre Blanche and Durrheim (199:155-156) 
suggest that discourse analysis is not necessarily one thing. Legitimately, it can be 
about the identification of the ‘discourses’ in a text, or it can focus on the kinds of 
effects that the text achieves, or it can explain the context in which the text emerges 
and operates in. I propose to use discourse analysis to identify the discourse around 
women, children, men and their relations to each other. 
 
Daly and Rake (2003:40) argue that social policies are both ideological and 
normative and reinforce appropriate behaviour for men and women. They argue that 
the state, as an institution in society, through policy, can reaffirm and valorise 
existing social roles in society and, in this way, act to produce and reproduce them. 
Conceptions of gender and caring within the family, as they are reflected in policy 
and programmes, can also accord or deny women their agency in other areas in 
society. In a study of programmatic interventions on child care Marcus (2004:27), for 
example, demonstrates how programme activities are influenced by ideas of family, 





Marshall (1994:127-8) argues that the state constitutes and regulates gender in 
particular ways through its various activities. State institutions underpin certain 
dominant discourses and ideologies about gender. These are reflected in policies and 
programmes that intentionally or otherwise produce and reproduce gender 
differences and inequalities in society. In this way institutions act as conduits for 




Several writers (Gouws 2005, Sevenhuijsen et al 2006, Hochfeld and Bassadien 
2007, Schram 1993, Fraser 1989, Razavi and Hassim 2006, and Kabeer 2004) have 
analysed how gendered discourses of state institutions and their policies have 
generally negative consequences for women’s political agency in society. One of 
their arguments is that as policy allocates caring responsibilities to women within 
families so it impacts on women’s full citizenship. Schram (1993:250) argues that 
welfare policy operates as a cultural force and reinforces certain family structures at 
the expense of others. Daly and Rake (2003:17) argue that in the context of welfare 
states, their programmes shape the lives of women and men by contributing to rather 
than determining social relations.  
 
The social construction of motherhood has been used by feminists to compare 
welfare states and to examine how policies have constructed women as mothers and 
have endorsed maternalism as an ideology (Rake 2003:19). Official documents are 
the means through which certain ideas and discourses are perpetuated in society. In 
this view, policies, legislation and programmes can have intended and unintended 
consequences for the production and reproduction of gender difference in society. In 
their examination of Welfare States, Daly and Rake (2003: 40) argue that these 
consequences are ideological and the content of social programmes are normative 
and can be powerful in creating and reinforcing appropriate behaviour in men and 
women where social roles can be affirmed and valorised. Social roles can be 
reflected and continually reconstituted through social policy ( Rake 2003:40). 
 
5.2. The construction of women, children and men  
 
5.2.1. The texts 
 
The White Paper on Social Welfare (WPSW) was issued by the Ministry for Welfare 







and children as part of the vulnerable in society, making them potential targets for 
social development and potential recipients of social welfare policy and programmes.  
 
The goals of both development and welfare are to attend to the needs of those living 
in poverty, the vulnerable and those with special needs: 
“…The goal of developmental social welfare is a humane, peaceful, just and 
caring society which will uphold welfare rights, facilitate the meeting of basic 
human needs, release people’s creative energies, help them achieve their 
aspirations, build human capacity and self reliance, and participate fully in all 
spheres of social, economic and political life” (Department of Welfare 1997: 
preamble). 
 
The first chapter of the White Paper on Social Welfare (hereafter WPSW) outlines a 
broad economic and social context from which the discourse on the need for social 
development and social welfare in South African society emerges. This context is 
characterised as one where there is an historical lack of economic growth, unequal 
income distribution, poverty, unemployment and unequal access to social services 
and welfare. In this, there are race, gender, geographical and sectoral disparities, 
inadequate information systems, a fragmented welfare system, a lack of participation 
of citizens in policy decision making, a lack of sustainable financing and a lack of 
equal status amongst partners involved in the delivery of social security (p.1-3). 
Together these substantiate historical injustices and economic underdevelopment as 
well as shortcomings in institutional administrative practices and citizen 
participation. And they lay the foundation for the discourse on caring, which 
construes women, children and men as subjects in need of government services to 





The WPSW then goes on to ‘discuss’ the policy framework (Part 1) for the delivery 
of developmental social welfare in South Africa. In Part 1 the WPSW covers national 




financial and budgeting arrangements, in which the emphasis is on technical and 
administrative responses to the problem as it has been constructed. In Part II, the 
WPSW narrows down to focus on the restructuring of the delivery system.  Here, 
programmes and guidelines for action are specified and elaborated upon for the 
various categories of (mostly) people that have been identified as vulnerable, namely, 
children, youth, aged, women, people with disabilities, people with special needs and 
families.  
 
The State’s understanding of what it is to be a (vulnerable) man, woman or child and 
the relationships they are said to have with one another and society in general can 
also be read off the Child Support Grant (CSG), one of the key programmatic 
interventions that emanates from the White Paper and its legislative framework, the 
Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992. Analysis of the CSG and the Act show that 
programmatic and legislative criteria for state support for caring within CSG 
households is circumscribed by certain assumptions and conceptions of care givers 
and caring.  
 
The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced by the Department of Social Welfare 
in 1998. At the recommendation of the Lund Committee (Department of Welfare 
1996:88) it was designed to replace the existing State Maintenance Grant (SMG) that 
was given to White, Coloured and Indian children and a separate amount, to mothers 
without partners to support themselves and their children. Paid via a “primary care 
giver” (PCG) who has passed a means test, the CSG aimed to protect the poorest 
children (irrespective of race) in their most vulnerable years (Department of Welfare 
1996). In other words, poor and vulnerable children are the primary target, albeit 
through the mechanism of a person (of unspecified gender) deemed to be the child’s 





Considerable research has been conducted on the CSG, its conceptualisation, history, 




others, listed in Hunter’s “Annotated Bibliography of Recent Research on the Impact 
of Social Security Grants” (2002), in the work of  The Children’s Institute at the 
University of Cape Town, and the Centre for Actuarial Research and by Lund 
herself. Lund’s (2007) book “Changing Social Policy: The Child Support Grant in 
South Africa documents the CSG in the transition to democracy in South Africa.    
 
In looking at the policy, legal and programmatic texts, I propose to consider the way 
the State conceptualises women, children and men and the meaning the state gives to 
gender difference in the light of Chodorow’s (1978) theory of gender difference, 
(women as mothers and women as having a primary caring and socialising function 
of children).   
 
5.2.2. The discourse on women  
 
In the WPSW (Department of Welfare: 1997) women are mainly referred to as 
poverty stricken, economically vulnerable, unequal, excluded, discriminated against 
and as lacking rights and access services and resources. Their subject position in 
society is accounted for in terms of past historical disadvantages, lack of economic 
development, discriminatory economic practices in customary marriages, lack of 
access to State services and programmes, their reproductive functions and their care 
giving roles in society. Defined as being subject to or victims of certain constraints 
and circumstances, women are therefore identified as having certain needs which can 
be attended to by the State, through institutional and administrative solutions 
designed to promote women’s agency in particular spheres of their lives and help 
them to overcome structural barriers. In particular, the state proposes to do this 
through policy and legislative reforms, capacity building programmes, securing 









The WPSW (Department of Welfare 1997) characterises South Africa as being a 
society of extreme poverty and also extreme wealth. Poverty is understood to be 
unevenly distributed, making some segments of the population more vulnerable than 
others, with some women being among them. In general, reference is made variously 
to rural women, rural women who are household heads, women who are household 
heads, unemployed women, African women. To wit, 
“African households, households in rural areas, especially those headed by 
women in rural areas, are the most affected” (p.1). 
“Unemployment has been more severe among women, especially those in  rural 
areas”  (p.1). 
“While poverty is widespread throughout South Africa, African people are most 
affected. Women and children (particularly in female-headed households), 
people with special needs and those living in rural areas, informal settlements 
and on farms are the most at risk and will be assisted” (p.7). 
 
In this account, women’s vulnerability is primarily construed in specific geo-
economic terms, namely, whether they are wage workers or not, whether they are 
rural or urban, and whether they are ‘heads of households’ or in female-headed 
households or not. The consequences for all in  poverty are generally dire – family 
disintegration, substance abuse, low levels of literacy, lack of capacity to access 
resources, hunger and malnutrition (p.7) the last being especially linked to women’s 
vulnerability (p.8).  
 
These initial articulations about the vulnerability of some women are elaborated in a 
specific section entitled ‘Women’. Here women’s position is juxtaposed relative to 




“Illiteracy and poverty are major obstacles to women’s advancement. Female 
unemployment is higher than male unemployment. Women account for only 45% 
of those employed in the formal sector. Moreover, women tend to be employed at 




majority in informal sector employment where wages are generally lower and 
there are no social benefits. Research indicates that households headed by 
women are significantly poorer. Working women are faced with increasing 
pressures in reconciling parenthood with work responsibilities. Early childhood 
development programmes to meet the needs of working women are insufficient. 
Female-headed households are also financially vulnerable as fathers do not 
always pay for the maintenance of their children” (p.51). 
 
As vulnerable economic subjects women are then fashioned as being in need of 
government assisted development not only to overcome their inherited disadvantages 
but also to assist them in their parenting responsibilities. In this discourse, there is an 
implicit normative assumption that it is women who have primary responsibility 
towards children. The only association made between working men and child care 
responsibilities is their failure to provide economic support. But also, perhaps more 
insidiously, that women’s economic rights are only justified because they are the 
carers of children.  
 
This idea of women’s primary social role as providers of care in society is widely 
emphasised in the WPSW (Department of Welfare: 1997). 
“In the main, women are the key providers of unacknowledged social care to the 
sick, the physically and mentally disabled, the young and the elderly. In addition 
to their roles in the family, women in communities contribute voluntary time to 
social and development programmes” (p.51).  
  
Given that women are conceived of as unequal and discriminated against by society 
both in terms of resource distribution and exclusion from services and programmes 
and they are also cast as the primary providers of care, it is not surprising that these 
concerns are explicitly reiterated in the principles developed to guide the policy 








The principle on equity, thus states that developmental social welfare policies and 
programmes are intended to address gender, racial, urban/rural and sectoral 
disparities (p.5).  
The principle on non-discrimination seeks to address the exclusion of vulnerable 
groups of people from services and programmes. Here discrimination against women 
in general is linked to: 
“children, the physically disabled and mentally disabled, people with HIV/AIDS, 
the elderly, and the people with homosexual or bisexual orientations” (p.5/6).  
 
At the same time, women are said to be specifically discriminated against both 
through the lack of equal opportunities and societal values: 
“Discrimination against women continues to prevail in all spheres of life and 
women do not enjoy equal opportunities. The principle of shared responsibility 
and partnership between men and women is not accepted in society as the basis 
for achieving equity and equality” (p.51). 
 
Women’s vulnerable subject position is also reflected in their position as victims of 
violence, which in turn translates into them being in need of care themselves: 
“Violence against women undermines the psychological and physical health of 
women and girls” (p.51).  
 
Thus, at one and the same time, women are characterised as being both providers of 
care and in need of care provision.  
 
The discourse then introduces a biological dimension by focusing on women’s 
reproductive functions as the bearers of children, and linking this capacity to the fact 
that not only do they take primary responsibility for contraception (p.51) but they 
also take primary responsibility for the care of children. Here too issues of 







around teen pregnancy and the failure of young women especially to use 
contraception. 
  
The discourse on women as vulnerable subjects and responsible carers continues in 
the section on people with chronic illnesses. Here they are identified as being 
especially at risk of HIV infection and AIDS.  The document refers to the use of 
survey data from antenatal clinic attendees for infection rates for women. This 
context  reflects a concern for the implications of the disease for women’s health as 
well as for their responsibilities to their unborn children (p.64). While the gendered 
causes for greater vulnerability to HIV infection or the gendered consequences of an 
earlier greater incidence of AIDS and premature death among women are not 
considered. Rather obscurely, the text focuses on customary marriages and the 
breakdown of rural networks as factors fuelling the epidemic, notably among rural 
women and children, even though rural/urban infection rates are not significantly 
different. Women’s vulnerability is played out, according to this discourse, because 
women’s rights and access to livelihoods are compromised by the lack of State 
intervention in traditional institutional practices that deprive them of rights to 
property, inheritance and access to land, or alternatively because they are made 
financially vulnerable when the family patriarch dies (p.65 see also p.52). 
 
Having identified women’s vulnerability mainly in terms of social and economic 
disadvantage, what is evident from the situational analysis, approach, guidelines and 
strategies that inform the delivery systems set out in Part 11 of the WPSW, is that for 
the most part, women are not targeted in their own right. Rather, they only feature in 
the document when they fall into other categories of vulnerability – as disabled, 




“Social assistance – non-contributory and income-tested benefits provided by the 
State to groups such as people with disabilities, elderly people and unsupported 





Alternatively, they are specified in the discourse where their needs and vulnerability 
are believed to impact on their caregiving role. Thus, 
“Women can claim support for themselves and their children through the law 
courts…There is a high rate of defaulting by fathers. Where the judicial system 
fails, mothers may apply for State maintenance grants” (p.32). 
 
Implicit in this provision is the assumption that men are or ought to be the usual 
providers for women and children. And while some concession is made to the need 
to enhance women’s economic development independently of their relationship to 
men, it is articulated in terms of a concern to sustain the family in order to meet the 
needs of children.  
“The approach underlying the way forward is a broad commitment to the 
preservation of the family as a unit in which children are raised to healthy 
adulthood, including the promotion of policies to fully integrated into the 
economy” (p.35).  
 
There is some specific attention paid to women as women. Women are held to be in 
need of support by the State in their own right within a discourse of being positioned 
in subject positions and suffering certain conditions – “violence”, “poverty”, 
“discrimination in customary marriages”, a lack of “gender-sensitivity” from 
welfare services and legislation and as having needs as ‘care givers’ and lacking 
‘capacity’. This support is also deemed necessary by the State, if it is to achieve its 
goals of equality between men and women in social, economic and civic areas of life 
(p.52). The focus on women as women, however, is undermined almost by sleight of 
hand, by the strategy of ‘partnership between men and women’: 
“Policies and programmes will also promote the partnership between women 









The guidelines for strategies by the state to promote women’s social integration 
(given their vulnerability) mainly suggest administrative, advocacy, technical, 
legislative, and institutional solutions. Implicit in all the discourses on strategic 
intervention, be they related to violence against women, poverty, women as care 
givers, gender-sensitive welfare services, capacity-building and legislative reform is 
the view that vulnerability, inequality and discrimination against women are caused 
by failures within welfare services. In turn, these failures are believed to relate to the 
functioning and orientation of these institutions, the lack of awareness of women’s 
rights in society, the lack of economic capacity in women, and their lack of access to 
resources (p.52).  
 
So, for example, in order to address violence against women the document  construes 
women as victims in need of care, support and protection. Posing the problem in this 
way gives rise to a discursive solution, namely, consciousness raising, human rights 
and administrative, legislative and institutional reform. Thus, the WPSW seeks to 
‘counteract’  women’s subject position through creating a ‘national consciousness’, 
‘give assistance’, ‘promote personal safety’, provide education on ‘women’s rights’, 
support women through ‘legal proceedings, improved policing and legislative 
procedural reform’ and retrain criminal justice personnel in the ‘management of 
violence against women’ (p.52). Absent among these strategies is a discourse on the 
perpetrators of violence against women or the gender, age and social status 
dimensions of the relations that give rise to violence .  
 
The discourse of the WPSW moves back and forth between a position of supporting 
women as women, and one of  supporting them in their responsibilities to others – 
the care of children, survival of the family, male/female partnerships etc:  
“Welfare personnel will advise business and unions on the needs of women and 
families in order to ensure that the rights of women to job security, health, safety 








In fact, the discourse of women as providers of care in society is ubiquitous: 
“Community and home-programmes will take into account the social and economic 
needs of women who are most often the primary care-givers of family members who 
have special needs. Women’s contribution in this regard has not previously been 
acknowledged. Options such as employment opportunities and financial support 
should be fully explored” (Department of Welfare 1997:52). Rather than 
problematising the disproportionate burden of care that falls on women, even 
following their own arguments regarding partnerships, it is taken as natural and is 
used to justify state support to them.  
 
When it comes to who or what is responsible for women’s vulnerability, the 
discourse also swings back and forth between state institutions and women 
themselves. On the one hand,  it is attributed to a lack of gender sensitivity among 
welfare services personnel, programmes and practice, which leads to the solution to 
‘train’ personnel on ‘gender issues’, do ‘research’ (get the facts, so to speak) and 
‘integrate’ gender issues in programmes. On the other hand, it is attributed to 
women’s own lack of capacity, especially where their (undefined) ‘special problems’ 
are concerned. Here the proposed solution is somewhat more abstract, lying as is 
suggested, in the overarching legal framework - the Constitution – and grand scheme 
programmatic interventions that promote equality, like the Reconstruction and 





Overall, the discourse on women (sometimes in general, sometimes in particular 
subsets) in the WPSW is that of multiple vulnerability. In this, however, women are 
generally construed as being the primary carers of children, and it is this 
understanding that resonates with Chodorow’s (1978) view that it is women who are 
responsible for and are providers of children’s care.  Women are also construed as 
unequal and different to men in terms of their social and economic positions in 
society, but whereas the WPSW ascribes these differences mainly to structural 




factors such as consciousness, Chodorow sees women’s inequality emerging from 
internal psychological processes that arise from their primary mothering role within 
families. 
 
Where the WPSW specifically addresses women as women, it articulates a solution 
of partnerships between men and women in private sphere responsibilities. At one 
level this notion resonates with Chodorow’s idea of co-parenting as a solution to 
transforming gender difference and inequality. However, she goes much further, 
calling for changes in the structure of  parenting arrangements in order to de-gender 
individual psyche, while the WPSW’s idea of ‘partnership’ aims to transform 
external arrangements. This and other solutions in the WPSW discourse focus on 
transforming wider political institutional practices and legislation to address 
women’s inequality, whereas Chodorow concentrates on the need to change men and 
women’s psyche. And while the idea of women as care givers pervades the WPSW 
as a normative assumption, for Chodorow it is a part of the psyche of women that is 
produced in the course of their mothering.  
 
If the WPSW constructs women through the specificity of one or another type of 
disadvantage, or more specifically through their care taker relationship to children, 
an examination of the legislative and programmatic interventions that followed from 
the WPSW reveals a different conception of who the carers of children can be and 
are.  
 
In this section I turn to The Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the Child Support 
Grant Programme (CSG) which gives effect to the state’s commitment to children in 
vulnerable households in the broader context of relieving poverty amongst the most 








The CSG is targeted at poor children. It is awarded to children through beneficiaries 
who are denoted as the ‘primary care giver’ and who receive the monthly payment 
on their behalf.  
 
At the time of writing, in order to be eligible for a grant:  
• the primary care giver must be over the age of 16 and a South African citizen 
or permanent resident; 
• both the applicant and child must reside in South Africa; 
• the applicant must be the primary care giver of the child/children concerned;  
• the child/children must have been born after 31 December 1993; 
• the applicant must not earn more than R30000 per year if single and not more 
than R60000 combined income if married; 
• the applicant may only apply for support for up to six non-biological children; 
• The Child/Children cannot be cared for in a state institution 
(South African Government Services 2010)  
 
The Social Assistance Act, 1992 Section 4 (Department of Welfare 1992) uses the 
term ‘primary care giver’  which ‘means a person older than 16 years, whether or 
not related to a child, who takes primary responsibility for meeting the daily care 
needs of that child.’  
 
This definition is broader and not gender or biologically specific and reflects a subtle 
change in thinking about who is or should be responsible for child care or the care of 
other vulnerable people in society, while the main thrust of the WPSW’s discourse 
was that it is mainly women, or mothers, who are the care givers. The Act and the 
CSG sought to take into account the complex household structure and caring patterns 
in poor households in South Africa (Lund 2007). Lund (2007) states that while 
making room for men conceptually, the authors of the interventions always 








While conceptually the Act and the CSG created a more open, ungendered 
understanding of primary care giver, it does not make provision for primary care 
givers who are under the age of 16 years old. This eligibility criterion contains an 
implicit normative conception about the age characteristic of a mother. Rosa, Leatt 
and Hall (2005:12) have pointed out that children who are under 16 but who are 
primary care givers are not eligible for the grant, because they are not entitled to hold 
an identity document. This is not only problematic in the context of a generalised  
HIV/AIDS epidemic where an increasing number of AIDS orphans also come to be 
the primary care givers of other children, their age not withstanding (Burman 
2004:75), but it is also anomalous because it supports a discourse on childhood 
which often contradicts children’s real lived experiences, their actual capacities, and 
their juridical standing in terms of contraventions of the law.  
 
By limiting the number of children any one individual primary care giver may 
support to six, there is an implicit bias against familial responses to the care of 
children in times of need. There is qualitative evidence of grandmothers and other 
care givers who routinely care for more than six children at any one time (Marcus 
2002; Marcus 2004).   
 
Equally, as Haarmann (1998:108) has argued, the income threshold discriminates 
against larger family structures where the care giver has more dependents or if the 
care giver has more children (not only biological) who are vulnerable living in the 
household. 
 
Inevitably, as the focus becomes more practical and technical, there are other shifts 
in the discourse. The Procedural Manual for Grants Administration for the CSG 
(Department of Social Development 2003) for example, stipulates the kinds of proofs 







• a marriage certificate (if applicable); 
• if you are divorced, a court order saying you have custody of the child ; 
• written confirmation of persons supporting the child and/or Primary Care 
Giver (PCG) financially or otherwise; 
• proof of personal income of PCG and his or her spouse; 
• the identity document of PCG; 
• the birth certificate of child; and  
• proof of occupation (ie. residential address) 
(South African Government Services 2010). 
 
What is evident from the above is the implicit normative bias towards the institution 
of marriage as the (preferred) basis for family making or child care giving. What of 
partner income in the absence of marriage, for example, or of care givers who are 
and are likely to remain unmarried.  
 
Similarly, the procedural requirement of ‘proof of income’ shifts the discourse on 
class, reflecting an implicit upward social bias, given the particular difficulty that the 
poor, and women in general, have in obtaining such evidence as they are 
concentrated amongst the unemployed, the poorly paid unorganised segments of the 
labour force or the bottom end of the marginal and self employed (Rosa, Leatt and 
Hall 2005: 25-26). 
 
In implementation, the discourse on care giving becomes categorically instrumental, 
focusing as it does on the care and well being of vulnerable children. Section 4 
(Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992) states that the primary care giver of the child 
receives the grant on behalf of the child. And they do so subject to special conditions 
(South African Social Security Agency 2010):  
“(a) he or she shall continue to be the primary care-giver of the child concerned     







  (b) the child shall have accommodation, be properly fed and clothed; 
(c) he or she shall allow the Director-General reasonable access to the child and 
the dwelling in which the child resides; 
(d) he or she shall ensure that the child concerned receives immunisation and 
other health services where such services are available, without charge; and  
(e) he or she shall carry out any instructions regarding the use of the grant 
issued by an authorised person appointed in terms of section 8 of the Act.” 
 
Thus, women (and men), as care givers, are construed as mere conduits to the end 
goal – the child – a policy shift away from the earlier practice of at least providing 
support to mothers in need as well. This then reinforces and the unpaid nature of care 
work and its devaluation in society. 
 
The needs of care givers – particularly of women – are made secondary and 
subordinate to those of the children in their care. Given the WPSW’s albeit limited 
narrative of concern for women’s vulnerability in their own right, or the fact that the 
State anticipated that women (and especially vulnerable women) would be the 
majority of ‘primary care givers’, or the absence of any other kind of grant for the 
poor below the age of 60 years (as of 2008). This narrowing of the discourse on the 
meaning of child welfare has significant implications for both children and women in 
society. Daly and Rake (2003:67) in their comparative study of Welfare States and 
their policies, argue that care provision fails to affirm women in the role of carers in 
several ways, one of them being in instances where the care givers’ needs are not 
taken into account by policy and may be overshadowed by those of the care receiver 





That this shift in focus is not unintended is evidenced by the size of the grant (R100/ 
child aged 0-7 in 1998; R200/child aged 0-14 in 2007; R250/child aged below 18 
years January 2010). By its scale it is clearly only intended to cover the barest of a 




removed recognition and compensation for women’s caring work, making it more 
invisible and taken for granted (Goldblatt and Liebenberg 2004:46). In so doing it 
has transformed care givers, especially women, into the most neglected category of 
vulnerable people (Burman 2004:65). 
 
That the State targets the poor, especially women, as CSG care givers is evident from 
the income thresholds set by the State as its means test. Using a monetary measure of 
poverty to determine care givers deserving of state support, in 2010 the following 
were the qualifying income levels:  
• If the care giver is a single person and earns less than R30 000 per annum 
• If the care giver is in a spousal relationship and jointly their income is less than 
R60 000 per annum (South African Government Services website 2010). 
 
As Burman (2004:66) argues, by qualifying to provide care to children, the needs of 
care givers are precluded, even though they themselves have insufficient income to 
attend to themselves.  This approach is inappropriate to the intention of the CSG – 
the provision of proper and effective care to vulnerable children – and especially it 
goes against the sub-discourse of the WPSW, namely that women are themselves 
vulnerable and in need of support.  
 
Taylor (2004:27) and other feminist theorists have argued that the right to full 
citizenship for all South African women and men, as enshrined in the South African 
Constitution, cannot be realised for women in the context of primary childcare 
responsibilities. The finding that the discourse on women’s needs is subordinated to 
their responsibilities as care givers in the WPSW, and then eradicated in the 
subsequent legal framework and programmatic intervention, resonates with 
Chodorow’s (1978) understanding of the position of women in relation to children in 
society. For her, women are devalued by society and children because of their 







to vulnerable and poor mothers in the CSG programme has effectively reduced the 
standing of child care and at the same time consolidated this burden in the private 
sphere.  
 
By nuancing the means test to take account of various rural and urban conditions, the 
State’s discourse on qualified support is however an acknowledgement of the 
specific broader social contexts of care and that the experiences and burdens of rural 
and urban primary care givers are different. Although this resonates with 
Chodorow’s theory, where mothering is understood to happen in specific social 
contexts, it differs in that Chodorow refers to the micro level of social relations 
within the family and not the broader macro social context and other structures in 
society. However, to really understand this, it needs to be explored empirically which 
would make a topic for further research. 
 
5.2.3. The discourse on children and family 
 
In the WPSW (Department of Welfare 1997) children are identified as one of the 
vulnerable groups in South Africa and therefore a target of social welfare 
programmes. The discourse on children’s vulnerability talks in terms of their being 
victims of and affected by a litany of external structural and systemic forces. These 
include historical injustices, poverty, living in vulnerable female headed households, 
discrimination, the absence of financial support from fathers, being orphaned by 
HIV/AIDS, violence in communities, natural disasters, disability, chronic illnesses, 





As “(o)ver half (54%) of all South Africa’s children live in poverty” (p.1) they are 
held to be particularly vulnerable to a condition that should and can be addressed 
through social welfare policies and programmes. Just as in its discourse on women, 
the WPSW’s discourse on children’s vulnerability to poverty is nested in other social 




“While poverty is widespread throughout South Africa, African people are most 
affected. Women and children (particularly in female-headed households), 
people with special needs and those living in rural areas, informal settlements 
and on farms” (p.7).  
 
Overall an indelible link is drawn between childhood poverty and growing up in 
female-headed households – the experience most common to children in South 
Africa. Not only does this combination carry with it negative physiological and 
nutritional consequences for children, but it also makes them vulnerable to negative 
social consequences, particularly contravention of the law (p.7). Clearly, addressing 
children’s poverty is of highest priority and it needs is to be done 
“by enabling impoverished households to provide adequate care for their 
members, especially children and those who are in vulnerable households” (p.2). 
 
‘Enabling households’ means helping women take care of their families, particularly 
the children in their care. These ideas are spelt out in ‘The Family and the Life-
Cycle: Families, Children, Youth and Ageing’ a special section that specifically 
elaborates on social security strategies for the social integration of vulnerable 
children.  
 
Thus, while vulnerability among all children is conceived of as a denial of their basic 
human rights which impairs their growth and development (p.39), some categories of 
children are identified as being more vulnerable and more in need of care and State 
support. Amongst others, these include those suffering from chronic illness, children 
suffering from abuse and neglect, children living on the street because of poverty, 
children involved in child labour, children involved in substance abuse, children of 
divorced parents and  nutritionally vulnerable children (p.39-41). In the process, 
from a discourse of general vulnerability a hierarchy of need allows for the creation 








In the process of considering children’s vulnerability, children themselves are cast as 
passive subjects in need of care and dependent upon others. Consequently, the 
discourse singles out ‘the family’ as the key institution of care, and care within the 
family is assigned as the responsibility of parents.  For its part, the State sees its role 
as indirect – to support and facilitate the parenting of children through various social 
security mechanisms. The logic of  this understanding of needs and responsibilities 
leads ‘naturally’ to the inclusion of children among other vulnerable categories in the 
social security system. Thus, people entitled to non-contributory, means-tested 
benefits from the state are: 
“groups such as people with disabilities, elderly people and unsupported 
parents and children who are unable to provide for their own minimum needs” 
(p.31). 
 
Children, it appears, acquire their vulnerable status through their fathers’ failures – in 
that it is the absence of their financial support that renders children eligible for a state 
grant (p.32). In the WPSW the only relationship that is deemed of relevance to the 
system between fathers and children and indeed fathers and mothers, is that of 
financial provider. 
 
HIV/AIDS adds another dimension to the discourse on children’s vulnerability and 
their need for care. Children’s vulnerability is not directly associated with the impact 
of the disease on their own health, but rather arises from the consequences of chronic 
illness and death of primary care givers on childcare. As the loss of parents deprives 
children of care and homes, so they become eligible for State intervention to assist 
with foster and adoptive care as a result of being homeless (pp.33, 35, 65).  
 
Throughout the WPSW the dominant discourse on the family characterises the 
institution in an essentialist and functionalist way – as largely integrated, 







“The approach underlying the way forward is a broad commitment to the 
preservation of the family as a unit in which children are raised to healthy 
adulthood...”(p.35). 
 
The family, as a nurturing, caring and socialising institution according to the WPSW 
therefore functions as an integrative social institution that serves all its members.  
“The family, ideally, seeks to care for, nurture and socialise its members. These 
members differ in terms of gender, age, stage of development, and physical and 
mental abilities. Children and young people, persons with chronic illnesses, 
physical and mental disabilities, the elderly and those individuals who are not 
functioning optimally and have special needs are normally members of a family. 
Their needs should be addressed in the context of the family life-cycle approach. 
Policies and programmes to strengthen and support families must be developed 
by Government and civil society” (p.37). 
     In this account children are cast as having special needs. 
 
The family’s caring responsibilities are linked to the idea of the human life-cycle 
which is imbued with both biological and social content. Thus, 
“As far as is appropriate, the life-cycle approach should guide and inform 
programming. This approach refers to the interaction between family members, 
the wider social environment and social support networks. Programmes must 
make provision for the needs of families in accordance with the different stages 
in the life cycle. These stages are: early childhood and childhood development 
phase (including the preparation and child-bearing phase); the school-going and 
adolescent years; the launching of young adults; middle age; and retirement and 





Although all ‘stages’ are listed, in fact the state does not see itself or the family as an 
institution having the same level of obligation to each. Rather, it is the understanding 




various social security provisions for the care of children into family structures; be 
they biological or surrogate. Daly and Rake (2003:23) in their studies on the Welfare 
State and gender point out that social policies define the onset of childhood, 
adulthood and later life, and influence the conditions under which people pass 
through the life phases. 
“The environment best suited to meeting the primary needs of children is the 
family. Maintenance and foster grants are key forms of community care 
provision. Adoption allowances to enable less wealthy families to adopt, and 
possible assistance to families who are prepared to adopt children with 
disabilities will be fully explored, bearing the best interest of the child in mind” 
(p.35). 
 
There are various sub-discourses in the WPSW on the family. One refers to its 
diversity of form and structure.  
“Children grow up in a wide range of family forms and structures, with different 
needs, role divisions, functions and values” (p. 39). 
 
In this sub-discourse, paternalism and the subordination of women and children is 
acknowledged as issues, albeit ones that can be dealt with.  
“Significant efforts need to be made to transform family relationships which 
currently contribute to the subordination of women and children” (p.41). 
 
Another sub-discourse points to family problems, which are listed as, alcohol and 
drug abuse, marital conflict, family violence, and family breakdown. These too can 
be dealt with.  
“Family-based policies and programmes should reflect the changing nature and 
structure of families. Programmes should be devised to strengthen families, and 








Generally speaking these sub-discourses, diverse family form and structure and 
family problems, have little bearing on the dominant essentialist view of the 
institution or its primacy in dealing with the array of vulnerable children’s needs. 
“The well-being of children depends on the ability of families to function 
effectively.  Because children are vulnerable they need to grow up in a nurturing 
secure family that can ensure their survival, development, protection and 
participation in family and social life. Not only do families give their members a 
sense of belonging, they are also responsible for imparting values and life skills. 
Families create security; they set limits on behaviour; and together with the 
spiritual foundation they provide, instil notions of discipline. All these factors are 
essential for the healthy development of the family and of any society” (p. 39).  
 
Overall, in the WPSW the institution is cast as a panacea for most social problems as 
well as being the provider of multiple social, physical, spiritual, moral and emotional 
needs of individuals in society and especially children. So it can be asked, why then 
is there a need for State intervention? As the WPSW puts it, the need for State 
intervention in the family arises because of the family’s inability to fulfil its 
parenting and social support functions.  
“As a result of the increasing pressure on families, they are often unable to fulfil 
their parenting and social support roles effectively without the active support of 
the community, the State and the private sector” (p.39). 
 
       The WPSW continues: 
“Special attention  must be given to families who are vulnerable and at risk, and 
who are poor and involved in child-rearing and caring for their members at 
unacceptable social cost to themselves” (p.41). 
 







“The aim of family and child welfare services is to preserve and strengthen 
families so that they can provide a suitable environment for the physical, 
emotional and social development of all its members” (p.41).  
 
In other words, it seeks to assist to restore functionality to the family, reassert its 
normalcy and restore it to an ideal – a dual parent, nuclear or extended site of human 
and social reproduction, preferably within marriage. 
  
Thus, while reference is made to strategies such as adoption, foster care, residential 
care, maintenance grants as possible measures that can help address the needs of 
vulnerable children (p.43), the discourse gives preference to surrogate family care as 
the best alternative to the absent or failed biological family.  
 
For the most part, the WPSW refers to the family as the aggregate responsible for the 
care of children. At times, for example in the chapter on ‘Social Security’ or the 
section on ‘Women’, the discourse becomes specific and gendered. Here women are 
described as the main care givers of children. 
      It is they who are said to  
“… have had to join the labour market for economic reasons and have had to 
rely on childcare outside the home” (p.39). 
 
 And they who 
       “…can claim support for their children through the law courts” (p.31). 
 





What is notable in all three narratives is that there is sparse reference to men.  When 
men are mentioned it is mostly with reference to their actual or idealised roles as 
breadwinners and providers of financial support within families or as role defaulters, 




“There is a high rate of defaulting by fathers. Where the judicial system fails, 
mothers may apply for State maintenance grants” (p.32). 
 
      Or for their wives and children in death: 
“Women are also disadvantaged in terms of customary law regarding property, 
inheritance and access to land. This disadvantage increases the financial 
vulnerability of the household when the father dies” (p.65).  
 
The discourse on men in the  WPSW implies that men are economically privileged, 
that they are not faced with pressures of parenthood and that they behave responsibly 
to their children when they are in families and that their presence in women’s lives 
reduces women’s and children’s vulnerability.  
 
This essentially ideal typical construction of men translates directly into the legal and 
programmatic discourse of the Social Assistance Act and the CSG programme into 
an inclusive and open approach – hence the terminology ‘primary care giver’ and the 
right and entitlement of men to apply for the CSG grant. 
 
5.2.5. The material practice of caregiving in the CSG Programme 
 
Having considered South Africa’s policy, legislative and programmatic discourse of 
gender and caring, it is now necessary to look briefly at actual practice at least in 
terms of CSG grant holders. An analysis of existing studies of the CSG provides a 
snapshot understanding of who primary care givers are as well as the familial 





The research on CSG programmatic support shows that poor children in South Africa 
are cared for, almost exclusively (98.59%), by women (Leatt  2004). Only 1, 4% of 
CSG claimants are men (Budlender et.al. 2005). The overwhelming majority of 




(Budlender et.al. 2005). And the majority of CSG recipients live in rural areas (66%) 
where poverty is deeper and more widespread (Leatt 2004). 
 
 In Umkhanyakude district, Hlabisa in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal, a deep 
rural area, Case, Hosegood, and Lund’s (2003) study of the reach of the Child 
Support Grant in 11,178 households found that 87 percent of primary care givers 
receiving the grant are resident mothers, 10 percent are grandmothers and one 
percent is an aunt of the child. Fathers comprise only 0.2 percent of the primary care 
givers. For over half  of the children receiving the grant (52%) the status of the father 
was unknown, whereas ‘missing’ mothers were relatively rare. Their study also 
found that children who did not live with their parents, in particular with their 
mothers, were significantly less likely to have a grant application made on their 
behalf, a finding consistent with earlier research that children living apart from 
mothers face particular risks and that household expenditure on child-related goods is 
lower when a child’s birth mother is absent (Case et.al.2000).  
 
An early study of the CSG programme by Kola et.al. (2000), found that in a sample 
of 999 beneficiaries, nearly all the primary care givers (99%) were women. At the 
time of their research, 89% were the biological mothers of the child beneficiaries and 
the majority of biological parents were single parents. The average age of the women 
was 33 years. In terms of household structure, 69 percent of children in the study 
lived in single parent households, these being more prevalent in formal urban areas 
than formal rural areas. In terms of care giving patterns in CSG households, the study 
found that 57% of primary care givers looked after the child beneficiary while 9% 
were looked after by the maternal grandmother of the PCG. That only 25% of the 
children were found to attend school or day care for either the whole or a part of the 
day is likely to be an artefact of when this study was conducted, as the CSG was 







The available evidence shows that, in practice, the CSG programme channels its 
support to children primarily through women, who, in turn, are mostly their 
biological mothers. A large proportion of these women live in rural areas.  
In the discussion below and by way of conclusion I will look at what this means for 
degendered notions like “primary care giver”, the discourse and practice of support 
that circumvents women as carers in need of care themselves, and Chodorow’s 
(1978) theory on women who mother and want to mother and the role of their 
mothering in the creation of gendered identities in children. 
 
5.3. Discussion and conclusion 
 
An analysis of the discourse of the WPSW shows that it conceptualises and positions 
women as vulnerable subjects and providers of care in society whereas men are 
mainly conceptualised as absent breadwinners and financial providers for women 
and children’s needs.  Children are identified as structurally vulnerable and in need 
of care mainly through the family; which is a normative familial model. The needs of 
men, women and children are framed and interpreted mainly through a discourse 
which is underpinned by gendered assumptions.  
 
The interpretation of this discourse is in the practice of welfare through the Social 
Assistance Act and CSG programme. In the CSG programme social assistance is 
provided for the care of children through the degendered notion of ‘primary care 
giver’ who lives in an economically vulnerable household. Whereas the WPSW 
recognises and essentialises the primary role played by women in childcare and 
identifies their vulnerability both economically and also in terms of their caring 
responsibilities, the provision of support for childcare through social assistance 
negates this recognition. The numerous qualifying criteria stipulated for ‘primary 







State and beneficiaries whose needs are administratively and institutionally defined 
by the State.  
 
The findings from CSG studies however, show that women are the main individual 
claimants/clients/beneficiaries of the CSG who qualify as ‘primary care givers’. They 
are also in most instances the biological mothers of the children and they are also 
mostly resident in the households of the children. These primary care givers are 
mostly unmarried and unemployed. These findings also reveal that fathers are mostly 
absent from households and that males comprise a very small percentage of primary 
care givers.  The implications of the degendered notion of ‘primary care givers’ in 
the Act and CSG programme is a failure by the State to recognise that it is women 
who  are mainly the primary care givers and to provide support to women for this 
function through relief or compensation. It also implies a failure to acknowledge that 






Sainsbury (1996) argues that the State through its welfare systems may treat women 
as wives or mothers or workers, in the case of the WPSW the women are primarily 
located within a discourse of care as mothers and care is located within the discourse 
of familial ideology. In so doing the State policy fails to account for and provide for 
the social structural problems experienced by women as a consequence of their care 
giving roles as well as to provide the conditions for women to assert their agency to 
meet their own productive needs. Walby (2009:113) argues that the provision of 
State facilities for childcare is very important in facilitating the employment of 
mothers who in the absence of such provision may choose to look after their children 
in a domestic setting. Further, she (ibid) argues that the greater the extent of State 
childcare, the higher and more rapidly the rate of female employment rises. She 
(ibid) does however, also acknowledge that high levels of female employment do 
also occur without State support but mainly in households that can afford to privately 




provision for care by the State is heavily implicated in gender inequality and patterns 
of individual and family well being and associated with variations in the situation 
between men and women. 
 
Fraser (1989:149) argues that welfare policies position women and interpret 
women’s needs as subjects in a particular way rather than dealing with women as 
women: 
“Of course, the welfare system does not deal with women on women’s terms. On 
the contrary, it has its own characteristic ways of interpreting women’s needs 
and positioning them as subjects”  
 
       She further argues: 
“Clearly, this system creates a double bind for women raising children without a 
male breadwinner. By failing to offer these women day care for their children, 
job training, a job that pays a “family wage,” or some combination of these, it 
constructs them exclusively as mothers. As a consequence, it interprets their 
needs as maternal needs and their sphere of activity as that of “the family.” 
Now, according to the ideology of separate spheres, this should be an honoured 
social identity. Yet the system does not honour these women. On the contrary, 
instead of providing them a guaranteed income equivalent to a family wage as a 
matter of right, it stigmatizes, humiliates, and harasses them. In effect, it decrees 
simultaneously that these women must be and yet cannot be normative mothers”  
(ibid:153). 
 
Hassim (1999:16) cites Lister (1994) as arguing that state social security grant 





With regard to Chodorow’s claim that it is mainly women who mother in society and 
want to mother, the findings from the CSG studies confirm that it is women who are 




Chodorow’s argument that women continue to play the  role of primary caretakers of 
infants in society. Chodorow argues that the basis for women’s predominantly 
mothering role is linked to their pre-Oedipal experiences of being mothered by 
women, where they develop mothering capacities which become part of their 
unconscious psyche, however she also argues that women mother because they 
derive meaning from this identity.  
 
Walker (1995:437) argues that women invest in motherhood and family not simply 
as a product of socialisation or patriarchal ideology but because of their own 
experience of this role. She (ibid) argues that woman want to mother and that the 
contribution of Chodorow’s theory is her recognition of women’s agency, an agency 
that stems from unconscious drives. The finding that it is women who predominantly 
claim the CSG, can be interpreted as women consciously constructing and claiming 
their mothering role and identity in society. Women’s recognition of themselves as 
‘primary care givers’ by mostly applying for the grant, can be viewed as a reflection 
of women asserting their agency as mothers in a consciously reflective way.  
 
Peattie and Rein (1983) have developed a claims-related perspective in order to 
introduce an agency perspective on the relationship between the welfare state and 
gender and for purposes of describing political economy at the level of the individual 
and the household and to connect the individual with the household. However, 
women’s agency as expressed in claiming the CSG  can also be seen as a response to 
the recognition of the stark reality that they are economically vulnerable, unable to 
provide for their own children’s needs and that men are absent as fathers and 
breadwinners in households. Peattie and Rein (1983: 20) argue that claims originate 
in particular sets of norms and values and are interpreted through prevailing social 





However the findings of the predominance of mothers who are ‘primary care givers’ 




and practices of social institutions. Here the choices, desires, motivations and 
behaviour (including mothering) of women in the family and society are constructed 
through discourses of mothering and gender in policy by political institutions. This 
institutional and policy discourse can be seen as perpetuating their role as ‘primary  
care giver’ and fulfilling a ‘reproductive function’ in society which relegates them to 
the private sphere. Hakim (1996:5) argues that the position of women in society is 
determined ‘both by their access to, role and status in paid employment, and the 
status accorded to their reproductive and domestic role.’ From a social interactionist 
perspective the women mothering (interaction with children) can also been seen as a 
reaction to the features of their particular social context (family) where they are 
expected to be and are categorised by others and themselves as nurturers. Schram 
(1993:251) argues that: 
“…value gets created when discursive structures are stabilised sufficiently to 
serve as the basis for enabling people to value some identities and interests over 
others. Identities emerge out of textually constructed differences.”  
 
With regard to the theory of object relations to which Chodorow subscribes, the 
social practice of mothering by individual women produces gender personalities in 
children. Children’s identification with same sex parents provides them with the 
experiences to learn the meanings of maleness and femaleness and is significant to 
their emotional development. She also argues that women and children relate to men 
as providers and breadwinners engaged in the public sphere. In the CSG households, 
women and children do not relate to men as providers of the family as they are 
absent but rather depend on the State to provide financial support for children. 
Children do not develop an inner psyche of triangular object relations of 
son/mother/daughter or daughter/mother/father. Mothers’ continued presence in CSG 
households does allow for both girls and boys to form primary attachments to their 








However, if you apply Chodorow’s model of identity formation to boys in CSG 
households – boys would also experience difficulties in male gender identity 
formation not because fathers are absent breadwinners but rather because fathers are 
mostly absent in any form at all. Chant (1997 cited in Visvanathan, Duggan, Nisnoff 
and Wiegersma (1997:158) suggests that boys become confused about their identity 
in households where fathers are absent. She argues that their experiences of 
insecurity could lead to them to demonstrating exaggerated masculinity later in life. 
However, she also (ibid:161) argues that in female-headed units children experience 
the absence of violence and this gives children greater psychological security and 
this could also act to reduce machismo and hostility between men and women.  
 
In contrast to Chodorow’s model which implies that women are devalued in society 
because of their primary mothering role and location in the private sphere, the fact 
that women are the main primary care givers who receive the CSG to provide for 
children’s material needs, could positively impact on women’s status within the 
family; as it could increase their value and status with children as they become the 





Chodorow’s theory on gender difference holds the view that the social organisation 
of the family with women mothering is the cause of gender difference within an 
individual’s psyche, she therefore proposes shared parenting as a solution to change 
the psychology of children in order to transform gendered psyches – rather than the 
transformation of social institutions and practices which reproduces gender 
differences and inequalities within the family. Her solution is however, consistent 
with her explanation that because the cause of gender difference and inequality 
resides in an individual’s psyche which arises from a particular social organisation of 
parenting, transformation of gender difference requires a change in the social 
organisation and practice of parenting within families. Woollett (1991) also argues 
that ‘psychological constructions of motherhood are underpinned by wider social 




with the WPSW proposal for partnership between men and women in domestic 
activities to overcome their vulnerability and the CSG also implies gender neutral 
care through the “primary care giver”. But the overall discourse and provisions of the 
State with regard to care belie these intentions. The implications of the discourse and 
practice of support by the State for women is that they are mainly provided for in 
their role as carers and their needs which arise from their social structural 




























Part III - Gender as maternal practice and maternal 
thinking 
 
The preceding chapters have analysed theoretical explanations of gender difference 
and inequality as maternal essence which is located either in women’s biological or 
psychological experiences of mothering. There are however other feminist theorists, 
including Carol Gilligan (1982), Sara Ruddick (1989), Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981), 
and Ann Ferguson (1989) who also explain gender difference and maternal essence 
but who focus on mothering as work, practice and/or activities. For them, gender 
differences emerge from the common activities of mothering such as nurturing, 
protecting, and caring and it is these practices that give rise to and is influenced by 
distinctive cognitive capacities, attitude and values. Here human practice forms the 
basis of subjectivity and consciousness. Mothering activities are demanded by 
children according to their basic needs. For these theorists, rather than mothering 
being a source of oppression, the sexual division of labour – where women mother – 
produces attributes in women which are deemed valuable and should be celebrated 
by all in society. This is especially because maternal experiences transform women’s 
consciousness to a more progressive political and feminist consciousness. If there is a 
problem, they argue, it lies in masculinist culture, which values instrumentalism and 
rationality and devalues feminine virtues and values and consciousness. 
 
This approach to mothering and male/female difference arises from what Eisenstein 
(1984: p.xviii-xix) observed as a shift in the 1970s in the feminist movement away 
from the erasure of difference to an emphasis on women’s difference to men, where 
women’s difference came to be regarded as a source of enrichment rather than as a 
tool of oppression. Briefly, in this changed conceptual framework, Eisenteisn (1984: 
pxviii-xix) cites Jean Baker Miller (1976), as arguing that women have learnt to 
develop certain psychological qualities such as nurturing qualities, affiliative and 







human qualities than those in which men were socialised. She also argues that this 
shift was also evident in conceptions of women’s bodies; while reproduction, 
motherhood and female physiology were formerly construed as oppressive by 
Firestone (1970), they now came to be regarded by Rich (1976) as a source of 
strength rather than a constraint. For Eisenstein (1984), Rich made an important 
distinction between the experience of motherhood and the institution of motherhood 
with the latter being linked to patriarchy. She pointed out that Rich viewed the 
female body as something that allowed women a “richness of experience that might 
extend potentially to new human possibility” (ibid: xix). In identifying and validating 
women’s difference, these theorists argued that ‘female’ virtues should counter and 
replace aggression and competitiveness and should be spread throughout society. 
 
In a similar vein, Young (1990:74) has characterised the shift in accounts of 
women’s oppression as a move away from humanist feminism, which is seen as 
typical of the 19th & 20th century and early Second Wave feminism, to gynocentric 
feminism. She describes gynocentric feminism as defining “women’s oppression as 
the devaluation and repression of women’s experience by masculinist culture that 
exalts violence and individualism” (ibid: 73).  Like Eisenstein (1984), she contends 
that gynocentric feminists claim that the values of traditional female experiences are 
superior to the values of traditional male institutions. 
 
In the African context Oyewumi (2000) also emphasises the importance of 
motherhood as a self identity of African women, while Amadiume (1997) argues that 




This shift in the conceptualisation of gender difference was accompanied by 
methodological and epistemological shifts. The point of enquiry became the study of 
women’s actual experiences, with women being active subjects consciously and 
purposively constructing their identity, behaviour and world as opposed to them 
being the objects or passive subjects of external, structural forces (Ritzer 1998:312). 




perspective of ‘others’ or as a function of patriarchy, few studies have tried to 
understand their ‘positioning or social role from inside the mother’s discourse’. 
Epistemologically these feminist theorists view the standpoint of the subject, in this 
case mothers, as an equally valid explanation of behaviour. In sociology this 
explanation of behaviour falls within the ambit of social interactional, 
microstructural and social action perspectives where humans are viewed as purposive 
actors orientating their actions to other individuals (Ritzer 1998: 316-8). 
 
Not surprisingly, theories built on the celebration of women’s difference from men 
and which focus on women’s experiences and activities as an explanation of gender 
differences have been extensively critiqued. Numerous writers (Spelman 1988, Fuss 
1989, Fraser and Nicholson 1990, Flax 1990, Butler 1989, Bordo 1992, and Haraway 
1991) point to the theoretical limits of this approach. The emphasis on and the 
celebration of women’s individual mothering activities excludes a social 
constructionist explanation of mothering, how it is linked to the public sphere and 
how it perpetuates the assignation of women to the private sphere. It does not engage 
with the problem of a gendered private/public dichotomy and the implications this 
has for women, oppression or mothering. Hekman (1999:21) citing Teresa Ebert 
(1996:16) argues that experience, like all other cultural and political practice, is 
socially constructed and relational.  
 
The valorisation of women’s lives is also criticised for generalising, universalising 
and essentialising women’s mothering activities as well as children’s demands. Di 
Leonardo and Lancaster (2002:53) argue that Western popular culture is guilty of 
fetishizing motherhood and claiming a female consciousness that exists across time 
and space. The criticism points to a reifying of women’s activities, ‘women’s work’, 





In terms of sociological theorising, the social action, social interactionist paradigms 




criticised for their neglect of the power of social structural and institutional external 
forces in shaping behaviour. Epistemologically, the naturalistic and interpretive 
approach underlying this position on mothering has been criticised from a more 
positivist approach for its relativist, particularistic viewpoint. 
 
Sara Ruddick, the next author I propose to consider, falls among those gender 
theorists who, while not seeking to minimise women’s differences from men, have 
argued for the re-evaluation of women’s difference in society. In her book Maternal 
Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (1989) she holds that there are distinctive 
maternal practices/work/activities which emerge in response to children’s demands 
and that these practices are informed by a distinctive kind of maternal thinking. 
Maternal practices are not restricted to women but can be done by others, including 
men, if they have the interests of nurturing and preserving children.  For her, 
maternal thinking provides a platform for anti-militaristic values, which can 




















Chapter 6  
 
The reproduction of gender through practice: the theory 
 
 6.1. Sara Ruddick 
 
For both Ruddick (1989) and Chodorow (1978) mothering experiences are linked to 
the creation of gender difference. However, whereas Chodorow focuses on the 
practice of mothering and its unconscious gendered effect on the gender identities of 
children, Ruddick focuses on the practice of mothering and the gender difference it 
gives rise to in women’s thinking through their conscious reflection of their 
mothering practice. In her own reflections on maternal practice and thinking Ruddick 
argues that she draws heavily on the works of  the Women’s Ways of Knowing 
collective,  namely Jean Baker Miller and especially Carol Gilligan, whose 
‘different-voice’ theory examines women’s work and experiences and articulates the 
ideals of an alternative epistemology and moral reasoning (p.95).  
 
Ruddick (in Bassin, Honey and Kaplan 1994:37) attributes her approach to what she 
regards as the then prevailing contempt of Western philosophers for bodies and 
matter as well as the need to validate experiential subjective ways of knowing in a 
world dominated by a belief in scientific objectivity. She criticises abstract thinking 
as being a form of masculine thinking that creates false dichotomies such as 
one/other, mind/body, male/female, and she rejects masculinist reasoning.  For her, 
the best approach is a subjectivist analysis of behaviour.  
 
Ruddick (1989:9) disconnects birthgiving from mothering. For her, the work of 
mothering is central to women’s practice and it is this practice that gives rise to 
maternal thinking.  She argues that maternal practice begins in response to the reality 








Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (1989), the text which is 
under consideration here, is divided into three parts: Thinking About Mothers 
Thinking, Protection, Nurturance and Training and Maternal Thinking and Peace 
Politics. For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on the first two parts, as they set 
out her conceptions of the thinking and practices of mothering and are central to the 
focus of my thesis.  Part III, which looks at the positive implications of her 
characterisation of mothering for political, non-violent activism takes up issues of 
politics and political practice. As these are not germane to this dissertation, this 
section of her book will not be considered further here. 
 
Ruddick attributes the genesis of her own experiences and ideas about maternal 
practice and thinking to her initial ‘love affair’ with Reason, defined by Western 
philosophers as detached, impersonal, rationality. This notion of Reason, articulated 
by Descartes as being the ‘correct method’ (Ruddick 1989:7) entails having self-
control, objectivity and detachment. Not surprisingly it is embodied in men and 
lacking in women. By acting through Reason, subjectively she was able intellectually 
to move away from social responsibility and subjectivity.  
 
However, as a wife, mother and citizen Ruddick gradually became disillusioned with 
this kind of Reason because not only was it used to justify domination, violence, 
oppression and privilege, but it also implied being detached, impersonal and 
irreverent to affections and loyalties (Ruddick 1989:.8). Ruddick found herself 
questioning and redefining the social and sexual politics of Cartesian Reason. For 
Ruddick (1989) the human good in reason lay elsewhere and needed to be differently 
understood. For her, reason was defined as learning, experimenting, imagining, 
discovery, designing, inventiveness, steady judgement, self-reflectiveness, clear 
speech and attentive listening. And this form of reason, with its feminine attributes, 








What Ruddick theorised was an alternative conception of reason that ideally is linked 
to the more appropriate attributes of responsibility and love, which arise from the 
perspective of the work and experiences of mothering.  
 
Drawing on the ideas of Wittgenstein (1975/1980), Winch (1952) and Habermas 
(1972), Ruddick argues that “All thinking ...arises from and is shaped by the 
practices in which people engage” (p.9).  In the first chapter of the book she 
develops her ideas on maternal thinking by focussing on the relationship between 
thinking and practice in the abstract and then applying these ideas to her own and 
others maternal practice and maternal thinking. She describes maternal work as 
demands to which workers respond. “These demands shape, and are in turn shaped 
by, the metaphysical attitudes, cognitive capacities, and identification of virtues that 
make up maternal thinking” (p.11). Drawing from her own and others’ experiences 
of mothering, she suggests that maternal thinking emerges from the practice of 
mothering as a social interaction between mother and child.  
 
Her ideas have been described philosophically as a ‘practicalist’ conception of ‘truth’ 
or as ‘practicalism.’ It is an approach that holds that “ways of knowing and criteria 
of truth arise out of practices” (p.13) rather than there being foundational notions of 





According to this philosophical approach “thinking arises from and is tested against 
practices” (p.13), and practices are “collective human activities distinguished by the 
aims that identify them and by the consequent demands made on the practitioners 
committed to those aims” (p.13-14). In other words human action or practice is 
defined by aims and goals that are directed at meeting demands, while the thinking 
that practice generates is both social and solitary in character. Thinking is social in so 
far as concepts have shared meanings in language and, therefore, the aims and the 
means as well as the rules to achieve the aims are shared. But it is also a solitary 




logic, there is no one way of thinking that can transcend its social origins, making 
truth 
“perspectival, relative to the practices in which it is made …The practicalist’s 
point is that the criteria for truth and falsity, the nature of evidence, and the role 
of faith will vary with the practice, whether the practice be religious, scientific, 
critical – or maternal” (p.16). 
 
Applying this philosophical perspective to the specific practice of mothering, 
Ruddick (1989) argues that: 
“Maternal practice begins with a response to the reality of a biological child in a 
particular social world. To be a “mother” is to take upon oneself the 
responsibility of child care, making its work a regular and substantial part of 
one’s working life” (p.17). 
 
She also points out that, apart from maternal practice, mothers do engage in various 
other activities and as individuals are not only defined by their work. She argues that 
mothers are also all very different from one another as they are also shaped by their 
social contexts. However, Ruddick’s definition of a mother is specifically in relation 
to women’s commitment to meeting the demands made by their children and the 
social world which is constituted in maternal work (ibid).  
 
Ruddick suggests that there are three demands made on mothers – “preservation, 
growth and social acceptability” and these, in turn, generate three kinds of maternal 
work “preservative love, nurturance, and training”. She holds that the preservation 
and growth of children is a truth and achieving this end is the goal. I now turn to 









6.1.1. Children’s demands and maternal work 
 
For Ruddick, preservation is the most important maternal demand, because human 
children are physically fragile and have a longer dependency on adults for their 
safety and well-being and, therefore, require protective care. She argues that 
although the cause and type of dependency and protection might vary, this is a 
universal need in children which creates a category of human work. Even though the 
perception of the need for care and the actual rendering of care is optional, as they 
are both subject to social interpretation, the aim of maternal practice is to preserve 
the lives of children. Commitment to achieving that aim defines the maternal act. 
 
The second demand made on mothers by children, emotional and intellectual growth 
generates the maternal practice of nurturing this growth, albeit in historically and 
culturally specific ways (p.19). Despite their varied contexts, all children require 
nurturance and this work is typically done by mothers (p.20). 
 
The third demand defining maternal practice is a demand that is not made by 
children but by the social group of the mother. It is a demand that relates to the 
socialisation of individuals according to the norms and values of a particular social 
group and these norms and values may vary among groups and cultures (p.21). 
Ruddick calls this a demand for  the ‘acceptability’ of children within the groups to 
which they belong. This demand to ‘fit in’ or to train children to be socially 
acceptable is not variable and it involves several strategies, namely, “persuasion, 
manipulation, education, abuse, seduction or respectability” (ibid.21). The social 
group of the mother sets the standards of acceptability and she is also responsible for 
training children to be acceptable. Ruddick argues that mothers are usually woman 





While maternal work also involves other, additional demands, Ruddick argues that it 




She does also concede that mothers and children may be differently defined in other 
cultures. However, since mother and child are relational concepts, maternal practice 
will exist wherever cultures recognise children as demanding protection, nurturance 
and training. The fact that maternal commitment is voluntary and that there are 
culturally varied and subjective choices on whether or not to respond to demands to 
protect, nurture and train children, the demands themselves require mothers to reflect 
on their responses. It is this act of reflection that generates maternal thinking. 
 
6.1.2. Maternal thinking  
 
Maternal thinking is the distinctive discipline that arises from thoughtfulness over 
maternal practice. Ruddick describes maternal thinking as “the intellectual 
capacities she develops, the judgements she makes, the metaphysical attitudes she 
assumes, and the values she affirms” (p.24). For her this discipline is like any other 
discipline. It entails asking questions about the aims of her work and evaluating the 
relevance of her answers, establishing criteria for this evaluation, setting priorities 
and identifying appropriate virtues. Maternal thinking also requires disciplined 
reflection on identifying questions, methods and aims. In itself it is not virtuous, 
however, but rather requires an assessment of the possible content of the virtues of 
maternal thinking (p.25). She claims that the thinking that mothers engage in arises 
in and is tested through their practice and, therefore, can only be evaluated by those 
who practice maternal work or who live “closely and sympathetically with those who 
do” (p.26). In other words, she contends that criticism of maternal thinking and 
practices cannot be made by those who are not involved in maternal work. This does 
not mean that self criticism or interpractice criticism is not possible, but rather that 
there is no one discipline that can be used as a standard to judge all other practices 
(p.27). She is here once again referring to her rejection of metanarrative explanations 








Ruddick gives a detailed account of maternal thinking – the specific metaphysical 
attitudes, cognitive capacities and virtues which arise from mothering in the second 
part of her book.  
 
Methodologically, she describes her approach as “making it up” (p.61), in other 
words that she developed her conceptualisation of maternal practices and mothering 
by making sense of her own reflections on her experiences and practices. By 
intuitively recognising that mothering was a type of work and then linking this 
insight to the epistemological claim that labour or practice forms consciousness, she 
developed her theory that distinctive kinds of maternal thinking arise from the 
demands of maternal work (p.62). By her own account, only retrospectively did she 
discover that this approach was used by theorists in a range of disciplines (sociology, 
anthropology, political science, psychology) and from a variety of perspectives. 
Especially, she found her ideas resonated with strands of feminism, and these, in 
turn, have come to shape and influence her own distinctive ideas. 
 
By analysing what she holds to be the three essential demands children make on 
mothering and maternal thinking, she explores the conflictual nature of the attitudes 
that the experience gives rise to and the need for mothers to continuously struggle to 
think and act maternally.  
 
6.1.3. Maternal practice and maternal thinking 
 
In this section I turn to maternal practice and maternal thinking, in the form of 
maternal work as it is influenced by children’s demands. 
 




The first demand that a mother responds to from her child is the demand for 
protection with preservative love. As maternal thinking is imbued with feelings and 




mother’s passionate feelings for her child. But ‘mother-love’ is intermixed with hate, 
sorrow, impatience, resentment, and despair so  ambivalence becomes a distinctive 
feature of mothering. She writes: 
“In protecting her child, a mother is besieged by feeling, her own and her 
children’s. She is dependent on these feelings to interpret the world. The world 
that mothers and children see and name, separately and together, is constructed 
by feeling” (p.68).  
 
Protective love is structured by feelings as feelings provide the instruments for 
thought. Mothers reflect on their feelings in their thinking about mothering. This 
reflection leads to action and more reflection. Thus, 
 “feelings demand reflection, which is in turn tested by action, which is in turn 
tested by the feelings it provokes” (p.70). 
 
In their protection of children from outside forces, from mothers themselves or from 
children, Ruddick argues, mothers develop a mental habit or cognitive style called 
“scrutinizing” where mothers look out for dangers before they appear (p.72). At the 
same time, she suggests, this attribute of scrutiny is tempered by humility, an 
attribute that enables mothers to acknowledge the limits of their actions and the 
unpredictable nature of the consequences of maternal practice. Humility is a virtue 
for mothers who see that they cannot control everything to keep their children safe.  
 
Humility is a metaphysical attitude that is not typical in Western scientific thinking, 
as it entails seeing children as subjects who are also purposive agents, rather than as 
objects that can be controlled (p.73). For Ruddick, humility does not mean that 
mothers become so passive as to give up all efforts to control. Rather than 
relinquishing control, they come to think of it in a particular way without 
domination. From this perspective, successful care means ensuring the safety of 







tempted to be passive by relying on the judgement and advice of experts. In the 
process, they give control up to them in their thinking and practice.  
 
“Cheerfulness” or the preservation of control in an uncontrollable world as well as 
the securing of self against one’s own impatience, anxiety, fatigue and self-
preoccupation is another virtuous attribute that Ruddick believes mothers develop.  
She argues that to be “cheerful” means to “respect chance, limit and imperfection” 
(p.74) and still endeavour to keep children safe. By identifying cheerfulness as a 
virtue of mothering, she is not claiming however, that mothers all possess it, but 
rather she is seeking to highlight the struggle that maternal work is for women.  
 
Ruddick goes on to argue that, in the process of doing protective work, mothers also 
acquire a particular conception of “nature”, which is an attitude that accepts the 
physical being of their children, their bodies, its physicality, chemistry, emotions, 
vulnerability (p.75-76). This does not mean that they do not try and protect them 
against ‘nature’ but rather that a mother appreciates the “workings of nature within 
herself and those she loves …like the Ghandian non-violent activist”(p.77). 
 
“Holding” is another characteristic of protectiveness that mothers develop in their 
efforts to protect their children. Through it they seek to “minimize risk and reconcile 
differences” by trying to maintain harmony, material resources and skills for their 
children’s safety (p.79). While at its best, it is virtuous, Ruddick suggests that 
“holding” could degenerate into “holding too closely, too timidly, too materially” 
and “holding” together relationships which children depend on but which are harmful 





She celebrates these cognitive attitudes and virtues of preservative love – scrutiny, 
cheerfulness and holding – which are widely found in powerless people but points 
out that they are often used by the powerful to oppress them. However, Ruddick’s 




political struggle.  Lastly, she argues that maternal care (protection) of their children 
extends beyond keeping the home safe for children and into keeping the 
neighbourhood, community and nation safe (p.80-81). 
 
6.1.3.2. Fostering growth 
The second demand made by children on mothers is that of fostering growth in 
children and mothers respond to this demand through nurturance. Ruddick argues 
that “to foster growth is to nurture a child’s developing spirit – whatever in a child is 
lively, purposive, and responsive” (p.82). She argues that mothers’ reflect on how to 
foster growth, and in so doing recognise children’s complexity and the difficulties of 
responding confidently to them. She also claims that mothers’ nurturance of children 
assumes that nature is their ally. They cooperate with it in the belief that for the most 
part it ‘moves them toward health and integrity’ (p.84). 
 
For Ruddick, ‘nurturance’ means identifying children’s behaviour and feelings as 
‘natural’, that is, as appropriate to their age and circumstances. She argues that 
children need sympathetic attention from adults to cope with intense emotions, 
abuse, fears, and passions otherwise they will be damaged intellectually (p.84). At 
the same time, confronted with daily questions from helpers, experts, fathers, friends, 
grandparents  etc., mothers have to make decisions about  their children’s various 
activities (such as play, reading, school) as they carry out administrative tasks for 
example organising times and places for toddlers to socialise, for learning, for 
friendship, central to fostering growth (p.85, 87). This means that conditions of 
growth are established in different ways by different mothers in different 





A further metaphysical attitude of fostering growth in children that Ruddick 
identifies is the ability of a nurturing mother to hold her children close and  at the 
same time “welcome change”  in her children. It is a metaphysical attitude where 




learning” according to Miller (1976:90), and it is this maternal experience that helps 
women understand the changing natures of all peoples and communities. Like other 
attributes she identifies, Ruddick regards the ability of mothers to change, to their 
children’s changes, as a maternal ideal, rather than a universal reality.  
 
For a mother to understand her child, Ruddick argues, she needs to assume the 
existence of a conscious mind that is not separate from the body but which interacts 
with it, where thoughts express themselves physically and the physical is mentally 
interpreted (1989:91). In this she conceptualises the mind as being inseparable from 
and continuous with feelings in children, so that their thoughts and perceptions as 
well as their understanding of the world is shown to them through their own and 
others’ fears and desires. By seeing the continuity of mind and feeling and action, 
mothers come to understand their children as constructive agents of their lives and 
worlds. They constantly ask what their children think in order to protect them 
effectively. Ruddick argues that this approach to mothering corrects distortions and 
inhibitions but also allows children the privacy to develop spirit, albeit in connection 
with others. Because mothers want to understand, they make themselves trustworthy 
listeners (p.93). 
 
Drawing from Carol Gilligan (1982) and the Women’s Ways of Knowing collective, 
Ruddick argues that the widely held belief that women have a cognitive style 
distinctly more concrete than men’s that arises from their experiences of mothering, 
as ‘fostering growth’ which creates and enables their cognitive capacity for 
“concrete  thinking” as they practice understanding of children’s minds (p. 95). 
Saying that mothering elicits a markedly more concrete style she however maintains 





Ruddick argues that mothers refine their concrete cognitive style through maternal 
conversations or stories, which in turn become important instruments of confidence 




reflect on observations about their children’s particularities. They also make up 
stories for themselves and their children about their children’s lives where both 
develop a common understanding of shared experiences. For Ruddick, the key 
virtues of maternal stories are “realism, compassion and delight” (p.98). 
  
6.1.3.3. Training 
The third demand children make on mothers is for ‘social acceptability’ which they 
respond to through ‘training’ children. Ruddick suggests that the view that children 
need ‘training’ seems universal.  But there are cultural and individual differences in 
what ‘training’ entails. This arises from variations in understanding what human 
nature is. What moral values are and who should be responsible for this training in 
children. By assuming that children’s nature is hospitable to goodness and maternal 
work is potentially a work of conscience for Ruddick, ‘training’ is the drawing out of 





The central challenge of ‘training’ as maternal practice is the task of making a child 
acceptable to the community and one whom mothers can appreciate (p.104). In 
‘training’, as mothers reflect on their own values and moral principles, they try to 
judge children tenderly but with confidence (p.108). ‘Training’ is also about being 
aware of the contradictions of maternal power as it entails both intervention and 
control for example deciding on what behaviour to allow, to ignore or to insist upon. 
Mothers express their power through the choices they make and techniques they use 
(p.109).  This, in turn, means that ‘training’ is also challenging, confusing and 
fraught with self doubt. In part, this is because the power of mothers to make 
decisions is circumscribed by ‘the gaze of others’ – where other people, policies, 
institutions and the natural happenings around them contradict their values and 
strategies (p.110). In part, their power is limited by children’s wills as well as their 
own feelings. In the process mothers become confused and powerless. They often 
experience a sense of loss of self and abdicate maternal authority to the judgement of 




This results, she says, in a deformation of ‘training’, as mothers work against their 
own and their children’s ‘natural’ impulses, act inauthentically and domineeringly 
and with Reason alone, rather than with nurturance and preservative love (p.114). 
 
Ruddick invokes ‘nature’ by depicting ‘training’ as “the trainer’s ability to judge 
‘natural’ tastes, desires, and behaviours… Such natures are educated, that is, they 
are “led out of” temptation into virtues “naturally” awaiting them” (p.116). From 
this perspective, when a mother demands “the education of a responsive nature 
rather than the domination of a hostile one”(ibid) she is training for acceptability. 
Training is also about fostering and protecting conscientiousness in children, where 
mothers, through their ability to identify, reflect on, and respect the demands of 
conscience must judge against dominant values so that their children learn that they 
cannot count on their or other people’s authority.  
 
The attribute of ‘conscientiousness’ requires taking responsibility for judgements of 
trust while maintaining a respectful independence from authorities judged 
trustworthy. Thus the conscientiousness of mothers becomes a model for that of their 
children (p. 117). Ruddick also makes reference to “training with a conscience”, 
which is about building trust and trustworthiness by mothering without being 





Ruddick adds to the discipline of mothering and maternal thinking, the notion of 
‘attentive love’ which is part of ‘training.’ For this concept she draws extensively on 
the philosophy of Simone Weil (1952) as well as it is elaborated by Iris Murdoch 
(1985). Where attention is simultaneously an act of knowing and an act of love, 
where ‘attentive love’ combines – the cognitive capacity of attention with the virtue 
of love (p.120).  It is similar to empathy and it lets differences emerge in children 
and others. In so doing ‘attentive love’ respects the truthfulness of the reality of 
others. ‘Attentive love’ is to ‘really look.’ Ruddick argues that through ‘attentive 




real and trustworthy child. In the process they also learn to bracket their own desires, 
to look with a patient loving eye, imagine, and then to accept what is different (p. 
123), which may give rise to another danger, as by their ‘attentive love’ actions and 
thoughts they can become vulnerable to ‘self-denial’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ (ibid). 
Ruddick argues that attentive love is a discipline and maternal thinking is a discipline 
in attentive love and through the discipline of attentive love mothers make 
themselves trustworthy.  
 
In sum, Ruddick argues that women’s engagement in maternal practice leads to 
maternal thinking, which is a distinct kind of reasoning that is different from Reason 
typical of men and mainstream thinking. This distinctiveness is seen by Ruddick as 
an asset in society rather than something to be devalued or eradicated or replaced. 
 
6.2. Understanding gender difference as maternal practice and 
thinking – limits and possibilities 
 
While distinctive, Ruddick’s ideas are neither epistemologically nor theoretically 
unique. Epistemologically, she falls within the interpretive paradigm in social 
science where people are viewed as intentional actors who actively construct and 
interpret their social worlds and there are multiple interpretations of events and 
situations (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2000:21-22). Methodologically, 
interpretivism seeks to explain behaviour through individual interpretations of 
behaviour, drawing directly from their experiences (ibid: 23). A typical exemplar in 
Ruddick, is her idea of maternal thinking as the disciplined reflection of maternal 
practice (1989:24), which is not dissimilar to Gidden’s (1991:52) notion of 
reflexivity as applied to the construction of identity. Ruddick’s specific emphasis and 
valuing of women’s experiences, voice and activities was developed into a distinctly 
feminist epistemological perspective; identified as a feminist standpoint perspective 







standpoint theory argues that knowledge is situated and must be derived from the 
perspective of the actor. 
 
Sociologically, Ruddick’s practicalist view resonates with George Herbert Mead’s 
(1934) symbolic interactionism and Max Weber’s (1949) social action theory. Each 
theorises the internal meanings of human action as arising from subjectivity, action 
and social interaction. From an interactionist perspective and in a similar vein to 
Ruddick, Wharton for example, has argued that “doing household work and caring 
for children are not merely activities one performs; rather, these activities help to 
create people’s gendered sense of themselves” (2005:150). Risman (1987:9), using 
micostructural or micro-interpretive theory, has argued that most differences between 
women and men arise from different experiences, opportunities and access to social 
networks.  
 
Various epistemological and theoretical criticisms have been levelled against the 
underlying micro theoretical approach of Ruddick’s ideas of mothering. The 
relativism of the interpretive paradigm has been criticised by Giddens (1976 cited in 
Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2000:27):  
“No specific person can possess detailed knowledge of anything more than the 
particular sector of society in which he participates, so that there still remains 
the task of making into an explicit and comprehensive body of knowledge that 





Sociologically Ruddick has been criticised by some theorists for swinging the 
pendulum in the structure – agency debate too far towards agency – to the power of 
the subject which results in her theory (and similar ones) failing to explain the 
oppressive aspects of women’s lives (Young 1990: 88). Ruddick claims that 
mothering itself is not oppressive and that mothering is a gratifying, rewarding, 
affirming and pleasurable experience even in trying circumstances. Unlike other 




work (1989:30). Ruddick’s claim that women can potentially choose to experience 
the pleasurable aspects of mothering practice, assumes the power of agency in 
women which gives them the ability to extract positive experiences out of oppressive 
practice and ideology.   
 
Sevenhuijsen (1998:22) argues that: 
“… care can be seen as a mode of acting in which participants perceive and 
interpret care needs and act upon these needs. How their interpretation and 
acting proceeds varies according to the situation and social and institutional 
contexts, and depends on a variety of factors, such as norms and rules about 
good caring and the relational dynamics between the actors concerned.”  
 
Many theorists, from a social structural perspective, have argued that the emphasis 
on individual action and subjectivity in ascribing, determining and experiencing 
mothering activities, reasoning and attitudes is something positive. They maintain 
that this should also include an analysis of the relationship of mothering experiences 
to the practices, values, ideologies and discourses of external institutions, 
organisations and social groups which also shape individual action and meanings. 
Some theorists have specifically noted the difficulty in separating out individual 
meaning from the context in which individuals operate within. Kaplan (1992:4) 
argues that the discourse of motherhood is reflected in the values and norms about 
‘the Good Mother’ and is embedded in society and social groups. The ideas and 
notions of developmental psychology around childrearing are embedded in the policy 
discourse and practices of what constitutes children’s needs and should be a mother’s 
response to this. Walkerdine and Lucey (1989) suggest that expert theories on 
appropriate childrearing can act as a source of oppression to women. Kaplan 
(1992:4) elaborates that it would be difficult for mothers to disentangle what they 
think, desire and value from the dominant patriarchal discourse imposed on them and 








Ann Ferguson in Holmstrom (2002:135) argues that the amount of control and 
agency of individuals in parenting exchanges is variable and contingent on 
economic, political, legal and cultural constraints. Walker (1995:429) has argued that 
the actual practices, demands and the social identity of motherhood in South Africa 
were different in different historical, political and economic periods and insists that 
this difference would have impacted on the meanings mothers attached to their work 
and self image. 
 
While these criticisms are of general interest I am specifically interested in the 
problems of essentialism inherent in Ruddick’s conception of maternal practice and 
thinking. I believe that the key essentialising concept in her theory is that it is women 
who are mostly mothers and their identities are constituted by their mothering 
practices which emerge from a distinctive form of feminine reasoning. Mothers’ 
agency is located primarily in their response to children. Social constructionist 
feminists have criticised Ruddick for defining all children as having essentially 
common demands and all mothers as defined by their same response to children’s 
demands. They argue that gender is socially and variously determined rather than 
biologically.  Even though Ruddick makes claims to being aperspectival and a 
pluralist her work reflects a distinctive essentialist interpretation of mothering 





DiQuinzio (1993:6) argues that feminist essentialist theories assume attributes of the 
subject which exist prior to any social construction and that there exists a stable 
coherent gender experience and mothering identity, a core self. DiQuinzio (ibid:10) 
argues that also underlying these essentialist notions of mothering practice are 
universalising tendencies which claim a transhistorical, cross-cultural and 
normalising maternal subjectivity. He (ibid) points to Ruddick’s analysis of 
mothering as a practice accompanied by ways of thinking and goals and virtues as 
evidence of these tendencies.  Another criticism made against gynocentric feminism 




maternity and devaluing of patriarchal culture from a maternal standpoint can be 
seen as essentialising maternity in women (Young 1990:87). Young (ibid) argues 
that “By ‘essentialism’ I mean an account that theorises women as a category with a 
set of essential attributes.”  Young (ibid) argues that similar to patriarchal ideology 
which essentialises women’s biology and mothering activity in efforts that devalue 
these characteristics, gynocentric feminism falls into the same trap even though these 
attributes are now valued.  
 
Turning now specifically to Ruddick’s claims of what constitutes mothering 
practices and the demands of children, evidence of her essentialist notions will be 
discussed. Firstly from the above summary of her theory she identifies three key 
demands which children make; for preservation, growth and social acceptability 
(1989:17-23) as universal and that these needs are constitutive of maternal practice 
(p.22).  In viewing maternal practice as relational and existing only in response to 
demands made by children, Ruddick precludes an examination of how relations to 
others in the form of the presence or absence of other children, the father or other 
adults can influence mothering practice and cognitive attitudes. Here human needs as 
experienced by children are seen to exist separate from their varying cultural 
contexts and other discourses in society. Lawler (2000:126) argues that by asserting 
that children have needs and mothering involves responding to these needs is to 
ignore that needs are socially constituted. She (ibid) argues that this kind of argument 
also assumes that children’s needs are fixed and objectively knowable. Lawler 
(ibid:127) specifically levels this criticism at Ruddick’s views on maternal thinking; 
she argues that her ideas are based on a notion of a “universal category of maternal 
work which exists in relation to a fixed and universal set of children’s ‘needs’.” 
Lawler (ibid: 134-5) also cites Fraser (1989) as arguing that needs are foregrounded 









Ruddick argues that although most mothers have been and are women, mothering is 
potentially work for men and women, but maintains that mothers are the primary 
caretakers of children.  
“Although maternal work can, in principal, be performed by any responsible 
adult, throughout the world women not only have borne but have also 
disproportionately cared for children. Since most of the people who have taken 
up the work of mothering have had female bodies, mothers, taken as a class, 
have experienced the vulnerabilities and exploitation as well as the pleasures of 
being female in the ways of their culture. Although some individual mothers may 
be men, the practices and cultural representations of mothering are strongly 
affected by, and often taken to epitomize, prevailing norms of femininity” 
(1989:41). 
 
Here Ruddick describes as fact that women are primarily involved in maternal work 
and it is this experience which renders this work as gendered. She endorses the 
traditional dominant institutional discourse on mothering which exists in society 
which equates women with maternity. Her use of the term ‘maternal’ for care work 
of children can be viewed as perpetuating essentialist notions of mothering as the 





Her theory presupposes a series of appropriate responses by mothers to children’s 
demands which involves mothers’ reflecting on their practices through maternal 
thinking and acting with preservative love, nurturance and training (p.65-123). 
Mothering experiences are seen to exist prior to their social construction where 
maternal subjectivity is conceived of as a coherent, unified response; an attribute 
which mothers possess in relation to children’s needs. In this way Ruddick 
essentialises mothering by suggesting that women engage in distinctive practices 
which are traditionally feminine and also explains what mothering entails. In so 






Black feminists have criticised theories of motherhood as being ethnocentric. Di 
Leonardo and Lancaster (2002:49) also argue that theorists who focus on maternity 
as an area of analysis in gender theorising have a transhistorical and unchanging 
view of women’s work and the separation of spheres of human activity into different 
spheres is in itself a Western historical construction. In criticising universal notions 
of women’s activities they also cite the criticism of Kathy Pollitt’s (1995) essay on 
Sara Ruddick and Carol Gilligan and Deborah Tannen: 
“But the biggest problem with all these accounts of gender is that they credit the 
differences they find to universal features of male and female development rather 
than to the economic and social positions men and women hold, or to the actual 





Mothers’ preservative love (Ruddick 1989:65-81) endeavours to protect children 
from outside forces, mothers themselves and from themselves. Ruddick explains that 
children’s need for preservation elicits certain cognitive attitudes in mothers; 
‘scrutinizing’ for dangers, showing ‘humility’ in recognising that children have their 
own will that cannot be controlled, showing ‘cheerfulness’ even in the face of 
uncontrollable circumstances, accepting children’s ‘nature’ as physical beings and 
lastly ‘holding’ which is an attitude of minimising risks and reconciling differences.  
Essentialist notions of maternal work and reasoning resonate in these conceptions of 
mothering; as these attitudes are conceived of as appropriate responses which 
mothers possess independent of their varying social contexts.  Usually social 
contexts will act to circumscribe individual reflections on maternal practices and also 
maternal practice itself. Ruddick’s description of the maternal protection of children 
derives from an essentialist notion of  maternal cognitive attitudes; as these attitudes 
and responses are contingent on very specific meanings and interpretations of what 
constitutes – a danger to children, children’s will, uncontrollable circumstances and 
risks to children. These practices and thinking seem to exist apriori to the demands 




children is built into maternal identity and this precludes instances where mothers 
forego this responsibility or relinquish it to other people. 
 
The second maternal practice “nurturance” is described by Ruddick as a response to 
children’s demand for their growth to be fostered and spirit to be developed. The 
maternal attitude assumed in this practice is that children are naturally inclined to 
‘health and integrity’ (p.84) that children’s natures are constantly changing and that 
children are active subjects who consciously interpret their world (p.91). Mothers 
also organise various activities to foster learning, socialising and friendships in their 
children. Fostering growth in children leads mothers to having a more concrete style 
of thinking because their mothering practice leads to attitudes which try to 
understand children (p.95). These maternal attitudes that mothers develop towards 
their children’s growth makes very specific assumptions about children’s needs and 
nature; that children are naturally healthy and good and that their growth requires 
fostering in a very specific manner. Their response is seen as recognition of 
children’s need for nurturance and understanding of children’s nature. Mothers’ 
nurturing response to children is seen as them having the ability to recognise that 
children need fostering and that mothers are capable of, able to and want to meet this 
demand – implying that they possess the essential attributes and agency necessary for 





Lastly, Ruddick identifies ‘training’ as a maternal practice which responds to 
children’s demand for social acceptability. She argues that children’s and mothers’ 
nature are mainly good and training entails a recognition and trust of these natural 
characteristics (p.103, p.116).  Mothering practice therefore naturally tends towards 
“good” maternal practice and children too tend towards ‘good’ behaviour. There is a 
core attribute in both mothers and children which is naturally good. Ruddick’s 
reliance on the concept of an essential goodness in both mothers and children for 
training for social acceptability excludes notions of mothers who are neglectful and 




contexts in which mothers and children exist, such as poverty, affluence etc is not 
accounted for in her account of mothers’ or children’s nature. Even though Ruddick 
describes mothering as an activity, there are several instances in the book where she 
evokes nature in her description of maternal practice and in this way ties the 
attributes and practices of mothers to women’s essential biology (p. 78, 31, 51, 96).  
 
Di Leonardo and Lancaster (2002:49) cite Pollit’s work which argues that Ruddick’s 
claim about maternal practice is not based on a real description of what women do 
but are rather prescriptive notions of what they ought to do. 
 
In sum then despite Ruddick’s attempts to defend herself against maternal 
essentialism and universalising tendencies, there is evidence in her book of these 
tendencies. Her theory excludes an explanation of the impact of social influences on 
the construction of maternal practice and children’s demands and therefore creates 
notions of an essential character to maternal practices and children’s demands. Her 
emphasis on the subjective voluntaristic construction of meaning and action means 
that she excludes the force of discourse and ideology in individual constitution of 
meanings. In so doing her theory is too narrowly micro sociological. By constructing 
maternal practice around affective demands she reinforces patriarchal notions of 
women’s belonging in the private sphere. The interpretive methodology relies on 
subjective explanations of meaning of events and intentions and behaviour – the 
validity of such accounts is often raised by critics of interpretive perspectives. Young 
(1985:89) has also cautioned that by emphasising women’s superior maternal values 
and practices, celebratory feminists accommodate women to dominant patriarchal 
ideology and practices. For Young (ibid), the unintended consequences of valuing 
women’s maternal experiences are the reinforcement of gender stereotypes and the 





The usefulness of Ruddick’s theory on gender difference as located in maternal 




ways in several studies both locally and internationally (Ribbens 1994). In South 
Africa several empirical studies have explored the deployment of maternal identity 
and subjectivity in political struggles for instance Hassim (1993), Fester (2005), and 
Walker (1995), while others have investigated mothers’ perceptions, experiences and 
meanings of motherhood in the journal Jenda issue number 4 and 5. I want to explore 
the usefulness of Ruddick’s notions of the mothering experience by looking at 
empirical evidence which either reflects or challenges her essentialist conception that 
the interests of maternal practice and thinking happens invariantly and unchangeably 
























Chapter 7  
 






In Maternal Thinking Towards a Politics of Peace (1989) Ruddick employs a 
practicalist explanation to explain gender difference. This view holds that all 
thinking arises from and is shaped by the practices people engage in (p.9). In 
applying this perspective to women she argues that for many women, their practice is 
centrally defined by mothering, where mothering is construed as a form of work and 
a practice that demands a distinctive form of reasoning or thinking (p.17). Ruddick 
describes mothering as a response to three basic demands that all children present to 
mothers: preservation, growth and social acceptability. The mother meets these 
demands through the work of preservative love, nurturance and training for social 
acceptance. Ruddick defines a mother as someone who responds to these three main 
demands which essentially define maternal work. She considers preservation to be a 
paramount demand, as it is a universal need that creates, defines and is constitutive 
of the category of maternal work. Responding to children’s demands through 
maternal practice involves mothers having to think about strategies in the form of 
disciplined reflection that entails intellectual capacities, judgements, and 
metaphysical attitudes (p.23-24). Implicit in Ruddick’s view of maternal practice and 
children’s demands is the assumption that children need to be ‘brought up’ as 
opposed to simply just ‘growing up’ (Lazarre 1987:163). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, critics of Ruddick have pointed out that she 







essentialism of her argument rests on her notion that maternal practice is primarily 
driven and constituted by a set of universal demands made by children; preservation, 
growth and social acceptability. In other words, children’s vulnerability and 
dependence evoke in mothers a distinctive form of maternal thinking and practice. 
The maternal practices are universal because they are responses to a ‘biological child 
in a social world’ (Ruddick 1989:17); the social worlds vary but the biological child 
is invariant. It is this ‘necessity’ that determines mothers’ perceptions of the need for 
care in children. Ruddick assumes that children are able to assert agency in 
demanding care from mothers. The social relation between mothers and children is 
conceptualised as being driven and constructed around some innate, natural 
properties in children.  
 
Critics argue that this notion of maternal practice does not account for the way in 
which maternal practice is socially constructed by race and class for example  
(Patricia Collins 1994). Lawler (2000:126), for example, argues that children’s needs 
are not derived from any intrinsic quality of children but rather from the social 
cultural context in which adults define children’s nature. Their needs are socially 
constituted and thus carry with them power implications that are historically variable 
and politically contestable. Frazer and Lacey (1993:17) argue that human action and 
practices related to care are bound to and interpreted within various social, economic, 
cultural and institutional discourses and contexts. As much as these practices and 
discourses exist independently of social subjects, human action and practices also 
constantly constitute them. This means that social practices do not have intrinsic 
purposes or aims in themselves, but rather that these are made by people in particular 





Ruddick’s notion of maternal practice is also described as a micro-interpretive, 
social/symbolic interaction perspective which does not take into account the power 
of external, macro social structural influences on social behaviour. Critics query the 




experiences, actions and interpretations in formulating general explanations (Giddens 
1976). 
 
While acknowledging that there is political and social variation among children and 
those who care for them: 
“Despite the variations among children and those who care for them, these 
demands, I claimed define, essentially, a kind of work” (Ruddick 1989:51). 
 
 Ruddick still maintains that mothers are naturally compelled to protect their 
children: 
“I do expect sufficient commonality in the demands made by our children to 
enable us to compare, which also means to contrast the requirements of our 
work.” (p. 53).  
 
Despite claiming the existence of a general mode of maternal thinking and practice 
she does state that her own experience and social position, which are the source of 
her claims, affects here conceptions of maternal thinking and work: 
“I write out of a middle-class, technocratic, property-oriented culture 
ambivalently obsessed with bonds of biology. ... I make claims about all children 
and I believe them. But I make those claims out of a particular intellectual 
training and Protestant heritage that taught me to look for human needs and 
desires underlying the divisions between women and men and between cultures” 
(p. 54-55).  
 
While recognising the diversity of mothering and the specificity of her own 
mothering she does not however explore other different maternal practices and her 





Her scientifically rather dubious claim, notwithstanding, the essentialist 




behaviour: that they know how to respond to children’s demands, that they respond 
to these demands in an invariant and unchangeable way, that they engage in 
reasoning and intellectual activity when responding to children’s demands, that their 
practice reflects their thinking and that what they do is primarily driven by children’s 
demands. It is difficult to empirically test all these assumptions, not least of all 
because they have been the starting point of much existing research in South Africa. 
Several qualitative studies of mothering (Phoenix and Woollett 1991, Scarr and 
Dunn 1987, Sanger 1999, Amadiume 1987, Magwaza 2003, Sudarkasa 2004, 
Jeannes and Shefer 2004, McMahon 1995, Pillay 2007) show how social, economic, 
cultural, historical and political factors influence mothering. Ribbens (1990a, 1990b, 
1993, 1994) has also conducted international studies on childrearing which has given 
an ‘insider’s perspective’ of women’s position and experiences of being a mother.  
 
However, there also exist studies which describe the status of children in society, as 
well as related institutional policies and programmes on children that can be used to 
reflect on maternal practices, meanings and institutional discourse of mothering and 
children’s needs. I propose, therefore, to use some of this available secondary 
evidence to consider Ruddick’s notions of mothering practice and children’s 
demands.  
 




According to Ruddick the first demand that children make on mothers is for 
protection and mothers respond to this demand with preservative love. She argues 
that this need in children primarily constitutes maternal practice, where the 
commitment to meeting children’s demands for preservation means seeing their 







(Ruddick 1989:19). The central constitutive aim and interest of maternal practice 
becomes the protection of children’s lives informed by the cognitive capacities and 
attitude of scrutiny, humility and cheerfulness (p.71-75). These capacities and 
attitudes are accompanied by respect for nature and what is natural in their children 
as well (p.75-78).  
 
Research in South Africa and elsewhere in the world shows that children’s need for 
protection is variously met and the nature of a mother’s preservative love is often 
determined by political, social, economic and cultural circumstances of both child 
and mother. In other words, rather than there being an innate universal preservative 
response, protective mothering is determined by the social, economic and cultural 
resources at the disposal of carers. These variable social conditions also point to 
differences in the nature and extent of children’s vulnerability and dependence as 
well. The kind of relationship and expectations between mothers and children that 
Ruddick describes is also implied in the institutional discourses and practices in 
society on children’s needs and mothering practices. 
 
7.2.1.1 The situation of mothering in South Africa (time use study) 
Ruddick’s claim that it is mostly women who are engaged in maternal practice is 
evident in South Africa since it is women who mostly mother, spending 
(significantly) more time than men on childcare activities (Chobokoane and 
Budlender 2002:77).Women spend an average of 87 minutes a day on active 
childcare compared to seven minutes a day spent by men. They also spend more time 
than men in household maintenance, management and household shopping (ibid:74),  
all this being part of the work that Ruddick holds women do to protect their children 





South African men spend more time than women in work establishments but both 
men and women spend the same amount of time involved in primary production not 




Budlender 2002:77). Men spend more time than women on leisure activities (ibid.). 
All childcare activities, except for the supervision of adults and children needing 
care, are usually done on their own rather than simultaneously with other activities 
(ibid:85). This is evidence that South African women are attentive to children’s 
needs and respond more than men to children’s demands for care. In other words, 
they squeeze time into mothering even though they also spend time in productive 
work and they also engage in mothering in the absence of men.  
 
Even under varying social situations women perform more childcare activities than 
men. Both men and women seem to respond to childcare according to whether they 
have children, whether these children live with them and the age of the child. 
However, when confronted with this same reality of children in the home, on 
average, women spend more time per day on childcare than men (p.78). Women also 
spend more time on childcare activities than men, even in the presence or absence of 
other adults in households and whether children live in households or not (p.79). A 
detailed breakdown of child care activities – physical care of household children, 
teaching and training of household children, accompanying household children, 
supervising children/adults, caring for non-household children – reveals that for all 
these activities most men were less likely to mention and also performed less of these 
activities than women. Most women mentioned childcare activities unprompted and 





In South Africa the conditions exist for children’s demand for protection to be met 
with preservative love by adults. Most children in South Africa are living with 
adults; either both parents, only their mothers or only with their fathers or with 
relatives (Budlender and Meintjies 2004). The majority of orphans are also cared for 
by their relatives and live in their homes when their parents die. This is attributed to 
the non-nuclear nature of South African households where children are cared for by a 
range of adults in the households (Meintjies, Budlender, Giese and Johnson 2003). 




maternal orphans where most of the former live with their mothers, while only a 
small number of the latter live with their fathers and the rest mainly stay with other 
relatives (Budlender and Meintjies 2004). Contrary to frequent assertions, only a 
small number of orphaned children are living on the streets or in child headed 
households as a consequence of HIV/AIDS (Budlender and Meintjies 2004). Even in 
poverty conditions, in general, children are cared for by their mothers, as best as they 
can (World Health Organisation 2002). 
 
7.2.1.2 Child fosterage and household structure 
The protection of children takes different forms in different social, economic and 
cultural contexts. In South Africa, children and especially children living in poverty 
are not cared for constantly by both or either one of their biological parents. A 
significant number of children grow up in households with either one or both parents 
absent and in most cases it is the father who is absent (Posel and Devey 2006; 
Wilson cited in Alfers 2006). There is a significant number of single mothers and 
female headed households in South Africa which is a legacy of the forced oscillating 
migrant labour system (Posel and Devey 2006; Denis and Ntsimane 2006). Women 
in South Africa tend to occupy low paying jobs and jobs with little protection (Casale 
and Posel 2002:157). Female-headed households are amongst the poorest in the 
country (Budlender 2002). Single mothers have to provide care and financial support 
for their children which means they have to juggle work and childcare commitments 





However, children who are orphaned and those who are not, live with a range of 
‘social’ parents for some periods of their lives, in many cases without paternal 
figures or in different households to their biological siblings (Giese, Meintjies, Croke 
and Chamberlain 2003). Most people in South Africa live in extended family 
structures (Amoateng et. al. 2004). Mothering is considered a communal practice in 
many South African families, and is shared amongst many people (Magwaza 2003). 




the mothering relationship which Ruddick describes in her book. For Ruddick the 
survival of the child is intertwined with an individual mother and she therefore only 
provides examples of family structures which reflect this type of relationship. 
Fostered and orphaned African children are overwhelmingly cared for in households 
headed by a grandparent or a great-grandparent (61–86%), and almost all others in a 
household headed by another relative (Anderson and Phillip 2006).  
 
South Africa has one of the highest rates of adolescent pregnancy in the world. More 
than 35 percent of South African adolescent girls become pregnant before the age of 
20 and more than 30 percent have given birth at least once by that age (Department 
of Health 1998). Family members are frequently available to provide childcare and 
the children of adolescent mothers are usually absorbed into the mother’s (or 
grandmothers) household and given the protection of her ancestors (Jewkes et al. 
2001; Kaufman, de Wet and Staedler 2001; Tanga and Uys 1996). Some researchers 
have noted that adolescent childbearing has become institutionalised and is a ‘fairly 
typical stage in the domestic lifecycle of families’ (Jewkes et al. 2001). Children of 
adolescent mothers are sent away to live with grandparents to improve the life 
chances of teenage mothers who often return to school (Kaufman et al 2001). 
Historically at least, the cultural and political context in South Africa sees teenage 
mothers able to mobilise extended family resources for the care of their children 
which also allows them to pursue their own futures (Preston-Whyte 1991; Preston-
Whyte and Louw 1986; Preston-Whyte & Zondi 1989, 1991, 1992) Explanations for 
these social care giving arrangements range from parents trying to provide better 
schooling opportunities for children, to the promotion of moral development. Other 
factors are the challenge of migrant labour and cultural expectations, (Bledsoe 1994, 





Mothering practices are also historically and politically bound. In South Africa they 
were and continue to be affected by race, socio-economic circumstances and the 




black families and white families. As a consequence, the protection of children 
assumed different forms (ibid). In black communities, the practice of mothering 
children who are not biological offspring is a response to impoverished conditions 
(ibid). Economically better off black families often put their relatives’ children 
through education or provide them with basic needs (ibid). In white families the 
practice of ‘adopting’ the children of others is less common.  
 
Magwaza (2003) also argues that within the context of AIDS deaths, which are  most 
common in black communities, ‘informal adoptions’ are on the increase. In these 
circumstances, informal adoptions and care of neglected children by individuals who 
are not kin is becoming quite extensive, although the nature and length of this type of 
care arrangement of children is a factor of social and economic circumstances as well 





There are incidences of abandonment of children in South Africa, and it is mothers 
who are mostly responsible for this practice. But even then, in most cases children 
are abandoned to the care of grandparents or family members by their ‘failed’ 
mothers.  Less frequently, they are left at other places, including child welfare 
offices, children’s home, clinics, hospitals, friends, neighbours, with strangers, on the 
street, at a taxi rank, in deserted areas or with the biological father (Giese et al 2003). 
Most babies are abandoned as a result of HIV and poverty (Berry and Guthrie 2003). 
This suggests that even when mothers feel they have no choice but to abandon their 
children because of health or economic incapacity, they invariably still seek 
alternative sources of protection for their children and in so doing demonstrate their 
persistent efforts to continue to protect their children. Whether these mothers’ actions 
to care for their children are caused by innate biological instinct, socio-cultural 
expectations, or institutional discourse or individual motivation is difficult to discern 
from available evidence. However, what each or any combination of these suggest is 
that there is preservative love, and that their actions contain the elements of 




estrangement of mothers from their children is (often) caused by poverty experienced 
by mothers (Scheper-Hughes 1985:310 citing Piers 1978: 37).  
 
7.2.1.3 Economic position of mothers and protection of children 
Poverty and employment are implicated in the quality of protection that children 
receive from the people entrusted with their care by working mothers. It has been 
found that the health, standard of care and physical safety of children is 
compromised in children of working class women who work long hours and who use 
younger and older relatives to care for their children (Lund 2005 citing Sekhamane). 
Young care givers tend to be neglectful, distracted and often eat the food of the 
children in their care. In some instances grandmothers too are considered to be poor 
care givers, as they are unable to ensure the children’s safety (Moller 1990).  
 




Socio-cultural expectations of mothering and patriarchal ideologies also influence the 
definitions, perceptions, thinking and practices of mothers. Ruddick has argued that 
although maternal work can be performed by men, women or any responsible adult 
she maintains that the practices and cultural representations of mothering are 
influenced by prevailing norms of femininity (Ruddick 1989:41). Mothers often 
experience a contradiction between societal expectations and what they, as mothers, 
are able to do. Historically, in African societies, women are made into mothers 
through cultural rather than biological practices, by being assigned the status of  
‘mothers’ and being ‘given’ the role of protectors or mothers of children other than 
their own (Sudarkasa 2004). Under these conditions, motherhood is not ‘natural’ but 
rather the outcome of a culturally defined kinship role (ibid). Different family 
structures (nuclear, extended and conjugal) and living arrangements (compounds and 
separate isolated households) present various constraints and supports to mothering 
practices (ibid). In extended families children’s demands and responsibilities may be 
shared by many mothers, where this is not the case in nuclear families. Communal 




have access to a range of support from other women (ibid).Women are able to share 
information on the upbringing of children and have access to a range of willing 
childcare providers (usually other women). Mothering becomes a communal 
practice. This involves both scrutiny and social rewards, including confirmation, 
gratitude and pride from other mothers as described by Ruddick (1989:29-30). Even 
where women don’t live communally, the social definition of women as mothers is 
informed culturally by the ideology of ubuntu (humanness) which embodies notions 
of caring for, worrying about and offering other people help (Magwaza 2003). 
 
There are also commonalities in cultural expectations of mothering practice. In both 
black and white South African communities the welfare of children is perceived by 
society as the primary responsibility of women. Working mothers within black 
communities are especially held responsible for their children’s welfare, successes 
and failures (Magwaza 2003). Unlike men, most of these women find that mothering 
constitutes a large part of their lives and they think of their children most of the time. 
The same is true for white women, who also see their children’s needs as primary. 
Generally, by contrast, there are minimal parenting expectations of fathers in both 
white and black families in South African society (ibid).  
 
White middle class mothers perceive themselves as primary care givers because of 
what they consider to be an inherent biological motivation, whereas they regard 
parenting responses in men as a  choice, albeit a positive and virtuous one (Jeannes 
and Schafer 2004). In this sense, they echo Ruddick’s notion of the naturalness of 
protective love and of maternal practice as being driven by children’s demands and 
needs. Cast in the frame of the primary care giver, they express themselves as 
selfless mothers who are driven by their children’s demands and needs to be good 
enough for them (ibid), living in the long shadow of what Ruddick says is the 








7.2.1.5 Institutional discourse and programme practices 
Maternal practice is not simply a private domestic experience. It is also regulated by 
an institutional discourse on nurturing practices which is best characterised as 
‘naturalist’, namely, that mothering is seen to be biological and instinctive (Marshall 
1991). This naturalist view is implicit in Ruddick’s claims as well and she also 
argues that mothering is shaped by social and economic policies (Ruddick 1989: 45).  
 
As articulated in Social Development policies and programmes in South Africa, State 
discourse and practices generally make underlying assumptions about mothers’ and 
children’s needs, vulnerability and dependence. As the analysis of  the White Paper 
on Social Welfare in South Africa (chapter 6 above) shows that these particular areas 
of policy discourse in South Africa conceptualise and positions women as both 
vulnerable subjects and as providers of care in society, whereas men are mainly 
construed as absent breadwinners and financial providers for women and children’s 
needs.  Children are also identified as structurally vulnerable and in need of care, 
mainly through a normative familial model. Women’s needs are therefore framed 
and interpreted through gendered assumptions about mother-child relations, where 
children have needs to which mothers ‘naturally’ want to attend, thereby making the 





This said, there are important nuances in the documents which have been taken into 
account. The Child Support Grant (CSG) programme prioritises children in the 
mother-child dyad, by positioning care givers (mainly woman) as conduits for 
children’s needs. The Social Assistance Act (2004, Chapter 2 point 6) casts care 
givers in gender neutral terms. To wit, “A person is, subject to section 5, eligible for 
child support grant if he or she is the primary care giver of that child”. By so doing, 
it uncouples gender from mothering and suggests that the acts of mothering are, or 
can be, socially learnt (by men), even though, it is women who in fact are, or who are 
anticipated to be, the primary care givers (Lund 2006). Indeed, that the ‘primary care 




complex household structures and caring patterns in poor households in South Africa 
(Lund 2006).  
 
Like Ruddick, both the CSG programme and the Social Assistance Act view children 
as in need of care and not as giving care. As a consequence, children under the age of 
16 do not qualify as primary care givers (Rosa, Leatt and Hall 2005:12). This 
assumption can be practically problematic given the context of a generalised  
HIV/AIDS epidemic where an increasing number of AIDS orphans also come to be 
the primary care givers of other children (Burman 2004:75). It is also anomalous, 
because it supports a discourse on childhood which often contradicts children’s real 
lived experiences, their actual capacities, and their juridical standing. Its notional 
weakness lies in the fact that in Africa and elsewhere, girls and boys often enact 
many mothering functions for their siblings, practices that are often intensified by 
calamities such as being orphaned. 
 
Ruddick makes her claims about children’s needs and children’s demands from the 
assumption that the women who mother are married and live in a nuclear family. In 
South Africa, to qualify for the CSG the eligibility criteria for primary care givers 
can include either a marriage certificate, a divorce order, and/or proof of spousal 
income (Department of Social Development 2003). As with Ruddick, inclusion of 
these documents seem to imply a normative bias towards the institution of marriage 
as the (preferred) basis for family making or child care practices, although these too 





The findings of various studies into the CSG (Kola et al 2000; Case, Hosegood, and 
Lund 2003; Leatt 2004; Budlender et al 2005) all point to women as being the people 
who mainly care for children in families,  resonating with Ruddick’s contention that 
it is mainly women who mother. They are suggestive also of another of Ruddick’s 
insights that women, through their mothering activities, consciously reflect on and 




their own survival, mothers can be said to be acting in the best way to protect their 
children.  The institutional discourse and the practices resonate with Ruddick’s  
maternal essentialism where, in mothering, primacy is given to children’s demands 
and the mother-child relationship is ‘naturally’ constituted around the care needs of 
children. In this way women’s role as primarily that of care giver to children and of 
fulfilling a ‘reproductive function’ in society, is reinforced and perpetuated. 
 
7.2.2. Fostering growth  
 
Ruddick argues that even though the demand to foster children’s growth is part of 
maternal practice and is historically and culturally specific, unlike the demand for 
preservation, it is not primarily a cultural creation but rather is universally true 
(1989:20-21). She argues that fostering growth in children entails being aware that 
children have a need for nurturance of their complex emotional and intellectual 
development and as such, is something mothers’ assume primary responsibility for.  
In terms of fostering growth, the prevailing institutional discourse and practices in 
South Africa put women and families centre stage. Equally, studies have shown that 
women are overwhelming responsible for childcare arrangements, including the 
protection of and fostering growth in children, although practices vary according to 
socio-economic conditions, with significant implications for the quality of the 
emotional and intellectual development children receive.  
 




In South Africa women do what Ruddick says they do to nurture emotional and 
intellectual growth in their children (1989:87). They spend more time than men on 
childcare activities such as informal teaching and training, accompanying children to 
places such as school, sports lessons, and so on. (Budlender 2001:69). They take 
primary responsibility for childrearing, household reproduction, childcare 
arrangements and often financial support for the household, without significant 




Ruddick’s observation that the varying locations and economic status of mothers 
establish different conditions of growth (1989:86) also holds true in South Africa, 
where mothers’ responses to children’s need for emotional and intellectual growth  
are contingent on their varying socio-economic circumstances and influences both 
their control over and the quality of childcare. South Africa has a high rate of adult 
illiteracy (Chisholm, Motola and Vally 1999:8). The rate of unemployment amongst 
women is high (Hassim 2005) and when women are employed, the majority work in 
low paying jobs with limited or no work related benefits (Goldblatt 2005: 119). Also, 
they generally have a low participation rate in the workforce, which can, in part, be 
attributed to child care demands (Biersteker and Kvalsig 2007:159).  
 
Given the above, do parents have the necessary means and knowhow to foster 
growth in children in the way that Ruddick (1989) assumes? Richter (2004) argues 
that they don’t, as women who are hungry and economically insecure are also less 
likely to provide children with adequate emotional care. To adequately foster growth, 
they need State support.  
 
7.2.2.2. Socio-economic context and fostering growth in children 
In South Africa, whether women are employed, unemployed or not economically 
active, they spend more time than men in unpaid work, which includes childcare 
(Budlender 2001: 39). However, their ability to do so is being seriously eroded 
especially by the AIDS epidemic, as breadwinners and caregivers lose their jobs, 
cannot work at home, are overburdened with caring for sick people, or they 
themselves become ill and die (Richter, Manegold & Pather 2004). As already 
indicated, the role of fathers in childcare is minimal for all working women 





At the same time, in varying proportions, mothers often assign childcare 
responsibilities to other people (mainly other women) or childcare institutions. The 




help and use child care institutions for the care of their children (Department of 
Health 1998).  And where they are economically active, many jobs require that 
women leave their children elsewhere. Some occupations such as street vending 
allow mothers to care for their children while they work (albeit under constrained 
conditions), (Goldblatt 2005:119). Even unemployed mothers need and use 
alternative childcare arrangements, while they look for jobs or go about daily 
activities that take them away from their homes and the children in their care 
(Budlender 1997:26; Goldblatt 2005:119).  
 
Ruddick’s contention that the main task of fostering growth is administrative is 
generally evident in South Africa. While there are some mothers or carers who make 
no arrangements at all, leaving children without care (Goldblatt 2005:119), most 
mothers organise some kind of childcare arrangement when they are unable to care 
for their children themselves. Their options are significantly influenced by social and 
economic circumstances, ranging from state, private and charitable crèches to home 
care by paid childminders to care by other household members, relatives and 
neighbours or other unrelated families.  
 
Thus, economically advantaged white and black women are able to transfer the 
responsibility of childcare onto domestic workers who are employed in over one 
million households in South Africa and who make up 18 percent of total female 
employment (Mills 2002). In this, they continue a practice of racial privileging 





By making alternative childcare arrangements, mothers are doing Ruddick’s 
‘administrative tasks’ to foster their children’s growth. They are also demonstrating 
agency. However, in so doing they often find themselves with little control over the 
kind of emotional and intellectual climate for growth that their children are placed in.  
In other words, these and other care arrangements often barely meet Ruddick’s idea 




based on mothering judgements and guidance such as whether to intervene in 
children’s feelings and behaviour, whether to change or to control or wait or listen or 
to trust, what to permit or not (1989: 84, 85). While Ruddick argues that mothers 
need to know what their children are up to in order to nurture their developing spirits 
(p.93), child care arrangements that are extra-mother, as it were, can’t and do not do 
this in most cases. 
 
Working mothers, who rely on paid or unpaid kinship networks for the care of their 
children, often express concerns about the lack of mental stimulation provided by 
their childcare arrangements (Moller 1990). Generally, they are dissatisfied with 
these (COSATU/Naledi 2005:12) and would prefer quality, institutionalised 
childcare facilities to appropriately meet the cognitive development needs of their 
children.   
 
7.2.2.3 Institutional discourse and practice on fostering growth in children – the 
Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) Policy  
Trade union organisations are a key site where working women and men articulate 
their desires, expectations and the challenges they face of meeting the growth needs 
of their children. Their interests are reflected in the demand for parental rights and 
the negotiated agreements they have attained through collective bargaining. They are 
also reflected in background and policy documents that inform these demands and 
practices.  The South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union 
(SACCAWU) publication, Sharing the Load: The struggle for gender equality, 
parental rights and childcare (1991), and particularly the chapter entitled For love of 
our Children exemplifies organised workers’ thinking as it presents both their 
experiences of and discourses around childcare.  
 
Their views of childcare echo Ruddick in that children need protection and 







“Childcare does not stop when a baby is 12 months old – children need to be 
cared for until they are of school-going age and, even after that, provision has to 
be made for after-school care. The kind of care that young children are given is 
vitally important. They have needs that go beyond being clothed and fed - they 
also require love and stimulation. Children need to be educated as well as cared 
for. A work that is becoming popular which expresses this need is educare” 
(1991:39).  
 
Like Ruddick, SACCAWU (1991) also argue for the need to foster growth through 
care that educates.  
“The idea of educare arises from the well-known fact that the first six years of a 
child’s life are the most important time for learning. These early learning 
experiences help children prepare for school, but equally important, they help 
prepare children for life by teaching them values and skills that will help them to 
be better people” (1991:39). 
 
However, unlike Ruddick, SACCAWU (1991) expects that these needs can and 
should be met institutionally rather than simply within the family and within the 
interpersonal mother-child dyad. The problem for them is construed as an absence of 
pre-school facilities to cater for the care and educational needs of working class 
children. This legacy, they argue has its roots in the political and economic relations 
that characterised apartheid. 
 
This understanding of where and how to address children’s needs to foster growth is 
underscored by COSATU initiated campaigns and policies around maternal and 
parental rights to meet children’s needs for emotional and intellectual growth.  For 
example, in their ‘National Campaign for Childcare’ COSATU encouraged workers 
to take their children to work in an attempt to get workers, employers and 








The emphasis on the need for institutional responses to foster growth and care for 
children does not preclude ideas about the part that mothers and fathers can and 
should play in these tasks.  What they contend  is that it is not enough to shift this 
burden onto women and especially not into the private domain, not least of all 
because of its implications for women’s employment. COSATU argues that: 
“Women also face hardship in accessing and sustaining participation in the 
labour market. The majority of women have to juggle careers, domestic 
responsibilities such as cooking and caring of children. The shortage of 
childcare facilities and the sexual division of labour in the home impose serious 
burdens on women. Maternity leave and pay provision are also inadequate, and 
in some cases even the legislated minimum is not complied with” (COSATU 
2003). 
 
As with Ruddick’s observations about most cultures (1989: 41), in South Africa, 
women and mothering are conceptually and politically linked. And like her, women 
in South Africa demand the restructuring of the work place to better attend to the 
fostering of growth in children, implying both women’s responsibility for mothering 
and the unfair burden it places on them, to the economic and professional advantage 
of men (p.45).  
To address these issues COSATU developed a Parental Rights campaign,  
“to enable women and men in waged work to combine career with full time family 
life, while infants are given all the care and attention required. The benefits of 
such a campaign are that it will deliver concrete benefits for working women, it 
will play an important role in challenging and addressing women’s oppression, it 
will contribute towards the proper care and early childhood development of 






Some of the core demands of COSATU’s Parental Rights campaign which are 




• Paid maternity leave. 
• Paid and unpaid parental leave. 
• Childcare leave. 
• Flexible working time. 
• Provision of childcare. 
• Breaks and facilities for breastfeeding mothers. 
• Job security and health and safety for pregnant mothers (COSATU 2003). 
 
These demands neatly capture COSATU’s assumptions about the need for both 
institutional and personal responsibility for the care of children. Closer analysis of 
these demands points to two things. The first is that the gender neutral call for 
parental leave, child care leave and child care facilities suggests that organised 
workers as simultaneously claiming space in child care for fathers at the same time 
as they shift the burden away from mothers. The second is that some demands such 
as maternity leave, breaks and facilities for breastfeeding mothers, job security and 
health and safety for pregnant mothers specifically refer to women, as they are 
intended to enable them to perform mothering functions, protect the health of their 
unborn children and prevent pregnancy and child birth from prejudicing them in the 
workplace.   
 
In this, they speak in a similar vein to Ruddick, who too distinguishes conceptually 
between the demands of birthing labour and mothering. (1989:49-50). For her 
birthing labour is essentially female and performed by one woman but also demands 
certain maternal attitudes  for example taking care of the foetus by caring for herself. 
While birthing labour culminates in the act of giving birth, mothering is “an ongoing, 
organised set of activities that require discipline and active attention” (p.50). 
Ruddick also argues that, unlike birthing labour which is confined to women, 







(p.40-50), and that there is no biological based reason for men not to be capable of 
maternal work (p.41).  
 
However, COSATU’s (2003) discourse differs in one important aspect from 
Ruddick. While it presents childcare as a parental responsibility, Ruddick insists on 
conceptualising care work related to meeting children’s demands as ‘maternal’ work 
rather than ‘parental’ work (p.46). For her, although caring labour is a general 
category which includes many aspects of mothering work, and like mothering, is not 
tied to female bodies, she prefers the maternal idiom for intellectual and practical 
reasons. She argues that her retention of ‘maternal’ is based on the fact that it is 
women who mostly care for children and that the practices and cultural 
representations reflect normative assumptions of femininity (p.41). Mothering 
therefore becomes inseparable from being female. Understanding mothers then 
means understanding women’s way of knowing (p.41-42).  
 
Her reasoning is that different kinds of caring cannot be combined because caring 
work in general entails different activities related to different people and not only 
activities related to the care of children (p.47). Maternal work does not encompass all 
of caring work. And since each of the types of caring activities give rise to distinctive 
thinking, they need to be individually described in terms of both their connections 
and differences. Her insistence on characterising care work related to children as 
maternal work reflects the essentialising notion that underpins maternal work for her. 
The discourse in COSATU policy challenges this essential view. 
 




State legislation and policies also respond to the demand for fostering growth in 
children as a way of meeting their needs. As I have argued earlier (chapter 4, above) 
the WPSW (1997) is underpinned by assumptions about the care needs of children 
for emotional and social development locating their “survival, development, and 




At the same time and notwithstanding its normative preference for ‘the family’, the 
discourse also points to inherent shortcomings in the institution that have a direct 
bearing on its ability to meet children’s care and growth needs. Amongst others, the 
WPSW points to alcohol and drug abuse, communication and relationship problems, 
marital conflict and breakdown, parenting problems, family violence, and poor inter 
and intra- familial networks (p.39).  
 
“The aim of family and child welfare services is to preserve and strengthen 
families so that they can provide a suitable environment for the physical, 
emotional and social development of all its members” (p.41).   
And it has to do this, in part, by overcoming the institutional dysfunction in the 
process.   
 
The discourse of the WPSW is not able to confine itself to attending to arguably 
structural and functional constrains of the family, since like Ruddick, it situates 
women at the centre of child care and development. It also engages with the 
influence of work on women who are mothers:  
“Increasingly women have had to join the labour market for economic reasons 
and have had to rely on childcare outside the home” (p.39). 
 
      And 
“Working women are faced with increasing pressures in reconciling parenthood 
with work responsibilities. Early childhood development programmes to meet the 
needs of working women are insufficient” (p.51). 
 
By implication it is women who need to mother their children in order to foster 
growth and the problem is that economic activity, especially work, competes with 
child care for their time and attention. And even though early childhood programmes 







discourse points to their inadequacy in doing the job.  This is exactly Ruddick’s 
contention. 
 
Ruddick’s ideas of what fostering growth means and who should be doing it 
resonates even more deeply with those articulated by the State. While all children 
may be vulnerable and in need of care, the State’s discourse on the matter points to 
early childhood development as being especially formative for children ,and 
therefore a time when they especially need care. 
 “Children from birth to nine years of age have special needs, which, will be met 
to foster their physical, mental, emotional, moral and social development” 
(WPSW 1997:42).  
 
These ideas are more fully articulated through the State’s Department of Education 
White Paper, where the problem is both explicitly defined, 
“Early childhood development….. refers to a comprehensive approach to 
policies and programmes for children from birth to nine years of age with the 
active participation of their parents and care-givers. Its purpose is to protect the 
child’s rights to develop his or her full cognitive, emotional, social and physical 
potential” (Department of Education 2001:14-15). 
 
    ... and explained,  
 
• South Africa is committed in terms of section 28 of the Constitution as well as 
the World Declaration on Survival, Protection and Development of Children 
to the advancement of the rights of children; 
• The early years of a child’s life are critical for the development of the 
potential of the human being, and the first seven years are characterised by 
the rapid development of the physical, emotional, intellectual, social and 







• Unless conditions of poverty under which many children grow up are 
addressed, some 40% of South Africa’s children face the prospect of 
irreversible brain damage and stunted physical growth (Department of 
Education 2001:12-13). 
 
Generally, the State and COSATU concur with Ruddick on the importance of  
fostering growth in children, and they disagree to varying degrees with her in respect 
of who can or should be responsible for these tasks citing numerous sources which 
include child care institutions, families, parents and/or mothers themselves.  
 
However, to all intents and purposes the problem remains unaddressed in practice, as 
neither mothers nor any of the respective institutions meet the challenge adequately. 
 
Thus, for example, of six million children in the age cohort 0-6 years, a little over a 
million were registered in Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres (Department 
of Education 2001:18). A large number of these ECD centres have poor facilities and 
they generally employ unqualified personnel (Coetzee and Streak 2004:260-261). An 
audit of ECD facilities showed that the sites serving African children were of lower 
quality than those serving the rest of the population (Biersteker and Kvalsvig 
2007:163). And as Richter (2004) points out, institutionalised care cannot offer 
children, especially very young children, the emotional warmth of a primary care 
giver.  
 





For Ruddick ‘training’ is the third demand on which maternal practice is based. 
Unlike the previous two demands, it is not defined by children’s need but rather by 
the social groups to which mothers belong (1989:21). Training demands that mothers 
shape children’s behaviour to be morally ‘acceptable’ to their social group. Ruddick 




need for children’s behaviour to be acceptable does not vary and is not naturally 
developed in children (ibid).  
 
Ruddick sees ‘training’ as an active task which mothers engage in with their children 
using a mixture of strategies which may include being “persuasive, manipulative, 
educative, abusive, or respectful” (ibid). Underpinning a mother’s training of her 
children is her own conscience, which she uses to identify, question and reflect on in 
her endeavours to discipline and guide her children in acceptable social behaviour. In 
her reflections on her training of children a mother faces many challenges. She has to 
consider what acceptable behaviour is, as it varies between and within society. Also, 
there may be contradictions between her own values and that of society (Ruddick 
1989: 105-109). Mothers have to learn when to show sympathy and when to show 
self-control. Ruddick maintains that in order not to submit completely to the 
judgement of others and to relinquish their authority, values and their children’s 
natural moral values, mothers try to act authentically. To do this, mothers make 
reflective judgements on whether to act against or comply with dominant values and 
in this way they also become models for their children (Ruddick 1989: 116-117).  
 
Societal expectations regarding the moral development of children are often seen as 
the responsibility of mothers (Hardyment in Phoenix and Woollett 1991; Magwaza 
2003). Mothers are often blamed when their children behave in socially unacceptable 
ways, because as Ruddick argues, they live in the “Good Mother’s shadow” 
(Ruddick 1989: 31).  However, Ruddick argues that mothers’ real power to make and 
implement decisions about their children is often undermined by other people, 






One of the difficulties that confronts any effort to engage Ruddick’s notion of 
training in an empirically informed way, is the fact that she speaks of children in 




have no bearing on them or their mothers’ capacity to influence them. In other 
words, she constructs the challenges of training in a way that is unable to address the 
significance of competing influences and types of training that other people and 
institutions can have on children’s demands and maternal practice at different stages 
of their development.  
 
7.2.3.1. Mothers’ ‘training’ and social deviance 
In South Africa most mothers do their ‘training’ of children in material 
circumstances of want and poverty, socially disrupted relations and family and 
community breakdown. Children often do behave in socially acceptable ways. But 
some children resort to behaviour that generally albeit not always locally is 
considered to be socially unacceptable. Such behaviour includes committing crimes, 
being violent and aggressive, abusing drugs and alcohol, not attending school, 
running away from home and living on the street. While socially acceptable 
behaviour and socially deviant behaviour in children may or may not be directly 
attributed to maternal training, the fact is little discursive or empirical evidence exists 
that might help us understand just how maternal training is working. Without this 
kind of evidence it becomes difficult to explore the distinctive kind of maternal 





This said, a range of studies carried out by advocacy groups which monitor 
children’s rights through assessing the status of children in South Africa: the Child 
Health Policy Institute,  the Children’s Institute, the Child Justice Institute, the 
Children’s Justice Alliance and the Institute for Security Studies provide a weak and 
speculative but potentially relevant starting point to begin to consider the issue. 
Especially important are studies that look at socially deviant behaviour in children, 
like running away from home and living on the street, violence, substance abuse, 
truancy, or crime and gangsterism. These children are identified as being vulnerable 
and in need of special care and protection, and although they make no specific 




behaviour, its absence, lack or limited influence may be implicit in their explanations 
of socially deviant behaviour in children. Alternatively, in identifying influences and 
conditions which cause socially unacceptable behaviour, these studies also indirectly 
point to necessary factors which promote behaviour in children that is socially 
acceptable. Similarly, state policies and programmes articulate a discourse that 
emphasises the need for and importance of moral training for social acceptability in 
children. What follows is an attempt to understand the pertinence of Ruddick’s 
arguments on training through some examples of social deviance in children as well 
as the policy discourses which highlight the need for moral training in children.  
 
 
7.2.3.2. Child criminals 
Criminal behaviour in children is a form of socially unacceptable behaviour which 
can be construed as exemplifying the consequence of the lack of training for social 
acceptability in children. In South Africa some 1703 children under 18 years of age 
were reported to be in detention and of these only 3 were under 14 years of age 
(Department of Correctional Services 2008). Whether this number is high or low 
depends on the perspective from which the problem is considered. Although the 
number is large, it represents just a fraction of the population of children in South 
Africa, and suggests that few children are engaged in socially deviant criminal 
activity that ends up in them being held in detention. Alternatively, it could be read 
to suggest that most children in South Africa are behaving in socially acceptable 
ways and that their need for training is being met in some way, more or less. That 
significantly more adolescent children are involved in socially unacceptable 
behaviour than younger children, also could imply that as children get older the 
influence of maternal practice competes with other social influences, peers, school 





Children involved in criminal activity give a range of reasons for their involvement 




crimes, including poverty in families, parenting and care of children, and (poor) 
family relationships (Frank 2006:15). These responses support Ruddick’s view that 
the family and parental training within the home are important factors that shape the 
making of socially acceptable behaviour in children and that an absence of this 
training within the home has a negative impact on them. But there are additional 
factors that children attribute their criminal behaviour to, including peer pressure, 
drug and alcohol use and the influence of gangs (Frank 2006:15-16, Giese et al 2003, 
Leoschut and Burton 2006). These are influences that are external to the mother-
child dyad, and as Ruddick points out, they often challenge maternal training, 
perhaps ever more so as children get older and are exposed to more influences 
outside the home. And then there is the matter of individual agency. These children 
say they commit crimes without coercion from adults and act on their own volition 
based on their environment and personal circumstances (Frank 2005:18). In other 
words, they confirm Ruddick’s other claim that mothers’ effectiveness in training is 
limited by children themselves, who are by nature unpredictable and have 
independent wills (1989:110).  
 
At the same time, the idea that children can behave criminally, even if such 
behaviour may be more the exception than the rule, challenges Ruddick’s naturalist 
assumption that children are intrinsically hospitable and good (p.103) and suggests 
that they are influenced in their behaviour by social factors as much as by free will. 
 
7.2.3.3. Street children 
Another example perhaps of the ‘failure’ of maternal training is where children run 
away from home and live on the streets. In South Africa there are more than 10,000 
children living on the streets (Street-wise 2008, Giese et al 2003). Once again while 
these numbers are cause for concern, they also indicate that children living on the 
street is not a generalised phenomena. Among the combination of macro social and 







problems in family life, abuse and neglect, which point to the importance of training 
in the home.    
 
7.2.3.4. School violence 
When children go to school, maternal authority is handed over to others and both 
children and mothers have to ‘submit’ to the authority and training of the teachers, 
principal and school authorities as well as other children. Sometimes the training and 
disciplinary measures employed there may contradict those of maternal training as 
children come under the moral influences of others in the community and the school 
(Ruddick 1989: 108-111). Sometime maternal training may be violated or subverted.  
 
Violence perpetrated by children in school can be seen as an example of maternal 
training that doesn’t always hold or endure.  In South Africa, acts of violence occur 
in the schooling context at many schools across the country. Violent acts are 
perpetrated by some learners against their fellow learners, by some educators against 
learners, by some learners against educators and by some external persons against 
both learners and educators (South African Human Rights Commision [SAHRC] 
2006). This violence takes many forms including bullying, gender-based violence, 
accidental violence, discrimination and violence, sexual violence and harassment, 
physical violence and psychological violence. The report suggests that although 
violence previously occurred in schools, they believe that learners are increasingly 
more willing and able to employ physically aggressive methods to resolve conflict 
using knives and handguns, which appear to be more readily available than in the 





Factors in both the school environment and communities have been identified as 
contributing to school-based violence (SAHRC 2006). These include poverty, 
gangsterism, drug and alcohol abuse, the social de-sensitisation of youth to violence 
(ibid) and especially violence in the home. It is an established fact that learners who 




school (ibid), pointing to the importance of Ruddick’s contention that training within 
the home influences socially acceptable behaviour at school. At the same time, 
factors within the school that have been identified as contributing to school violence 
relate to the models of discipline employed in schools, unclear management roles, 
unattractive school environments and educators’ misconceptions with regard to the 
human rights of learners (ibid) – none of which directly or indirectly relate to 
maternal training.  
 
Generally, these examples, suggest that there is social deviance among South African 
children. Depending on how it is defined, it is a problem, although not necessarily on 
a scale that can be generalised to all children, or all children of a particular age. In 
fact, the numbers suggest that it is more of an exception than the rule, thereby 
suggesting that maternal training is going on and is working, albeit not as robustly as 
Ruddick and others would hope. Although the studies do not show the workings of 
maternal training specifically, they do point to the family home environment (the 
absence of parental care, parental abuse of drugs and alcohol and parental violence) 
as being an important contributing factor to social deviance in children, confirming 
Ruddick’s view of the importance of maternal training (which can be done by either 
mothers or fathers) in ensuring children’s need for social acceptability. But as 
pointed out earlier on in this chapter protection of children and childcare in South 
Africa is primarily done by women and mothers. 
 
7.2.3.5 Institutional discourse on moral training of children  
Turning to institutional policy, we find a discourse in the WPSW (1997) that 
resonates closely with Ruddick’s views on the importance of family based/maternal 
training for social acceptability in children. The White Paper explicitly states that the 
demands for protection, nurturance as well as the moral training of vulnerable 




“The well-being of children depends on the ability of families to function 




secure family that can ensure their survival, development, protection and 
participation in family and social life. Not only do families give their members a 
sense of belonging, they are also responsible for imparting values and life skills. 
Families create security; they set limits on behaviour; and together with the 
spiritual foundation they provide, instil notions of discipline. All these factors are 
essential for the healthy development of the family and of any society” (p. 39).  
 
Among the children identified by the White Paper (1997) as especially vulnerable, 
are those who are socially deviant, who live on the streets and who abuse substance. 
(p.40-41). The WPSW also raises concerns about an increase in child and youth 
crime, about “... delinquency, crime … and violence” (Department of Welfare 
1997:47,59) that once again is attributed to poverty and social instability.  Here the 
discourse emphasises the influence of structural factors as impacting negatively on 
the family and thus increasing women and children’s vulnerability to socially deviant 
behaviour. These, in turn, generate adverse family conditions which not only create 
vulnerability for women and children, but which also, by inference, imply weak, 
poor or absent training. 
 
Yet despite identifying women as structurally vulnerable, and the family as being 
adversely affected by poverty and inequality, the discourse still charges the family 
(read women) with primary responsibility for meeting most of the needs of children, 
including their moral development. To wit, 
“The Government is committed to giving the highest priority to the promotion 
of family life, and to the survival, protection and development of all South 
Africa’s children” (p.41). 
  
This emphasis on the family (and women) underpins the principles which guide 




“Children and juveniles are always in some way connected to their family or 




capacity of such families and communities to provide support and care will be 
promoted” (p. 60) [and] ...“the involvement of parents and communities in 
efforts to prevent the re-commitment of offences” (p. 61). 
 
Another example of the recognition of the need for training in children is the White 
Paper on Education and Training (Department of Education 1995) which regards 
parents or guardians as being primarily responsible for the education of their 
children. The chapter on Values and Principles of Education and Training Policy, 
while recognising the external challenges faced by most families, articulates a 
discourse which puts families (especially mothers) as the repository of care of young 
children: 
“Since countless South African families are fragmented by such factors as 
 past unjust laws, migratory labour practices, and marital breakdown, and 
handicapped by illiteracy from participating fully in the education of their 
children, the state has an obligation to provide advice and counselling on 
education services by all practicable means, and render or support 
appropriate care and educational services for parents, especially mothers, 
and young children within the community.” 
 
This thread continues in the Education White Paper 5: Early Childhood Education 
(Department of Education 2001:12-13) which articulates a discourse on the 
importance of moral training in children in which parents and care givers are active, 
even central players.  
“The early years of a child’s life are critical for the development of the potential 
of the human being, and the first seven years are characterised by the rapid 
development of the physical, emotional, intellectual, social and moral character 





Generally, Ruddick’s emphasis on children’s need for training in social acceptability 




institutional policy discourse where primary emphasis is placed on the family, and its 
role in the social, emotional and moral development of children. This holds true 
despite the recognition of constraining influences of poverty on the family’s ability 
to train children. 
 
7.3. Discussion and conclusion 
 
What this chapter has shown is that both empirically and in terms of institutional 
discourse, there is fairly strong concurrence with Ruddick’s notion of maternal 
practice - some of the empirical evidence and institutional discourse shows this more 
clearly than others. Mothers are primarily involved in protecting their children in 
South Africa, and they do respond to children’s needs, albeit within the constraints 
and opportunities of their varied socio-economic contexts. Mothers also engage in 
other types of work but still assume primary responsibility for the protection of their 
children. Maternal practice as a response to children’s needs in South Africa happens 
within the context of the social, economic and cultural resources available to 
mothers. People act on the basis of resources available to them, such as “money, 
influence, expertise, competence and knowledge where access to these resources is 
determined by social relations and power processes of social, economic and political 
nature” (Sevenhuijsen 1998: 23).  
 
Even though children are raised in diverse family and kin relationships – the 
extended family, single mother households, non biological households – their need 
for protection is responded to by women, even though they might not be their 
biological mothers. Mothering practice happens in the context of different 
relationships and not only in a dyadic relationship of mother to children. Household 
structure, history, politics, economics and socio-cultural factors all influence the 
nature and form of maternal protection of children, but for all that, mothering 








However, institutional discourse and programme practice position women as 
providers of care and children as vulnerable and in need of care. They resonate with 
Ruddick’s conceptions of the importance of children’s needs for protection, 
emotional, intellectual and moral development and the family as the best means to 
meet this need. The fixing of the mother/family- child relationship in Ruddick’s 
claims and the institutional discourse follows a pattern which prioritises children 
over their mothers or care givers.  
 
In South Africa women are also mainly responsible for nurturing the emotional and 
intellectual development in children by spending more time than men on activities 
such as informal teaching and training and taking them to schools or sports lessons 
(Budlender 2001). However, as with protection and preservative love, the varying 
social and economic locations establish different conditions under which the demand 
for emotional and intellectual growth is met by mothers. Childcare responsibilities 
are mainly taken up by women who are not necessarily biological mothers of the 
children no matter what their socio-economic status. Both these findings confirm 
Ruddick’s observations about the historical and cultural variability of mothers’ 
responses to this demand. The poor socio-economic status of most women in South 
Africa also shows that women are poorly equipped to meet foster growth in children 





The institutional discourse and practices of fostering growth in children in the trade 
union organisation (COSATU), where working men and women articulate their 
expectations and demands, also resonates with Ruddick’s notion that children need 
protection and nurturance. However, unlike Ruddick they expect these needs to also 
be met institutionally in pre-school facilities and not simply within the family by the 
mother only. Emphasis is on shifting the burden of care of children away from 
women alone and the private domain, in an attempt to remove the economic 




understanding of the need for nurturing emotional and intellectual growth in children 
is evident in COSATU policy and campaigns around maternal and paternal rights 
and childcare. The discourse on childcare within COSATU is gender neutral and 
talks of parental work and differs from Ruddick’s insistence on retaining the 
conceptual term ‘maternal’ rather than ‘care work’ for children. However, some 
demands are made by COSATU which specifically relate to women and the demands 
of birthing and here they speak of maternity, which is in a similar vein to Ruddick’s 
conceptual distinction between birthing labour and mothering. 
 
State legislation and policies also respond to the demand for fostering growth in 
children. The discourse of the White Paper on Social Welfare (1997) argues a 
normative preference for ‘the family’ in meeting these needs and places women at 
the centre of childcare and children’s development. The State’s discourse points to 
early childhood development as being especially important to children’s 
development and this is articulated through the State’s Department of Education 
policies and programmes on early childhood development. Although state policy and 
discourse concur with Ruddick on the importance of fostering growth in children, 
they disagree in some ways about who can or should be responsible for meeting 
these demands eg: child care institutions, families, parents and/or mothers. However, 
what is evident in practice is that neither mothers nor institutions can adequately 





For Ruddick the demand for training of children is driven by social groups to which 
mothers belong. In South Africa mothers train their children for social acceptability 
in conditions of poverty, socially disrupted family and community relations. Children 
do behave in the main in socially acceptable ways but some do resort to socially 
deviant behaviour such as criminal behaviour, running away from home and living 
on the street, violence, substance abuse and truancy. In South Africa only a minority 
of children are reported to be involved in criminal activities and this would seem to 




who do commit crime were factors related to the home and this seems to supports 
Ruddick’s view of the importance of family and parental training for children’s 
social acceptability. Several other factors such as drug and alcohol use, peer pressure 
and gangs are also cited, which Ruddick also alludes to in claiming that often other 
peoples’ values challenge maternal training. But these child criminals have also 
stated that they act out of their own volition which confirms Ruddick’s claim that 
children have independent wills and are unpredictable which can limit the 
effectiveness of mothers’ training. However, criminal behaviour in children also 
challenges Ruddick’s notion that children are intrinsically good.  
 
Street children may be seen as a ‘failure’ in their training by parents. However, a 
range of factors; poverty, neglect, abuse, breakdown in family are all reasons for 
their running away from home which does include a lack of maternal training as 
well. 
 
Lastly, school violence is an indication of maternal training not enduring outside the 
home. Violence is being committed by learners in some schools and is caused by 
several factors within the school, in the home and in the community. 
 
Generally all these examples of social deviance in children are not the norm and 
would seem to indicate that there is some measure of success in respect to the 
training of children for social acceptability. Although several factors are implicated 
in social deviance in children, the studies do show the importance of the home 
environment for socially acceptable behaviour in children. This supports Ruddick’s 






Institutional policy discourse in the WPSW (1997) and the Education White Paper 5 
(2001) all also emphasise the importance of the family’s role in meeting the social, 




children’s growth, protection and training appear to assume a scientific universal 
validity. But it raises the question as to what counts as moral development, growth 
and protection. Gilligan (1982) presented a critique of the gendered terms used in 
traditional theories of children’s moral development which she argues define the 
goals of this development in masculinist terms. Woodhead (1990) also provided an 
analysis of the varied ways in which the concept ‘need’ is used and the value 
judgements inherent in them. 
 
It is difficult to say from the evidence provided whether maternal demands are child 
driven or driven by instincts or culture or institutional discourse or ideology. It is also 
difficult to directly read off maternal thinking from their practice or maternal 
motivations from mothering experiences. As Frazer and Lacey (1993:17) in 
Sevenjuhuisen (1998: 21) argue, human action is socially organised. Studies on 
women’s practice, meanings and narratives of motherhood point to their varied social 
positions and how this influences their mothering practices. Women’s agency with 
regard to mothering is shaped by their different locations. Caring is conceived of as a 
form of action where actors firstly perceive and interpret needs and then act on them 
where the interpretation and action varies in terms of the prevailing norms as well as 
the private and social context of the actors (Sevenhuijsen 1998: 22). She (ibid) 
argues that Ruddick’s notion of care and maternal thinking is really a notion of good 




















The conceptual power of maternal essence as the marker of 
gender difference 
 
“For nearly two centuries at least, the most powerful justifications of women’s 
exclusion from full participation in public life and our standing in a dependent 
relation to men have appealed to women’s unique role as mothers. The 
requirements of mothering, moreover, have often operated as a real constraint on 
the possibilities for individual women to work outside the home, acquire 
education, and engage in leisure activities and countless other possibilities for 
self-development that many men take for granted. Women’s connection to 
mothering thus has operated and continues to operate as an important 
ideological and material source of our inequality” Young (1990:37). 
 
What does this study say about using maternal essence as a framework to explain 
gender difference? I have tried to address this question by exploring the various 
views of gender essentialism conceptually, theoretically, empirically and 
discursively. In this chapter I draw together the commonalities between the 
discussions in all six chapters in addressing this question and point out some of the 
differences and similarities in the arguments. The conclusions in this chapter are set 
against the conceptual underpinnings spelt out in the introduction to this thesis. This 
conceptual framework presented the interface between gender, essentialism, gender 








Sayer (1997: 456) argues that in philosophy “essentialism is generally taken to be the 
doctrine that objects have certain essential properties which make them one kind of 
thing rather than any other.” Philosophical understandings of essences argue that 
they are what distinguish objects from each other and they are necessary for specific 
behaviours or outcomes. For a group of people to have a common essence it has to be 
a shared attribute. Essentialism also implies that objects have eternal and unchanging 
characteristics and that they are discrete and only externally related to one another, 
rather than seeing phenomena as internally and externally related and not 
determined. These underlying essences define what makes something what it is. 
Essentialism also tries to show how fixed properties deterministically produce fixed 
and uniform outcomes. Essentialism can be biological, social or discursive. 
Essentialist explanations reduce or read off the behaviour of objects to one of its 
constituents. The traditional Aristotelean (1925) notion of an essence sees the 
essence as the most irreducible, unchanging and constitutive property of a person or 
thing which defines the existence of an object and makes it be the thing it is. It is the 
single base which defines and explains all other characteristics of an object. 
 
The Lockean (1856) essentialist view presents another conception of essences. It 
divides essences into real and nominal essences, where real essences, linked to the 
Aristotelian conception cause and explain the observable properties which are 
nominal. A nominal essence is something that is used to classify and categorise and 
label things. Real essences need to be discovered through empirical observation. Fuss 
(1998) argues that constructionism refers to nominal essences and essentialism to 
real essences. 
 
Essentialist thinking assumes that by reducing the difference between men and 
women to an ‘essence’ we would be able to explain and understand what they can 
and cannot do in terms of their consciousness, relations, capacities and experiences. 







nature to an ‘essence,’ a single cause/base, a crucial property, which would then 
account for all aspects of their lives. 
 
The essentialist theorists examined in this study, de Beauvoir (1972), Firestone 
(1970), Chodorow (1978/1989/1994/1999) and Ruddick (1989,) all commonly 
identify gender difference between men and women as residing in an essence – 
maternal essence. For them maternal essence is a biological essence of reproductive 
functioning, a psychological essence of emotional drives and cognitive capacities, 
and/ or a social essence of mothering.  
 
8.1. Biological essentialism: Simone de Beauvoir and Shulamith 
Firestone 
 
De Beauvoir and Firestone can be characterised as biological essentialists because 
they argue that it is the intrinsic properties of women’s reproductive bodies which 
distinguish women from men. These properties are also the substratum, the base 
which accounts for the differences between men’s and women’s psyches, relations 
and experiences. For them women’s reproductive biology causes the social 
organisation of family to be an institution with women dependent on men, children 
dependent on adults, and women mainly caring for children. Women’s reproductive 
biology determines their individual consciousness, social behaviour and their social 
identity. Conceptually they use women’s reproductive biology as a maternal essence 
in the Aristotelian (1925) tradition and with regard to Lockean (1856) notions of 
‘real’ essence way. De Beauvoir and Firestone both look to the material body as the 
essence to explain gender differences because of the theoretical approaches they 
employ. For de Beauvoir the explanation lies in existential phenomenology where 
existence and consciousness is determined by the lived body and for Firestone it is 
historical materialism which looks to material explanations for social phenomena 
which includes the material body and material social relations. It is the material base 







of labour. Women’s individual biological characteristics lead to the social structuring 
of relations within the family. Bodies and social relations are separate. The social 
institution of the family is created because of biology. And for Firestone, women’s 
childbearing and childrearing roles lie at the heart of women’s gender oppression and 
difference. Woman’s reproductive functions are the point of origin, a first cause of 
gender difference and inequality. The logic of both of their explanations leads them 
to propose the use of reproductive technology by individual women to 
overcome/transcend the constraints of their reproductive bodies in order to become 
active subjects like men.  
 
De Beauvoir’s and Firestone’s biological essentialist explanations of gender 
differences are useful because they draw our attention to the reproductive body as a 
distinguishing characteristic between men and women. A woman’s capacity to 
reproduce is an essential capacity and the focus of these theorists on a woman’s 
reproductive body also shows that it is materially implicated in women’s different 
experiences and behaviour. Further they suggest that a woman’s material 
reproductive body may influence what women can and cannot do.  
 
Connell (1987:77) argues that the body is implicated in the processes of gender as it 
is involved in all kinds of social practices which can sometimes exaggerate, deny, 
mythologize or complicate biological differences. He argues that the body is also 
experienced in various ways in terms of pain, pleasure, aging and birth. The 
empirical evidence examined in this study points to gendered experiences of the 
body. Features of women’s biology do mean that women’s needs are different to 
those of men. The evidence also shows that women’s reproductive function does give 
rise to specific needs, such as maternity leave and access for nursing babies in the 





However, there are several things which de Beauvoir’s and Firestone’s biological 




functions of women’s bodies do not directly determine women’s consciousness, 
experiences and social relations. What women can and cannot do and what they 
experience with regard to their biological capacities is mediated by social, economic 
and historical factors and is socially constructed. The evidence shows that the fact 
that women assume primary responsibility for mothering within families is as much a 
factor of external social conditions as it is a factor of their biological capacity to 
reproduce children.  
 
The use of contraceptives controlled by women does not degender the social 
relations of caring within the family. Female controlled contraceptives do offer 
women the opportunity to decide on how they will regulate their fertility in terms of 
the timing and frequency of child bearing but this regulation does not mean that their 
desire to bear and mother children is overcome. Social and psychological factors 
influence women’s behaviour and therefore gender differences cannot be simply read 
off sexual relations and neither do cultural patterns simply ‘express’ bodily 
difference. Connell (2002:47) argues that bodies have agency and bodies are socially 
constructed such that it is not possible to separate the biological and social analysis 
and reduce the one to the other where the body is conceived of as a machine. Bodies 
are connected through social practices and social practices are connected by bodies; 
they are both objects and agents. They are also transformed by social practices. The 
evidence points to the connections between women’s bodies and the practice of 
institutions. Technology itself is a product of social practices and is mediated by 
social relations. It creates the possibility to regulate or overcome reproductive 
functioning implying that biology is not fixed. However, it is not sufficient in and of 





Another factor which mediates women’s biological capacities is the discourse around 
it. Ways of seeing and accounting for gender difference act to challenge or entrench 
certain conceptions. The discourse in the social policies, legislation and programmes 




Education White Paper 5 on Early Childhood Development (2001), Procedural 
Manual for Grants Administration (2003) and The Social Assistance Acts (1992 & 
2004), construe women’s identity and behaviour as tied to their reproductive 
biological capacities and childrearing capacities. Post structuralist and postmodern 
approaches argue that behaviour and identity are also constituted discursively and 
can become objectified in practice through institutions. As is evident in this study, 
childbearing involves more than having the biological powers to do so. It is 
influenced by individual internal micro interpretive factors as well as external macro 
social structural and discursive factors. 
 
The evidence shows that the reproductive arena is contingent and not pre-determined 
and fixed by reproductive capacities but is activated by different internal and external 
factors which are context dependent. This challenges the discrete divisions of 
Cartesian dualism between body and mind and between biological and socio-cultural 
phenomena. Butler (1993:66-7) and Grosz (1995:210) argue that there are no clear 
boundaries that divide the materiality of the body from cultural interpretations of it. 
 
8.2. Psychic essentialism and social essentialism: Nancy Chodorow 
and Sara Ruddick 
 
In contrast to De Beauvoir (1972) and Firestone (1970), Chodorow (1978) argues 
that behavioural dispositions and capacities for mothering are not produced by 
women’s reproductive biology but by intrapsychic structures developed in girls 
through women’s social activity of mothering children. She argues that men and 
women, girls and boys unconsciously develop different relational capacities and 
gender identities through the sexual division of labour in which women, not men, 
mother. In turn this division of labour reproduces in boys and girls different 
psychological characteristics. Chodorow uses connectedness and differentiation in a 








For Chodorow, the sexual division of labour within the family in which women 
mother and men don’t is the consequence of differential emotional identification 
drives that are part of unconscious psychological processes which men and women 
develop as children. For her women’s mothering directly produces distinctly 
gendered personalities in men and women where women are unconsciously driven to 
seek attachments with other people for gratification, while men are driven to seek 
separation from others. These unconscious drives reproduce the sexual division of 
labour. Through these processes of gender identification children learn what it is to 
be male and female and their primary definition of self is implicated in their gender 
identity.  
 
Chodorow argues that women’s childhood experiences give rise to an essentially 
caring and compassionate subjectivity, concerned with the needs of others (Grosz 
1995). She employs psychoanalysis, specifically object relations theory, to explain 
the development of gender differences. This approach leads her to focus on subject, 
subjectivity, internal unconscious processes, desires, the psyche and object relations 
to explain gender difference. Object relations theory places the mother-infant 
relationship at the centre of psychological development. The emphasis is on the 
importance of gender difference and its social origins as well as the mother-daughter 
relationship as the site of the internalisation of women’s oppression. The logic of her 
argument leads her to propose shared parenting as the way to transform the 





Her argument is essentialist because it identifies women’s mothering and specifically 
psychological attributes as the common gender difference which all women share. 
Chodorow essentialises family formation, the social experiences of women as well as 
their identity and attributes when she attributes common features to all families and 
all women. Consciousness and subjectivity are located in this fixed human activity 
which produces a fixed gender identity. However, her notion of maternal 




and Firestone as she uses a Lockean nominal essence when she characterises gender 
difference with the activity of women mothering. The ‘real essence’ in her 
explanation lies in the different psychological drives and attributes which boys and 
girls develop. Chodorow’s notion of essentialism is also multi-dimensional. Her 
characterisation of mothering can also be seen as having a ‘generative property’ vis a 
vis Sayer’s (1997) definition of essences which is something that primarily 
determines what an object can and cannot do. The activity of mothering can also be 
characterised as having a social essence (Alsop et al 2002) in that all women share 
characteristics as a consequence of adoption of the same social role. Chodorow also 
points to a psychic essentialism and claims of common, shared psychological 
characteristics, such as empathy and nurturing, that distinguish women from men 
(Grosz 1994).  
 
Chodorow’s psychic essentialism is useful particularly because it shifts the analysis 
of gender difference away from social, economic, political and legal as well as 
biological constraints to women’s social experiences as mothers, daughters and 
childrearers in the constructions of their subjectivity. She turns our attention to 
women’s inner subjective experiences and women’s biography in the formation of 
gender identity. Her characterisation and explanation of gendered subjectivity 
derives from a modernist Cartesian (1968) epistemology which holds the body and 
mind apart. She also emphasises the formation of gendered subjectivity within the 
micro social context of the family. From the available empirical evidence, it is 
evident that women are distinguished from men by women’s primary involvement in 
childcare activities and mothering experiences. Women are the primary people 
engaged in childcare activities that nurture and protect and train children. They 
sometimes can also be seen to consciously claim their identity as mothers. The 
evidence also shows that men are mostly absent from households and if they are 








This said, Chodorow draws a direct unmediated causal link between women’s social 
experiences as mothers and the individual psyche, and between individual psyches 
and their social experience of mothering. For her the subject is locked into a 
deterministic relationship between the activity of mothering and gendered 
personalities – the causal relationship between the psyche and social relations are 
tightly drawn. Children’s gender identities are fixed in individual personalities and 
experiences, determined by and reduced to their experiences of being mothered by 
women. The gendered personalities of men and women are directly read off from 
their childhood experiences of being mothered by women. Mothering is in turn read 
off individual personalities, and social relations are read off psychic characteristics. 
Because Chodorow’s  psychic essentialist account of gender difference views 
subjectivity as stable and fixed and constituted by individuals it is unable to explain 
the variable and shifting nature of mothering experiences and their social 
constitution. The evidence shows that childcare happens in different kinds of family 
formations. Childcare also happens in different social, economic and cultural 
contexts which has implications for the form and quality of mothering. Mothering 
practice cannot therefore be reduced to a universal practice or set of social 
experiences. By privileging mothering in the acquisition of gendered subjectivity 
Chodorow makes all other processes through which subjectivity is constituted 
subordinate to this primary structuring and the gender inequality to which it gives 
rise. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that external social influences also constitute women’s 
subjectivity, making the character of women’s attachments to children local, 
contingent and variable rather than fixed. Descartes (1968) argued that subjectivity 
can be constituted socially and the mind is not separate from the external world as 
argued. Social relations between men and women also affect women’s mothering 
activities. In addition men’s relation to women is one of a balance of power and 








Men’s and women’s relation to children and each other and functions of the family 
can also be constituted and essentialised discursively. Post structuralists argue that 
language is implicated centrally in the construction of men and women, that is, 
individual subjectivity is also constituted in language. This study shows that the 
discourse on women in State social policies constructs women as being best placed to 
care for children. Men are constructed as the economic providers for children, or as 
defaulters of financial support. The family is represented as a functional unit 
responsible for the care of children, implying that mainly women will be the care-
givers within the family. Gendered discourses can be translated into institutional 
practices and provisions which then affect what men and women can and can’t do 
and legitimise certain practices. Subjectivity then is discursively constituted through 
macro institutional structures. However, men and women can also accomplish 
mothering through their individual agency and repeated acts of mothering. The 
evidence reflects the individual micro level performance and the macro institutional 





Chodorow’s theory points us to the individual female subject and her experiences 
within the family and social relations. However her explanation does not include the 
importance of external macro structural forces in constituting women and men’s 
subjectivity, as in discourse, other relations /social structures and power, ideology 
which renders the personalities of men and women unstable, variable and historical. 
By rooting gender oppression and personality formation in the mother-daughter 
relationship she implies that blame rests with mothers for women’s oppression and 
excludes an analysis of the power relations which privilege male domination. Her 
analysis fails to dialectically connect psychic structures within the individual with 
macro social structures in the construction of subjectivities and the constitution of 
desire. Mothers’ psychic experiences are viewed as separate from and are abstracted 
out of external social influences. Although Chodorow identifies the link between 
mothering and individual psyche as the reason for women assuming primary 




on the assumption that children form attachments and identify with same sex parents 
in developing a sense of self and gender identity where the only observable 
difference that children can make between mothers and fathers are physical 
biological differences. 
She proposes shared parenting to transform gendered mothering and also to revalue 
mothering activity. In so doing social factors which give rise to women mainly 
mothering remain. They are not part of her solution largely because of her 
essentialist notions of gender difference. This is so despite the evidence that points to 
social and discursive influences which structure parenting arrangements. These 
influences lie outside the private sphere of the family and the individual. 
 
Turning to Ruddick, like de Beauvoir, Firestone and Chodorow, Ruddick sees gender 
subjectivity as also residing in individual attributes and characteristics of women. 
However, unlike de Beauvoir and Firestone’s contention that women’s bodies are the 
determinant of their psychological characteristics and behaviours, Ruddick and 
Chodorow attribute gendered psyches and cognitive attributes to the social activity of 
mothering. While de Beauvoir argues that women lack the rational consciousness 
which men have because of the trap of their biological bodies, Ruddick celebrates 
women’s ‘practical consciousness’ (Wittgenstein 1980) as something positively 
different from the theoretical rational consciousness attributed to men. For Ruddick 
certain maternal virtues, ideals and cognitive capacities arise and are developed in 
the practice of mothering which she argues can be used to develop a politics of peace 
for humanity. Like Chodorow, Ruddick identifies specific valued maternal attributes 
which emerge from women’s mothering interactions and practices with children. 
These maternal attributes are preservative love, nurturance and conscientiousness. 
However, unlike Chodorow, she argues that these capacities and attributes in women 
emerge as the product of conscious reflections by women on their mothering practice 
rather than as the product of unconscious emotional drives. For Ruddick it is 







that generate a distinctive kind of maternal thinking which consists of intellectual 
capacities, judgements and metaphysical attitudes and values.  
 
Ruddick’s turn to focus on the practice and actions of women to account for gender 
difference, arises from the theoretical frameworks that underpin her ideas. These are 
a combination of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and a social action 
perspective. All these frameworks focus on the individual, either his or her identity, 
consciousness, social action and/or subjectivity. Epistemologically the social action 
perspective and interpretive paradigms underpin Ruddick’s theoretical approach. 
Within this framework, behaviour is explained as individual intentional actions in 
which meanings are bestowed on humans. The actions of individuals are perceived as 
aligned to the actions of those of others. The focus is on the activities taking place 
between people and the nature of the interactions. Actions are explained in terms of 
the meanings actors give to these interactions through language. These meanings are 
revised and processed through an interpretive process that individuals use to deal 
with the signs each encounters. In the context of Ruddick’s argument the signs 
encountered by women are received from the demands made by children on them. 
Language mediates the meanings and interpretations of the practical interests created 
through human interactions. Ruddick therefore defines a mother as one whose work 
is responding to the basic demands that all children present; preservation, nurturing 
growth and training for social responsibility. Fathers’ roles are seen by her as tied 





De Beauvoir also focuses on consciousness and subjectivity because, like Ruddick, 
she includes a phenomenological approach which is part of the interpretive paradigm 
to her existential explanation of gender difference. Ruddick specifically uses the 
ideas of Wittengenstein (1975/1980), Winch (1952) and Habermas (1972) in her 
explanation of maternal thinking and practice. Like these theorists she also assumes 
that thinking and ways of knowing arise from, and are shaped by the practices in 




defined by the aims and goals of the practices which are directed at meeting certain 
demands.  
 
Ruddick’s characterisation of mothering practice and thinking and children’s 
demands is essentialist because she identifies a fixed set of key demands which all 
children universally make and these demands are constitutive of a universal fixed 
type of maternal thinking and practice in mothers. In so doing maternal thinking is 
directly read off maternal practice which is in turn directly read off children’s 
demands. This tight fit between mother’s actions and children’s demands precludes 
the impact of other people and other social and discursive influences on the actions 
of mothers and the demands children make.  
 
The cognitive attitudes she describes as those mothers display in response to 
children’s demands for preservation are seen by Ruddick as the appropriate 
responses that all women seem to possess apriori and universally rather than 
contingently. Similarly Ruddick’s characterisation of the maternal attitudes of 
fostering growth in children also assumes that children have very specific needs and 
natures and that mothers can recognise these needs and are capable of and able to 
meet these demands. She also argues that children’s and women’s nature are 
mainly/essentially good and that the training of children requires a recognition and 





The possibilities introduced by Ruddick’s interactionist and micro - interpretive 
perspective lie in her focus on micro social interactions between individual mothers 
and children. Unlike Firestone and de Beauvoir she does not link these interactions to 
the constitution of social relations within the institution of the family. She rather 
focuses on micro interpretive processes and shows how they constitute gendered 
thinking and feelings. Individual behaviour, thoughts and feelings are seen by 
Ruddick to occur in response to the external demands from another individual (read 




relations between mothers and children and to individual agency in mothers and to 
conscious reflections on their actions. 
 
The evidence on maternal practice does show that it is mainly women who are 
responsible for protecting children, for nurturing their emotional and intellectual 
growth while most men do not engage in these activities. It is also evident from the 
responses from child criminals that they themselves attribute their deviant behaviour 
to a lack of family and parental training. This implies recognition by children of the 
importance of their need for social acceptability and the importance of parental 
training for social acceptability. These maternal activities of protection, fostering 
growth and training for social acceptability are evident in the studies and distinguish 
women from men. The evidence also shows that these maternal actions and thinking 
take place within the constraints and opportunities of women’s varied socio-
economic contexts. Mothers’ actions towards their children are circumscribed by 
their access to resources and the nature and the form of maternal responses is 
contingent on other relationships, household structure, history and politics. It is also 
evident that women do act as active subjects who engage in conscious reflections on 






However the nature of children’s demands and maternal practice cannot be attributed 
solely to the single cause of maternal thinking. The social and individual constitution 
of children’s demands, and maternal thinking and practice, is not emphasised by 
Ruddick. Mother and child are seen to exist separately from their cultural context. 
Mothering practice and experiences is thus seen as existing prior to its social 
construction. By also characterising the work of caring for children as maternal work 
specifically, she essentialises mothering as something that is tied to women.  
Individual conscious reflections on and interpretation of children’s demands and 
their practice are not the only source of women’s behaviour, feelings and thinking. 




maternal practice is influenced by their social context, be it other people or 
institutional discourse and practices and/or culture.  
 
The studies cited in this study show that the socio-economic conditions in which 
women live influence the form and content of their maternal practices, be it how 
children are trained, how they are protected or how they are nurtured. With regard to 
the training of children, the evidence shows that the ‘training’ of children as 
characterised by Ruddick is in fact taking place, as in the main in South Africa 
children are behaving in socially acceptable ways as only a minority of children are 
seen as socially deviant. However, the studies also show that this maternal training 
happens in conditions of poverty, in socially disrupted families and situations of 
fractured community relations. However, child criminals also speak of committing 
crimes of their own volition and also because of the influence of peers and other 
people. The danger with the interactionist and interpretive explanations of mothering 
is that the individual is detached from the outside world. It is too narrowly micro-
interpretive and cannot account for the way in which external macro social structures 






Such an approach does not account for the contested nature of the meanings and 
interpretations of mothering practice, nor does it take into account power. The 
discourse in the government policy documents and legislation cited in this study 
prescribe normative forms of maternal practice and thinking and also fix a set of 
children’s demands. In the process it positions women and ‘the family’ as best suited 
to meet these demands. Childcare occurs within an already gendered world. 
However, alternative conceptions of mothering are also proposed in state policy 
discourse where social and institutional responsibility for childcare is argued for.  
Policy documents relating to working mothers and fathers  call for parental work, as 
opposed to maternal work, and in so doing  recognise mothering as a shared 




their organisations and policy documents also demand social responsibility for 
childcare as opposed to individual responsibility. Thus mothers are subject to, and 
also influence discourses which either challenge or confirm or prescribe their 
maternal practices and thinking. Children’s demands are also constituted through 
discourse and by their mother’s interactions and are not fixed or stable.  
Ruddick’s essentialist notions of mothering, while drawing attention to mothering 
experiences and attitudes from the standpoint of women, deny the variability and 
contingent nature of mothering and children’s demands. 
 
8.3. In conclusion 
 
Collectively all the four theorists which I have analysed in this study locate gender 
difference in an essence of maternity that distinguishes men from women, a feature 
that they hold responsible for women’s experiences, actions, behaviour, attributes, 
attitudes and capacities. Hekman (1999:9) has also pointed out that many feminist 
theorists commonly identify sexual difference between men and women as embodied 
in an essence of maternity.  
 
Similar to the various conceptions of gender essence, maternal essence has also been 
variously characterised either as biological reproduction, mothering activities or 
maternal psychological capacities and attributes. Crowley and Himmelweit (1992) 
argue that motherhood has always been a problem for feminism in terms of 
theorising it either as an institution which posed an obstacle and limitation to 
women’s self realisation in society or as an experience which is a resource and 
strength to women. Several systematic reviews on motherhood (Snitow 1992, Ross 
1995, and Arendell 2000) have been published which have attempted to analyse 
different conceptions and theories of motherhood and maternity, historically and 
conceptually. They have identified different definitions and conceptions of 








Snitow (1992) identifies three distinct periods along a time-line and found that the 
writings about motherhood in the 1960s and 1970s questioned motherhood as a 
destiny and saw it as a oppressive and as a constraint to gender equality. The 
influence of the ideas of de Beauvoir resonates largely in this period and Firestone’s 
(1970) text The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution was also 
published in this period. The second half of the 1970’s saw feminists exploring 
women’s actual experiences of motherhood and began to theorise the social and 
psychological meanings and implications of this experience. In this period mothers’ 
own descriptions of mothering were investigated. In this period feminists speak of 
women having a ‘different voice.’ Nancy Chodorow’s (1978) The Reproduction of 
Mothering is one of the influential books published in this period. Sara Ruddick’ 
(1980) book Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace appears in the third 
period 1980-1990 which sees a reaffirmation and celebration of motherhood. Ross 
(1995) argues that the writings in this period looked at the details of mothers’ work 
and their feelings about their children.  
 
What is common to the various theories of maternity and motherhood over the 
different historical periods is their emphasis on the significance of maternity in 
women’s lives and gender difference – be it as constraint or as valued attribute. 
Marshall (1994:104) argues that although gender essentialist theories identify 
different types of gender difference, what is common to all is the connection they 
make between the female body and the reproduction of the species. This connection 
is made even though each type of essentialism rests on different sorts of arguments 





Essentialist notions are criticised for ignoring the “relational, diverse, positional and 
shifting character” of gender (Sayer 1997:460). Sayer (1997) and Walby (1990) raise 
several key points about the concept of essentialism which the findings of this thesis 




particular social locations and in so doing marginalises and suppresses other 
differences. Walby (1990:14) argues that the weakness of grand theories of 
patriarchy is that they use a simple base-superstructure model of causal relations, 
where one causal element is specifically used to explain patriarchy. Walby (2009: 
255) argues that the problem with theories which identify one key element as the 
cause of gender inequality is that they are unable to theorise variations and changes 
in gender relations. 
 
Other authors raise important points that also bear on the finding of this thesis. Segal 
(1987) and Spelman (1988) criticise essentialist approaches to gender as reductionist. 
While Mohanty (1991) and Mirza (1997) argue that essentialist approaches to gender 
have difficulty theorising the differences between women and the intersection of 
gender with other inequalities. The vantage point from which all four theorists in this 
study explain the cause of gender difference is specifically a maternal essence 
located in individuals; their reproductive biology, unconscious psychic drives and 
emotions or conscious motivations and intentions or their activities. This maternal 
essence, like essentialists’ notions in general, is a vantage point which only offers a 
partial understanding to the complexity of experiences and human behaviour.  
 
Despite their various characterisations of this maternal essence, either as biology or 
practice or psyche, epistemologically all four theorists focus on individual men and 
women and micro social relations between men and women and/or women and 
children to explain gender differences. Their essentialist notions of gender lead them 
to all read off micro social structural formations (family) from either women’s 
biological essence or women’s psychic or social essence. Individuals are conceived 
of as discrete objects separate from the macro social structural context in which they 
exist. These conceptions run contrary to Mills’ (1970:12) ideas of the sociological 
perspective, that “The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and 







Having explored the conceptions of gender essentialism of the four theorists in 
relation to empirical studies and policy discourse and practice, I conclude that what 
is useful about their essentialist characterisation of gender difference is that it draws 
our attention to the significance of maternity for women’s individual experiences and 
identity as well as for society in general. However, the study has also shed light on 
how external macro social structures, institutions and state discourse and practices 
influence this significance of maternity for women and for society in general. The 
study therefore points to both the strengths and the weaknesses of essentialist 
notions, specifically maternal essence in explaining gender differences. It confirms 
the need for an approach that takes into account the complexity of the experiences 
and the activities of mothering and the need to take into account the historical, 
constructed and dialectical approach in analysing the interaction between individual 
mothers and their social contexts in order to explain women’s experiences, 
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